Verification of Branching-Time and Alternating-Time Properties for Exogenous Coordination Models

Information and communication systems enter an increasing number of areas of daily lives. Our reliance and dependence on the functioning of such systems is rapidly growing together with the costs and the impact of system failures. At the same time the complexity of hardware and software systems extends to new limits as modern hardware architectures become more and more parallel, dynamic and heterogenous. These trends demand for a closer integration of formal methods and system engineering to show the correctness of complex systems within the design phase of large projects. The goal of this thesis is to introduce a formal holistic approach for modeling, analysis and synthesis of parallel systems that potentially addresses complex system behavior at any layer of the hardware/software stack. Due to the complexity of modern hardware and software systems, we aim to have a hierarchical modeling framework that allows to specify the behavior of a parallel system at various levels of abstraction and that facilitates designing complex systems in an iterative refinement procedure, in which more detailed behavior is added successively to the system description. In this context, the major challenge is to provide modeling formalisms that are expressive enough to address all of the above issues and are at the same time amenable to the application of formal methods for proving that the system behavior conforms to its specification. In particular, we are interested in specification formalisms that allow to apply formal verification techniques such that the underlying model checking problems are still decidable within reasonable time and space bounds. The presented work relies on an exogenous modeling approach that allows a clear separation of coordination and computation and provides an operational semantic model where formal methods such as model checking are well suited and applicable. The channel-based exogenous coordination language Reo is used as modeling formalism as it supports hierarchical modeling in an iterative top-down refinement procedure. It facilitates reusability, exchangeability, and heterogeneity of components and forms the basis to apply formal verification methods. At the same time Reo has a clear formal semantics based on automata, which serve as foundation to apply formal methods such as model checking. In this thesis new modeling languages are presented that allow specifying complex systems in terms of Reo and automata models which yield the basis for a holistic approach on modeling, verification and synthesis of parallel systems. The second main contribution of this thesis are tailored branching-time and alternating time temporal logics as well as corresponding model checking algorithms. The thesis includes results on the theoretical complexity of the underlying model checking problems as well as practical results. For the latter the presented approach has been implemented in the symbolic verification tool set Vereofy. The implementation within Vereofy and evaluation of the branching-time and alternating-time model checker is the third main contribution of this thesis

Logics for strategic reasoning and collective decision-making

Strategic decision-making is ubiquitous in everyday life. The analysis of game strategies has been a research theme in game theory for several decades since von Neumann and Morgenstern. Sophisticated models and analysis tools have been developed with wide applications in Economics, Management Science, Social Science and Computer Science, especially in the field of Artificial Intelligence. However, \much of game theory is about the question whether strategic equilibria exist", as Johan van Benthem, a world-leading logician and game-theorist, points out, \but there are hardly any explicit languages for defining, comparing, or combining strategies". Without such a facility it is challenging for computer scientists to build intelligent agents that are capable of strategic decision-making. In the last twenty years, logical approaches have been proposed to tackle this problem. Pioneering work includes Game Logics, Coalition Logic and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). These logics either provide facilities for expressing and combining games or offer mechanisms for reasoning about strategic abilities of players. But none of them can solve the problem. The intrinsic difficulty in establishing such a logic is that reasoning about strategies requires combinations of temporal reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, reasoning about actions, preferences and knowledge, as well as reasoning about multi-agent interactions and coalitional abilities. More recently, a few new logical formalisms have been proposed by extending ATL with strategy variables in order to express strategies explicitly. However, most of these logics tend to have high computational complexity, because ATL introduces quantifications over strategies (functions), which leaves little hope of building any tractable inference system based on such a logic. This thesis takes up the challenge by using a bottom-up approach in order to create a balance between expressive power and computational efficiency. Instead of starting with a highly complicated logic, we propose a set of logical frameworks based on a simple and practical logical language, called Game Description Language (GDL), which has been used as an official language for General Game Playing (GGP) since 2005. To represent game strategies, we extend GDL with two binary prioritized connectives for combining actions in terms of their priorities specified by these connectives, and provide it with a semantics based on the standard state transition model. To reason about the strategic abilities of players, we further extend the framework with coalition operators from ATL for specifying the strategic abilities of players. More importantly, a unified semantics is provided for both GDL- and ATL- formulas, which allows us to verify and reason about game strategies. Interestingly, the framework can be used to formalize the fundamental game-playing principles and formally derive two well-known results on two-player games: Weak Determinacy and Zermelo's Theorem. We also show that the model-checking problem of the logic is not worse than that of ATL*, an extension of ATL. To deal with imperfect information games, we extend GDL with the standard epistemic operators and provide it with a semantics based on the epistemic state transition model. The language allows us to specify an imperfect information game and formalize its epistemic properties. Meanwhile, the framework allows us to reason about players' own as well as other players' knowledge during game playing. Most importantly, the logic has a moderate computational complexity, which makes it significantly different from similar existing frameworks. To investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of players and its coalitional abilities, we provide a variant of semantics for ATL with imperfect information. The relation between knowledge sharing and coalitional abilities is investigated through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. Moreover, this semantics is able to preserve the desirable properties of coalitional abilities. To deal with collective decision-making, we apply the approach of combining actions via their priorities for collective choice. We extend propositional logic with the prioritized connective for modelling reason-based individual and collective choices. Not only individual preferences but also aggregation rules can be expressed within this logic. A model-checking algorithm for this logic is thus developed to automatically generate individual and collective choices. In many real-world situations, a group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups different priorities to determine the collective judgment. We design an aggregation rule based on the priorities of individuals so as to investigate how the judgment from each individual affects group judgment in a hierarchical environment. We also show that this rule satisfies a set of plausible conditions and has a tractable computational complexity

