Understanding patient safety performance and educational needs using the ‘Safety-II’ approach for complex systems

Participation in projects to improve patient safety is a key component of general practice (GP) specialty training, appraisal and revalidation. Patient safety training priorities for GPs at all career stages are described in the Royal College of General Practitioners’ curriculum. Current methods that are taught and employed to improve safety often use a ‘find-and-fix’ approach to identify components of a system (including humans) where performance could be improved. However, the complex interactions and inter-dependence between components in healthcare systems mean that cause and effect are not always linked in a predictable manner. The Safety-II approach has been proposed as a new way to understand how safety is achieved in complex systems that may improve quality and safety initiatives and enhance GP and trainee curriculum coverage. Safety-II aims to maximise the number of events with a successful outcome by exploring everyday work. Work-as-done often differs from work-as-imagined in protocols and guidelines and various ways to achieve success, dependent on work conditions, may be possible. Traditional approaches to improve the quality and safety of care often aim to constrain variability but understanding and managing variability may be a more beneficial approach. The application of a Safety-II approach to incident investigation, quality improvement projects, prospective analysis of risk in systems and performance indicators may offer improved insight into system performance leading to more effective change. The way forward may be to combine the Safety-II approach with ‘traditional’ methods to enhance patient safety training, outcomes and curriculum coverage

A safer place for patients: learning to improve patient safety

1 Every day over one million people are treated successfully by National Health Service (NHS) acute, ambulance and mental health trusts. However, healthcare relies on a range of complex interactions of people, skills, technologies and drugs, and sometimes things do go wrong. For most countries, patient safety is now the key issue in healthcare quality and risk management. The Department of Health (the Department) estimates that one in ten patients admitted to NHS hospitals will be unintentionally harmed, a rate similar to other developed countries. Around 50 per cent of these patient safety incidentsa could have been avoided, if only lessons from previous incidents had been learned. 2 There are numerous stakeholders with a role in keeping patients safe in the NHS, many of whom require trusts to report details of patient safety incidents and near misses to them (Figure 2). However, a number of previous National Audit Office reports have highlighted concerns that the NHS has limited information on the extent and impact of clinical and non-clinical incidents and trusts need to learn from these incidents and share good practice across the NHS more effectively (Appendix 1). 3 In 2000, the Chief Medical Officer’s report An organisation with a memory 1 , identified that the key barriers to reducing the number of patient safety incidents were an organisational culture that inhibited reporting and the lack of a cohesive national system for identifying and sharing lessons learnt. 4 In response, the Department published Building a safer NHS for patients3 detailing plans and a timetable for promoting patient safety. The goal was to encourage improvements in reporting and learning through the development of a new mandatory national reporting scheme for patient safety incidents and near misses. Central to the plan was establishing the National Patient Safety Agency to improve patient safety by reducing the risk of harm through error. The National Patient Safety Agency was expected to: collect and analyse information; assimilate other safety-related information from a variety of existing reporting systems; learn lessons and produce solutions. 5 We therefore examined whether the NHS has been successful in improving the patient safety culture, encouraging reporting and learning from patient safety incidents. Key parts of our approach were a census of 267 NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts in Autumn 2004, followed by a re-survey in August 2005 and an omnibus survey of patients (Appendix 2). We also reviewed practices in other industries (Appendix 3) and international healthcare systems (Appendix 4), and the National Patient Safety Agency’s progress in developing its National Reporting and Learning System (Appendix 5) and other related activities (Appendix 6). 6 An organisation with a memory1 was an important milestone in the NHS’s patient safety agenda and marked the drive to improve reporting and learning. At the local level the vast majority of trusts have developed a predominantly open and fair reporting culture but with pockets of blame and scope to improve their strategies for sharing good practice. Indeed in our re-survey we found that local performance had continued to improve with more trusts reporting having an open and fair reporting culture, more trusts with open reporting systems and improvements in perceptions of the levels of under-reporting. At the national level, progress on developing the national reporting system for learning has been slower than set out in the Department’s strategy of 2001 3 and there is a need to improve evaluation and sharing of lessons and solutions by all organisations with a stake in patient safety. There is also no clear system for monitoring that lessons are learned at the local level. Specifically: a The safety culture within trusts is improving, driven largely by the Department’s clinical governance initiative 4 and the development of more effective risk management systems in response to incentives under initiatives such as the NHS Litigation Authority’s Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (Appendix 7). However, trusts are still predominantly reactive in their response to patient safety issues and parts of some organisations still operate a blame culture. b All trusts have established effective reporting systems at the local level, although under-reporting remains a problem within some groups of staff, types of incidents and near misses. The National Patient Safety Agency did not develop and roll out the National Reporting and Learning System by December 2002 as originally envisaged. All trusts were linked to the system by 31 December 2004. By August 2005, at least 35 trusts still had not submitted any data to the National Reporting and Learning System. c Most trusts pointed to specific improvements derived from lessons learnt from their local incident reporting systems, but these are still not widely promulgated, either within or between trusts. The National Patient Safety Agency has provided only limited feedback to trusts of evidence-based solutions or actions derived from the national reporting system. It published its first feedback report from the Patient Safety Observatory in July 2005

