The roles of “old” and “new” media tools and technologies in the facilitation of violent extremism and terrorism

This chapter describes and discusses the roles of media tools and technologies in the facilitation of violent extremism and terrorism. Rather than focusing on how media report on terrorism, we investigate how extremist and terrorist groups and movements themselves have exploited various “traditional” and “new” media tools, from print to digital, outlining the significance that they have had on extremists’ ability to mark territory, intimidate some audiences, connect with other (sympathetic) audiences, radicalize, and even recruit. Underlined is that violent extremists and terrorists of all stripes have, over time, used every means at their disposal to forward their communicative goals. Also worth noting is that ‘old’ media tools are not extinct and while ‘new’ media play a prominent role in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism, ‘old’ tools—everything from murals to magazines—continue to be utilized in tandem with the former

HSx Homeland Security: Managing Global Issues as Actors Multiply

Includes a list of related educational materials

Dollars for Dash: Analyzing the Finances of American ISIS Supporters

This report focuses on the financial component of the Islamic State-related mobilization in the U.S. between 2013, when the first arrest of an individual linked to IS took place, and August 2020. As such, it contains a study of all the 209 individuals charged for Islamic State-related offenses in the country, and shows that, save for a few exceptions, the vast majority of U.S.-based IS supporters left a remarkably small financial footprint. Whether they focused on traveling overseas to join IS, carrying out attacks domestically or providing other forms of support to the group, most American IS supporters raised small amounts of money and often through very simple tactics. More specifically: • The vast majority of them simply relied on personal savings to pay the small costs required for their activities. Many of these individuals held jobs, which ranged from menial and relatively low paying to, in a few cases, relatively high-earning positions. Since most of their expenses (purchasing airplane tickets or weapons, sending small amounts to fellow IS supporters overseas) were no higher than a few thousand dollars, this could sustain them through fnances they already had at their disposal. • Some engaged in additional fundraising activities to supplement their savings: - 49 (23.4%) engaged in legal tactics (donations, asset sales, new credit lines…) - 14 (6.7%) engaged in illegal tactics. For the most part, the ways in which American IS supporters used illegal methods to raise funds required low-levels of sophistication. A handful engaged in relatively complex fnancial frauds. ● In only four cases a nexus between terrorism-related activities and violent crime (armed robbery, two cases) and drug trafficking (two cases) was identifed. Very few US-based IS supporters had a criminal background, a stark contrast with dynamics observed in Europe. ● US-based IS supporters tended to avoid using banking institutions to move funds; instead, they turned with more frequency to money or value transfer services. The use of cryptocurrencies was extremely rare. ● Most individuals raised the funds they needed for their IS-related activities alone. Some relied on pre-existing kinship/friendship connections, others on like-minded individuals they met after radicalizing. Most fnancial exchanges within support networks took place within the U.S., though a few Americans found fellow IS supporters online overseas and exchanged money to facilitate each other’s travel to Syria. ● Direct fnancial exchanges with foreign Islamic State operatives were rare, and in only one known case were these exchanges meant to support an attack on U.S. soil. ● There is no indication that charitable entities were set up or used to fund IS-related activities. The small size of the fnancial footprint of U.S.-based IS supporters is, in itself, good news for U.S. authorities but has a fipside. The scarcity and inconspicuous nature of the financial transactions of many U.S.-based IS supporters can represent a challenge for investigators, which often rely on fnancial operations to uncover terrorism-related individuals and as evidence in prosecutions against them. Overall, the system of triggers, sustained checks, and constant communication between private and public sectors that characterizes the U.S. counter-terrorism fnancing system put in place in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has proven to be quite effective also during the IS-related mobilization of the last years. At the same time, the system needs to be fne-tuned to keep apace with the evolving nature of terrorist networks (which in the case of IS in America, paradoxically, means less sophistication) and technological developments such as online crowdfunding, cryptocurrencies, and deep/dark web transactions

Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle: A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Model for Combatting New Terrorism

Terrorism in the new millennium has morphed drastically since the 1970s. The terrorist organizations of today are a hybrid between the insurgent group models of the 1960s and modern terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. This hybrid model has created what has become a transnational insurgency recruited, trained, and led by major terrorist networks such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Even smaller regional groups such as Boko Haram have surpassed merely conducting terrorist attacks. These smaller groups are also focused on controlling territory. Tan (2008) refers to this change as “New Terrorism”. To combat New Terrorism, a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and counterterrorism tactics must be employed. This study will examine the need to define roles and responsibilities for various organization and various echelons through the introduction of a new Special Operations Forces model; Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle. The acronym to be used for this model is D3. This model recommends different tactics, techniques, and procedures for forces not specifically assigned the counterterrorism mission. As new terrorism continues to change, only counterterrorism forces should be tasked with the Find Fix Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) model of targeting (Counterterrorism 2014). All other military and law enforcement elements should disrupt and deny the enemy in support of the counterterrorism effort. This study is based on extensive research and the author’s 23 years of experience serving in U.S. Army Special Forces. Throughout his career, the author interacted with people from various social, economic, and professional backgrounds throughout the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans

Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders

[Excerpt] The United States confronts a wide array of threats at U.S. borders, ranging from terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction, to transnational criminals smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and work in the United States. Given this diversity of threats, how may Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set border security priorities and allocate scarce enforcement resources? In general, DHS’s answer to this question is organized around risk management, a process that involves risk assessment and the allocation of resources based on a cost-benefit analysis. This report focuses on the first part of this process by identifying border threats and describing a framework for understanding risks at U.S. borders. DHS employs models to classify threats as relatively high- or low-risk for certain planning and budgeting exercises and to implement certain border security programs. Members of Congress may wish to use similar models to evaluate the costs and benefits of potential border security policies and to allocate border enforcement resources. This report discusses some of the issues involved in modeling border-related threats

Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress

[Excerpt] This report focuses on international and domestic human trafficking and U.S. policy responses, with particular emphasis on the TVPA and its subsequent reauthorizations. The report begins with a description of key TIP-related definitions and an overview of the human trafficking problem. It follows with an overview of major foreign policy responses to international human trafficking. The report then focuses on responses to trafficking into and within the United States, examining relief for trafficking victims in the United States and discussing U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat domestic trafficking. The report concludes with an overview of current anti-trafficking legislation and an analysis of policy issues