Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem

Abstract

In this paper we have analyzed sequencing problem from both incentive and normative aspects. We have identified unique class of VCG mechanisms that ensures egalitarian equivalence and we also have shown the possibility result with identical costs lower bound in that unique class of VCG mechanisms. Sequencing game imposes a stronger restriction on the possible set of “reference position”, compared to queuing game and that, in turn results into the failure of having a feasible VCG mechanism along with egalitarian equivalence. Although we found the necessary and sufficient condition for the above mentioned unique class of egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism to satisfy identical costs lower bound when the number of participating agents is two, necessary condition for the same for more than two agents remains an open question. Lastly, we contemplate a situation where the restriction that sequencing problem imposes on “reference position” is overlooked, that is, we assume almost no restriction (except the fact that it must be positive) on reference waiting time and identify the class of VCG mechanism that is egalitarian equivalent