An Analysis of The Multi-Channel and Multi-phase Queuing System for The Single Trip Commuter Line

Abstrak Sarana transportasi merupakan aspek yang sangat penting bagi suatu kota, termasuk kota Tangerang. Namun sayangnya sarana transportasi di kota Tangerang masih belum memadai. Salah satu jenis transportasi yang banyak digunakan saat ini adalah kereta api commuter line. Namun akhir-akhir ini kereta api commuter line mulai mengalami berbagai masalah, seperti antrian yang semakin panjang dan waktu antrian penumpang yang semakin lama. Penelitian ini melakukan analisis sistem pelayanan di Stasiun Tangerang. Sistem antrian di stasiun Tangerang dimodelkan dan diolah dengan bantuan software Win QSB dan software simulasi ARENA. Sebanyak empat skenario dikembangkan untuk mendapatkan konfigurasi sistem layanan yang optimal menggantikan sistem existing. Penelitian ini merekomendasikan perubahan konfigurasi sistem layanan di stasiun Tangerang yang dapat menurunkan biaya sistem pelayanan. Kata kunci: antrian pembelian tiket, multi-channel, multi-phase, WinQSB, simulasi, ARENA  Abstract Transportation is an important aspect for Tangerang. The transportation system in Tangerang unfortunately are insufficient for to meet the demand. One of the mass transportation mode used recently is commuter line train, which now have some problems, such as the long queue and long queuing time passengers. This research was done in Tangerang city station. Queuing system was modelled and solved by Win QSB and ARENA software. There were four scenarios developed to get the optimal configuration for the service system in the station. This research recommended  a new service system configuration which can reduce the service system cost. Keywords: ticket purchasing queue, multi channel, multi phase, WinQSB, simulation, ARENAÂ

Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem

In this paper we have analyzed sequencing problem from both incentive and normative aspects. We have identified unique class of VCG mechanisms that ensures egalitarian equivalence and we also have shown the possibility result with identical costs lower bound in that unique class of VCG mechanisms. Sequencing game imposes a stronger restriction on the possible set of “reference position”, compared to queuing game and that, in turn results into the failure of having a feasible VCG mechanism along with egalitarian equivalence. Although we found the necessary and sufficient condition for the above mentioned unique class of egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism to satisfy identical costs lower bound when the number of participating agents is two, necessary condition for the same for more than two agents remains an open question. Lastly, we contemplate a situation where the restriction that sequencing problem imposes on “reference position” is overlooked, that is, we assume almost no restriction (except the fact that it must be positive) on reference waiting time and identify the class of VCG mechanism that is egalitarian equivalent

Incentives and justice for sequencing problems.

We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just sequencing rule that we identify are the following. It is an affine cost minimizer. It can be implemented with budget balanced rVCG mechanisms. Finally, when waiting cost and processing time are private information, we identify all generalized rVCG mechanisms that ex-post implement the just sequencing rule

Incentives and justice for sequencing problems.

We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just sequencing rule that we identify are the following. It is an affine cost minimizer. It can be implemented with budget balanced rVCG mechanisms. Finally, when waiting cost and processing time are private information, we identify all generalized rVCG mechanisms that ex-post implement the just sequencing rule

Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines

We study queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines, the novelty being that coalitions not only choose how to queue, but on how many machines. After minimizing the processing costs and machine costs, we share the proceeds of this cooperation, and study the existence of stable allocations. First, we study queueing problems, and examine how to share the total cost. We provide an upper bound and a lower bound on the cost of a machine to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core. Next, we study requeueing problems, where there is an existing queue. We examine how to share the cost savings compared to the initial situation, when optimally requeueing/changing the number of machines. Although stable allocations may not exist, we guarantee their existence when all machines are considered public goods, and we start with an initial queue in which agents with larger waiting costs are processed firs