Inequality, a scourge of the XXI century

Social and economic inequality is a plague of the XXI Century. It is continuously widening, as the wealth of a relatively small group increases and, therefore, the rest of the world shares a shrinking fraction of resources. This situation has been predicted and denounced by economists and econophysicists. The latter ones have widely used models of market dynamics which consider that wealth distribution is the result of wealth exchanges among economic agents. A simple analogy relates the wealth in a society with the kinetic energy of the molecules in a gas, and the trade between agents to the energy exchange between the molecules during collisions. However, while in physical systems, thanks to the equipartition of energy, the gas eventually arrives at an equilibrium state, in many exchange models the economic system never equilibrates. Instead, it moves toward a "condensed" state, where one or a few agents concentrate all the wealth of the society and the rest of agents shares zero or a very small fraction of the total wealth. Here we discuss two ways of avoiding the "condensed" state. On one hand, we consider a regulatory policy that favors the poorest agent in the exchanges, thus increasing the probability that the wealth goes from the richest to the poorest agent. On the other hand, we study a tax system and its effects on wealth distribution. We compare the redistribution processes and conclude that complete control of the inequalities can be attained with simple regulations or interventions

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites' political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites' influence affect inequality depends on which industry's elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions

Conference News: Social Policy in Mineral-Rich Countries

This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide. Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.UNRISD_SocialPolicyInMineralRichCountries.pdf: 189 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Human Rights as a Tool for Sustainable Development

In poor as much as in rich countries there is a fear that environmentally sustainable development might be contradictory to development in general and equitable development in particular. There could be indeed a contradiction between environmental and social sustainability, too much care for the environment eventually leading to forgetting about the people. The purpose of this paper is to explore institutional principles and tools that allow the conciliation between environmental and social sustainability. In this respect we will present human rights based political economy as an institutional tool of this sort. We will show how a human-rights based political economy could at the same time respect ecological sustainability and social equity. One of the reasons for that consists in the fact that within a human-rights based political economy, welfare is not the result of economic growth, as within traditional political economy, but of justice. The main objectives of development will be attained, therefore, not through growth but through redistribution of resources or of access to resources. In this paper more specific aspects will be presented by examining the human right to work and the human right to water. Regarding the human right to work the main aspect which will be stressed is that within a human rights frame full employment becomes disconnected from both growth and labour market deregulation. It will be shown that traditional policies not only do not solve unemployment but are also not environmentally and socially sustainable. The only policy that is not contradictory with either human rights and de-growth is work sharing by decreasing the length of the work day. When properly enforced this policy has, indeed, historically shown to be the only one that has created jobs. Regarding the right to water, the point is that democratic and human rights oriented exploitation and distribution policies of water are both more sustainable and more equitable than those that intend to transform water into a private good as any other and, thus, promote commodification and privatisation of resources. This way of controlling water exploitation and distribution not only may relieve pressure from the resource but also alleviate deprivation of poorer families, conciliating, therefore, environmental and social sustainability.

MPs' attitudes to welfare: a new consensus?

The post-war ‘consensus’ on welfare was based largely in the perceived agreement of leading politicians of Conservative and Labour parties on the role of the mixed economy and the welfare state. However, from the late 1970s economic and demographic pressures and ideological challenges, particularly from the New Right, led to cuts in spending on welfare, increased private involvement and an emphasis on more individualistic and selectivist approaches to provision. Recently some scholars have begun to discuss the emergence of a ‘new liberal consensus’ around welfare provision. Drawing upon interviews with ten per cent of the House of Commons, this article examines the extent to which a new political consensus upon welfare can be identified. In addition to analysing responses to questions upon welfare issues it considers the extent to which MPs themselves believe there to be some degree of consensus in approaches to welfare. It also considers whether any consensus exists merely in the political language used in relation to welfare issues, or whether there is a more substantive convergence

Overview of contractual savings institutions

Contractual savings institutions include national provident funds, life insurance companies, private pension funds, and funded social pension insurance systems. They have long-term liabilities and stable cash flows and are therefore ideal providers of term finance, not only to government and industry, but also to municipal authorities and the housing sector. Except for Singapore, Malaysia, and a few other countries, most developing countries have small and insignificant contractual savings industries that have been undermined by high inflation and inhibited by oppressive regulations and pay-as-you-go social pension insurance systems. Contractual savings institutions play a much bigger role in the financial systems of developed countries. In some countries, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, the resources mobilized by life insurance companies and pension funds correspond to well over 100 percent of annual GDP. The authors provide an overview of the structure and the state of development of contractual savings institutions in both high- and low-income countries. They also identify a number of operating characteristics that define the social, economic, financial and regulatory implications of different types of contractual savings institutions. The authors emphasize the fundamental objectives for reforming the contractual savings and pension systems.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Contractual Savings,Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance Law,Environmental Economics&Policies

The Jospin Way

Since Malmö, Tony Blair has castigated all those who do not share his proselytising zeal for the ‘third way’. Underpinning his view is a thinly veiled assumption that ‘there is no alternative.’ Another reading, advanced by Sassoon, is that—under the influence of globalisation—the whole of the European left is converging on overwhelmingly similar positions, and all else is rhetorical embellishment and detail.1 Neither narrative is accepted here. Substantive differences are detectable between the ‘projects’ of Blair and Lionel Jospin, which go beyond the merely stylistic or rhetorical, suggesting qualitatively different ‘models’ of social democracy. This article examines the Jospin government’s first three years against the backdrop of the debate between the British and French premiers over the future direction of the left. The analysis focuses on those areas where commentators have located the fault-lines within European social democracy—macroeconomic policy, the role of the state, labour market and welfare reform, and employment policy

The Global Context: International Child Health

Approximately 5000 children under 5 years died on 11 September 2001 from diarrhoea, about double the number of persons who were killed when two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Towers in New York. For many years prior to that day, and every day since then, approximately 5000 children under 5 years have died from diarrhoea, by and large preventable by eliminating poverty. In 2003 global expenditure on anti-terrorism measures was quoted to be approximately $US551 billion. The UN Millennium Project has estimated that to cover basic needs in health, education, water, sanitation, food production, roads and other key areas, and achieve the Millennium Development Goals of the poorest countries would cost$US160 billion per year. This can be achieved by the wealthy countries of the world donating 0.7 % of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Only 5 of the 13 wealthiest OECD countries currently meet that target. The contribution from the USA (which currently contributes 0.15%) would be approximately $US60 billion – the same as the cost of the Iraq war per year for the first two years, similar to the Bush administration’s tax cuts to those earning more than$US500,000 per annum and approximately what Western Europe spends on alcohol every 6 months. Between 1990 and 2002 child health outcomes, particularly under 5 mortality rates world-wide have been improving except in the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Republics) and some Sub-Saharan African countries, where under 5 mortality has deteriorated, and rates in Sub-Saharan Africa remain high. However, as overall rates have been falling, inequalities and inequities in child health outcomes within and between nations have been increasing. From 1970-2000 under 5 mortality decreased by 71% in high income countries, but by only 40% in low income countries. The aim of this chapter is to describe broadly the determinants of child health, to question the current approach to improving child health outcomes, particularly in low and middle income countries, and discuss possibilities for improving child health in poor countries and reduce inequalities and inequities, considering strategies at a global, national and local level. ISBN: 978019576495