3,129 research outputs found
Options for Securing RTP Sessions
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of
different application domains and environments. This heterogeneity
implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide
services such as confidentiality, integrity, and source
authentication of RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets
suitable for the various environments. The range of solutions makes
it difficult for RTP-based application developers to pick the most
suitable mechanism. This document provides an overview of a number
of security solutions for RTP and gives guidance for developers on
how to choose the appropriate security mechanism
ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks
While the centralization of SDN brought advantages such as a faster pace of
innovation, it also disrupted some of the natural defenses of traditional
architectures against different threats. The literature on SDN has mostly been
concerned with the functional side, despite some specific works concerning
non-functional properties like 'security' or 'dependability'. Though addressing
the latter in an ad-hoc, piecemeal way, may work, it will most likely lead to
efficiency and effectiveness problems. We claim that the enforcement of
non-functional properties as a pillar of SDN robustness calls for a systemic
approach. As a general concept, we propose ANCHOR, a subsystem architecture
that promotes the logical centralization of non-functional properties. To show
the effectiveness of the concept, we focus on 'security' in this paper: we
identify the current security gaps in SDNs and we populate the architecture
middleware with the appropriate security mechanisms, in a global and consistent
manner. Essential security mechanisms provided by anchor include reliable
entropy and resilient pseudo-random generators, and protocols for secure
registration and association of SDN devices. We claim and justify in the paper
that centralizing such mechanisms is key for their effectiveness, by allowing
us to: define and enforce global policies for those properties; reduce the
complexity of controllers and forwarding devices; ensure higher levels of
robustness for critical services; foster interoperability of the non-functional
property enforcement mechanisms; and promote the security and resilience of the
architecture itself. We discuss design and implementation aspects, and we prove
and evaluate our algorithms and mechanisms, including the formalisation of the
main protocols and the verification of their core security properties using the
Tamarin prover.Comment: 42 pages, 4 figures, 3 tables, 5 algorithms, 139 reference
A Mobile Secure Bluetooth-Enabled Cryptographic Provider
The use of digital X509v3 public key certificates, together with different standards
for secure digital signatures are commonly adopted to establish authentication proofs
between principals, applications and services. One of the robustness characteristics commonly
associated with such mechanisms is the need of hardware-sealed cryptographic
devices, such as Hardware-Security Modules (or HSMs), smart cards or hardware-enabled
tokens or dongles. These devices support internal functions for management and storage
of cryptographic keys, allowing the isolated execution of cryptographic operations, with
the keys or related sensitive parameters never exposed.
The portable devices most widely used are USB-tokens (or security dongles) and internal
ships of smart cards (as it is also the case of citizen cards, banking cards or ticketing
cards). More recently, a new generation of Bluetooth-enabled smart USB dongles appeared,
also suitable to protect cryptographic operations and digital signatures for secure
identity and payment applications. The common characteristic of such devices is to offer
the required support to be used as secure cryptographic providers. Among the advantages
of those portable cryptographic devices is also their portability and ubiquitous use, but,
in consequence, they are also frequently forgotten or even lost. USB-enabled devices imply
the need of readers, not always and not commonly available for generic smartphones
or users working with computing devices. Also, wireless-devices can be specialized or
require a development effort to be used as standard cryptographic providers.
An alternative to mitigate such problems is the possible adoption of conventional
Bluetooth-enabled smartphones, as ubiquitous cryptographic providers to be used, remotely,
by client-side applications running in usersâ devices, such as desktop or laptop
computers. However, the use of smartphones for safe storage and management of private
keys and sensitive parameters requires a careful analysis on the adversary model assumptions.
The design options to implement a practical and secure smartphone-enabled
cryptographic solution as a product, also requires the approach and the better use of
the more interesting facilities provided by frameworks, programming environments and
mobile operating systems services.
In this dissertation we addressed the design, development and experimental evaluation
of a secure mobile cryptographic provider, designed as a mobile service provided in a smartphone. The proposed solution is designed for Android-Based smartphones and
supports on-demand Bluetooth-enabled cryptographic operations, including standard
digital signatures. The addressed mobile cryptographic provider can be used by applications
running on Windows-enabled computing devices, requesting digital signatures.
The solution relies on the secure storage of private keys related to X509v3 public certificates
and Android-based secure elements (SEs). With the materialized solution, an
application running in a Windows computing device can request standard digital signatures
of documents, transparently executed remotely by the smartphone regarded as a
standard cryptographic provider
miTLS: Verifying Protocol Implementations against Real-World Attacks
International audienceThe TLS Internet Standard, previously known as SSL, is the default protocol for encrypting communications between clients and servers on the Web. Hence, TLS routinely protects our sensitive emails, health records, and payment information against network-based eavesdropping and tampering. For the past 20 years, TLS security has been analyzed in various cryptographic and programming models to establish strong formal guarantees for various protocol configurations. However, TLS deployments are still often vulnerable to attacks and rely on security experts to fix the protocol implementations. The miTLS project intends to solve this apparent contradiction between published proofs and real-world attacks, which reveals a gap between TLS theory and practice. To this end, the authors developed a verified reference implementation and a cryptographic security proof that account for the protocol's low-level details. The resulting formal development sheds light on recent attacks, yields security guarantees for typical TLS usages, and informs the design of the protocol's next version
Sustainable Development Report: Blockchain, the Web3 & the SDGs
This is an output paper of the applied research that was conducted between July 2018 - October 2019 funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and conducted by the Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and RCE Vienna (Regional Centre of Expertise on Education for Sustainable Development).Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc
Sustainable Development Report: Blockchain, the Web3 & the SDGs
This is an output paper of the applied research that was conducted between July 2018 - October 2019 funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and conducted by the Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and RCE Vienna (Regional Centre of Expertise on Education for Sustainable Development).Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc
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