A neural basis for percept stabilization binocular rivalry

When the same visual input has conflicting interpretations, conscious perception can alternate spontaneously between each competing percept. Surprisingly, such bistable perception can be stabilized by intermittent stimulus removal, suggesting the existence of perceptual "memory" across interruptions in stimulation. The neural basis of such a process remains Unknown. Here, we studied binocular rivalry, one type of bistable perception, in two linked experiments in human participants. First, we showed, in a behavioral experiment using binocular rivalry between face and grating stimuli, that the stabilizing effect of stimulus removal was specific to perceptual alternations evoked by rivalry, and did not occur following physical alternations in the absence of rivalry. We then used functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure brain activity in a variable delay period Of Stimulus removal. Activity in the fusiform face area during the delay period following removal of rivalrous Stimuli was greater following face than grating perception, whereas such a difference was absent during removal of non-rivalrous Stimuli. Moreover, activity in areas of fronto-parietal regions during the delay period correlated with the degree to which individual participants tended to experience percept stabilization. Our findings Suggest that percept-related activity in specialized extrastriate visual areas help to stabilize perception during perceptual conflict, and that high-level mechanisms may determine the influence of such signals on conscious perception

A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness

Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on recently discovered long-lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against local theories, proponents of local theories cannot explain these effects away by conjecturing that subjects are phenomenally conscious of features that they cannot report. Only a strong and counterintuitive version of this claim can account for long-lasting postdictive effects. Although possible, we argue that adopting this strong version of the “overflow hypothesis” would have the effect of nullifying the weight of the evidence taken to support local theories of consciousness in the first place. We also discuss several alternative explanations that proponents of local theories could offer

Depth of interocular suppression associated with continuous flash suppression, flash suppression, and binocular rivalry

When conflicting images are presented to the corresponding regions of the two eyes, only one image may be consciously perceived. In binocular rivalry (BR), two images alternate in phenomenal visibility; even a salient image is eventually suppressed by an image of low saliency. Recently, N. Tsuchiya and C. Koch (2005) reported a technique called continuous flash suppression (CFS), extending the suppression duration more than 10-fold. Here, we investigated the depth of this prolonged form of interocular suppression as well as conventional BR and flash suppression (FS) using a probe detection task. Compared to monocular viewing condition, CFS elevated detection thresholds more than 20-fold, whereas BR did so by 3-fold. In subsequent experiments, we dissected CFS into several components. By manipulating the number and timing of flashes with respect to the probe, we found that the stronger suppression in CFS is not due to summation between BR and FS but is caused by the summation of the suppression due to multiple flashes. Our results support the view that CFS is not a stronger version of BR but is due to the accumulated suppressive effects of multiple flashes

Access to consciousness of briefly presented visual events is modulated by transcranial direct current stimulation of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

Adaptive behaviour requires the ability to process goal-relevant events at the expense of irrelevant ones. However, perception of a relevant visual event can transiently preclude access to consciousness of subsequent events — a phenomenon called attentional blink (AB). Here we investigated involvement of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in conscious access, by using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to potentiate or reduce neural excitability in the context of an AB task. In a sham-controlled experimental design, we applied between groups anodal or cathodal tDCS over the left DLPFC, and examined whether this stimulation modulated the proportion of stimuli that were consciously reported during the AB period. We found that tDCS over the left DLPFC affected the proportion of consciously perceived target stimuli. Moreover, anodal and cathodal tDCS had opposing effects, and exhibited different temporal patterns. Anodal stimulation attenuated the AB, enhancing conscious report earlier in the AB period. Cathodal stimulation accentuated the AB, reducing conscious report later in the AB period. These findings support the notion that the DLPFC plays a role in facilitating information transition from the unconscious to the conscious stage of processing

Change blindness: eradication of gestalt strategies

Arrays of eight, texture-defined rectangles were used as stimuli in a one-shot change blindness (CB) task where there was a 50% chance that one rectangle would change orientation between two successive presentations separated by an interval. CB was eliminated by cueing the target rectangle in the first stimulus, reduced by cueing in the interval and unaffected by cueing in the second presentation. This supports the idea that a representation was formed that persisted through the interval before being 'overwritten' by the second presentation (Landman et al, 2003 Vision Research 43149–164]. Another possibility is that participants used some kind of grouping or Gestalt strategy. To test this we changed the spatial position of the rectangles in the second presentation by shifting them along imaginary spokes (by ±1 degree) emanating from the central fixation point. There was no significant difference seen in performance between this and the standard task [F(1,4)=2.565, p=0.185]. This may suggest two things: (i) Gestalt grouping is not used as a strategy in these tasks, and (ii) it gives further weight to the argument that objects may be stored and retrieved from a pre-attentional store during this task

Seeing the invisible: The scope and limits of unconscious processing in binocular rivalry

When an image is presented to one eye and a very different image is presented to the corresponding location of the other eye, they compete for conscious representation, such that only one image is visible at a time while the other is suppressed. Called binocular rivalry, this phenomenon and its deviants have been extensively exploited to study the mechanism and neural correlates of consciousness. In this paper, we propose a framework, the unconscious binding hypothesis, to distinguish unconscious processing from conscious processing. According to this framework, the unconscious mind not only encodes individual features but also temporally binds distributed features to give rise to cortical representation, but unlike conscious binding, such unconscious binding is fragile. Under this framework, we review evidence from psychophysical and neuroimaging studies, which suggests that: (1) for invisible low level features, prolonged exposure to visual pattern and simple translational motion can alter the appearance of subsequent visible features (i.e. adaptation); for invisible high level features, although complex spiral motion cannot produce adaptation, nor can objects/words enhance subsequent processing of related stimuli (i.e. priming), images of tools can nevertheless activate the dorsal pathway; and (2) although invisible central cues cannot orient attention, invisible erotic pictures in the periphery can nevertheless guide attention, likely through emotional arousal; reciprocally, the processing of invisible information can be modulated by attention at perceptual and neural levels

A Dissociation of Attention and Awareness in Phase-sensitive but Not Phase-insensitive Visual Channels

The elements most vivid in our conscious awareness are the ones to which we direct our attention. Scientific study confirms the impression of a close bond between selective attention and visual awareness, yet the nature of this association remains elusive. Using visual afterimages as an index, we investigate neural processing of stimuli as they enter awareness and as they become the object of attention. We find evidence of response enhancement accompanying both attention and awareness, both in the phase-sensitive neural channels characteristic of early processing stages and in the phase-insensitive channels typical of higher cortical areas. The effects of attention and awareness on phase-insensitive responses are positively correlated, but in the same experiments, we observe no correlation between the effects on phase-sensitive responses. This indicates independent signatures of attention and awareness in early visual areas yet a convergence of their effects at more advanced processing stages