Certified Reinforcement Learning with Logic Guidance

This paper proposes the first model-free Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework to synthesise policies for unknown, and continuous-state Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), such that a given linear temporal property is satisfied. We convert the given property into a Limit Deterministic Buchi Automaton (LDBA), namely a finite-state machine expressing the property. Exploiting the structure of the LDBA, we shape a synchronous reward function on-the-fly, so that an RL algorithm can synthesise a policy resulting in traces that probabilistically satisfy the linear temporal property. This probability (certificate) is also calculated in parallel with policy learning when the state space of the MDP is finite: as such, the RL algorithm produces a policy that is certified with respect to the property. Under the assumption of finite state space, theoretical guarantees are provided on the convergence of the RL algorithm to an optimal policy, maximising the above probability. We also show that our method produces ''best available'' control policies when the logical property cannot be satisfied. In the general case of a continuous state space, we propose a neural network architecture for RL and we empirically show that the algorithm finds satisfying policies, if there exist such policies. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated via a set of numerical examples and benchmarks, where we observe an improvement of one order of magnitude in the number of iterations required for the policy synthesis, compared to existing approaches whenever available.Comment: This article draws from arXiv:1801.08099, arXiv:1809.0782

Efficient Methods for Automated Multi-Issue Negotiation: Negotiating over a Two-Part Tariff

In this article, we consider the novel approach of a seller and customer negotiating bilaterally about a two-part tariff, using autonomous software agents. An advantage of this approach is that win-win opportunities can be generated while keeping the problem of preference elicitation as simple as possible. We develop bargaining strategies that software agents can use to conduct the actual bilateral negotiation on behalf of their owners. We present a decomposition of bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-efficient-search methods: Concession and Pareto-search strategies focus on the conceding and win-win aspect of bargaining, respectively. An important technical contribution of this article lies in the development of two Pareto-search methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the respective use of these two Pareto-search methods by the two negotiators results in very efficient bargaining outcomes while negotiators concede the amount specified by their concession strategy

The 1990 progress report and future plans

This document describes the progress and plans of the Artificial Intelligence Research Branch (RIA) at ARC in 1990. Activities span a range from basic scientific research to engineering development and to fielded NASA applications, particularly those applications that are enabled by basic research carried out at RIA. Work is conducted in-house and through collaborative partners in academia and industry. Our major focus is on a limited number of research themes with a dual commitment to technical excellence and proven applicability to NASA short, medium, and long-term problems. RIA acts as the Agency's lead organization for research aspects of artificial intelligence, working closely with a second research laboratory at JPL and AI applications groups at all NASA centers

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field