Using information to deliver safer care: a mixed-methods study exploring general practitioners’ information needs in North West London primary care

The National Health Service in England has given increasing priority to improving inter-professional communication, enabling better management of patients with chronic conditions and reducing medical errors through effective use of information. Despite considerable efforts to reduce patient harm through better information usage, medical errors continue to occur, posing a serious threat to patient safety.This study explores the range, quality and sophistication of existing information systems in primary care with the aim to capture what information practitioners need to provide a safe service and identify barriers to its effective use in care pathways.Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with general practitioners from surgeries in North West London and a survey evaluating their experience with information systems in care pathways.Important information is still missing, specifically discharge summaries detailing medication changes and changes in the diagnosis and management of patients, blood results ordered by hospital specialists and findings from clinical investigations. Participants identified numerous barriers, including the communication gap between primary and secondary care, the variable quality and consistency of clinical correspondence and the inadequate technological integration.Despite attempts to improve integration and information flow in care pathways, existing systems provide practitioners with only partial access to information, hindering their ability to take informed decisions. This study offers a framework for understanding what tools should be in place to enable effective use of information in primary care

The Contributing Factors to Student Nurse Medication Administration Errors and Near Misses in the Clinical Setting as Identified By Clinical Instructors

The report, To Err is Human, by the Institutes of Medicine (IOM, 2000) brought attention to medication safety in the United States healthcare system. While advances have been made in patient safety, including electronic medication dispensing systems, electronic medication administration records, and scanning systems, it is estimated that 7,000 to 9,000 people die each year due to medication errors (Tariq et al., 2019). The medication administration process involves steps from prescribing to administration. However, nurses administering the medications are the final check point. James Reasons’ Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation illustrates the role that systems play in medical errors. The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the factors that contribute to undergraduate, prelicensure student nurse medication errors and near misses as identified by clinical instructors and the interventions that may help to mitigate these factors. The top 5 most common contributing factors of medication errors and near misses were ‘students having limited knowledge about medications,’ ‘the names of many medications are similar.’ ‘all medications for one team of patients cannot be passed within an accepted time frame,’ ‘the packaging of many medications is similar,’ and ‘students do not receive enough instruction on medications.’ The results have implications in nursing education and the potential to impact patient safety

Investigating the prevalence and causes of prescribing errors in general practice : the PRACtICe Study

Report prepared by the University of Nottingham, University of Reading and University of Hertfordshir

Patient safety in Europe: medication errors and hospital-acquired infections

The Report was commissioned by the European Federation of Nurses Associations (EFN) in November 2007 in order to support its policy statements on Patient Safety (June 2004). In that statement the EFN declares its belief that European Union health services should operate within a culture of safety that is based on working towards an open culture and the immediate reporting of mistakes; exchanging best practice and research; and lobbying for the systematic collection of information and dissemination of research findings. This Report adressess specifically the culture of highly reliable organisations using the work of James Reason (2000). Medication errors and hospital-acquired infections are examined in line with the Reprt´s parameters and a range of European studies are used as evidence. An extensive reference list is provided that allows EFN to explore work in greater detail as required

Safer clinical systems : interim report, August 2010

Safer Clinical Systems is the Health Foundation’s new five year programme of work to test and demonstrate ways to improve healthcare systems and processes, to develop safer systems that improve patient safety. It builds on learning from the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) and models of system improvement from both healthcare and other industries. Learning from the SPI highlighted the need to take a clinical systems approach to improving safety. SPI highlighted that many hospitals struggle to implement improvement in clinical areas due to inherent problems with support mechanisms. Clinical processes and systems, rather than individuals, are often the contributors to breakdown in patient safety. The Safer Clinical Systems programme aimed to measure the reliability of clinical processes, identify defects within those processes, and identify the systems that result in those defects. Methods to improve system reliability were then to be tested and re-developed in order to reduce the risk of harm being caused to patients. Such system-level awareness should lead to improvements in other patient care pathways. The relationship between system reliability and actual harm is challenging to identify and measure. Specific, well-defined, small-scale processes have been used in other programmes, and system reliability has been shown to have a direct causal relationship with harm (e.g. care bundle compliance in an intensive care unit can reduce the incidence of ventilator-associated pneumonia). However, it has become evident that harm can be caused by a variety of factors over time; when working in broader, more complex and dynamic systems, change in outcome can be difficult to attribute to specific improvements and difficulties are also associated with relating evidence to resulting harm. The overall aim of Phase 1 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme was to demonstrate proof-of-concept that using a systems-based approach could contribute to improved patient safety. In Phase 1, experienced NHS teams from four locations worked together with expert advisers to co-design the Safer Clinical Systems programme

Can the Heinrich ratio be used to predict harm from medication errors?

The purpose of this study was to establish whether, for medication errors, there exists a fixed Heinrich ratio between the number of incidents which did not result in harm, the number that caused minor harm, and the number that caused serious harm. If this were the case then it would be very useful in estimating any changes in harm following an intervention. Serious harm resulting from medication errors is relatively rare, so it can take a great deal of time and resource to detect a significant change. If the Heinrich ratio exists for medication errors, then it would be possible, and far easier, to measure the much more frequent number of incidents that did not result in harm and the extent to which they changed following an intervention; any reduction in harm could be extrapolated from this