Logics for strategic reasoning and collective decision-making

Cette thèse aborde le problème du raisonnement stratégique. Le raisonnement stratégique est un thème de recherches existant depuis e nombreuses années en théorie des jeux. Toutefois, celui-ci a le plus souvent pour objet de déterminer si des équilibres stratégiques existent sans détailler la définition en elle-même de ces stratégies. La construction d'agents artificiels capable de raisonner stratégiquement implique de se poser la question de la représentation de ces stratégies afin que les agents puissent les construire, combiner, comparer et enfin et surtout exécuter. Cette thèse propose un ensemble de logiques pour le raisonnement stratégique et la prise de décision collective. Elle établit dans un premier temps un cadre unifiée pour la définition de jeux, la représentation de stratégies et le raisonnement sur celles-ci dans le contexte des jeux à information parfaite. Ce cadre est ensuite étendu pour prendre en compte les jeux à information imparfaite. Les relations entre les connaissances de groupe, le pouvoir des coalitions ainsi que le partage d'informations dans une coalition sont ensuite étudiés. Dans un dernier temps, est introduit une logique modale permettant de de raisonner sur les choix collectifs, cette logique permet de généraliser les approches logiques existantes pour l'agrégation de jugements. La complexité de ces différents cadres logiques est aussi étudiée et nous montrons que ces différents cadres offre un équilibre pertinent entre efficacité computationnelle et pouvoir d'expression.This thesis proposes a set of logics for modelling strategic reasoning and collective decision-making. It first establishes a unified logical framework for game specifications, strategy representation and strategic reasoning in perfect information games. Based on that, it proposes an epistemic extension to address imperfect information games. To investigate the interplay of group knowledge and coalitional abilities, it further models knowledge sharing within coalitions. Finally it introduces a modal logic for collective choice and generalizes the logic-based approach to judgment aggregation. The complexity analysis of these logics indicates that these frameworks make a good balance between expressive power and computational efficiency

Automated Theorem Proving for General Game Playing

While automated game playing systems like Deep Blue perform excellent within their domain, handling a different game or even a slight change of rules is impossible without intervention of the programmer. Considered a great challenge for Artificial Intelligence, General Game Playing is concerned with the development of techniques that enable computer programs to play arbitrary, possibly unknown n-player games given nothing but the game rules in a tailor-made description language. A key to success in this endeavour is the ability to reliably extract hidden game-specific features from a given game description automatically. An informed general game player can efficiently play a game by exploiting structural game properties to choose the currently most appropriate algorithm, to construct a suited heuristic, or to apply techniques that reduce the search space. In addition, an automated method for property extraction can provide valuable assistance for the discovery of specification bugs during game design by providing information about the mechanics of the currently specified game description. The recent extension of the description language to games with incomplete information and elements of chance further induces the need for the detection of game properties involving player knowledge in several stages of the game. In this thesis, we develop a formal proof method for the automatic acquisition of rich game-specific invariance properties. To this end, we first introduce a simple yet expressive property description language to address knowledge-free game properties which may involve arbitrary finite sequences of successive game states. We specify a semantic based on state transition systems over the Game Description Language, and develop a provably correct formal theory which allows to show the validity of game properties with respect to their semantic across all reachable game states. Our proof theory does not require to visit every single reachable state. Instead, it applies an induction principle on the game rules based on the generation of answer set programs, allowing to apply any off-the-shelf answer set solver to practically verify invariance properties even in complex games whose state space cannot totally be explored. To account for the recent extension of the description language to games with incomplete information and elements of chance, we correctly extend our induction method to properties involving player knowledge. With an extensive evaluation we show its practical applicability even in complex games

Verification of Games in the Game Description Language

Malaysia - Penang [Pinang], Temple of the reclining Buddha, 108 ft. longColorVolume 7, Page