4,885 research outputs found
Remote attestation mechanism for embedded devices based on physical unclonable functions
Remote attestation mechanisms are well studied in the high-end computing environments; however, the same is not true for embedded devices-especially for smart cards. With ever changing landscape of smart card technology and advancements towards a true multi-application platform, verifying the current state of the smart card is significant to the overall security of such proposals. The initiatives proposed by GlobalPlatform Consumer Centric Model (GP-CCM) and User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) enables a user to download any application as she desire-depending upon the authorisation of the application provider. Before an application provider issues an application to a smart card, verifying the current state of the smart card is crucial to the security of the respective application. In this paper, we analyse the rationale behind the remote attestation mechanism for smart cards, and the fundamental features that such a mechanism should possess. We also study the applicability of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for the remote attestation mechanism and propose two algorithms to achieve the stated features of remote attestation. The proposed algorithms are implemented in a test environment to evaluate their performance. © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved
Citizen Electronic Identities using TPM 2.0
Electronic Identification (eID) is becoming commonplace in several European
countries. eID is typically used to authenticate to government e-services, but
is also used for other services, such as public transit, e-banking, and
physical security access control. Typical eID tokens take the form of physical
smart cards, but successes in merging eID into phone operator SIM cards show
that eID tokens integrated into a personal device can offer better usability
compared to standalone tokens. At the same time, trusted hardware that enables
secure storage and isolated processing of sensitive data have become
commonplace both on PC platforms as well as mobile devices.
Some time ago, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) released the version 2.0 of
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification. We propose an eID architecture
based on the new, rich authorization model introduced in the TCGs TPM 2.0. The
goal of the design is to improve the overall security and usability compared to
traditional smart card-based solutions. We also provide, to the best our
knowledge, the first accessible description of the TPM 2.0 authorization model.Comment: This work is based on an earlier work: Citizen Electronic Identities
using TPM 2.0, to appear in the Proceedings of the 4th international workshop
on Trustworthy embedded devices, TrustED'14, November 3, 2014, Scottsdale,
Arizona, USA, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2666141.266614
Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic Credentials
Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but
storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from
multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an
Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server
compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a
well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments,
and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms.
Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is
straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it
enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation,
and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for
securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using
remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the
CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical
risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In
addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls
for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a
limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log.
We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this
into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation
performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single
desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using
locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.Comment: Extended version of a paper to appear in the 3rd Workshop on
Security, Privacy, and Identity Management in the Cloud (SECPID) 201
Smart cards: State-of-the-art to future directions
The evolution of smart card technology provides an interesting case study of the relationship and interactions between security and business requirements. This paper maps out the milestones for smart card technology, discussing at each step the opportunities and challenges. The paper reviews recently proposed innovative ownership/management models and the security challenges associated with them. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible future directions for the technology, and the challenges these present
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