26 research outputs found
Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for
assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good
fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we
address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly,
we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the
possibilities of cycles, we prove that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist under the PS rule. We then show that verifying whether a given profile is
a pure Nash equilibrium is coNP-complete, and computing a pure Nash equilibrium
is NP-hard. For two agents, we present a linear-time algorithm to compute a
pure Nash equilibrium which yields the same assignment as the truthful profile.
Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate the quality of the equilibria that
exist under the PS rule, finding that the vast majority of pure Nash equilibria
yield social welfare that is at least that of the truthful profile.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1401.6523, this paper
supersedes the equilibria section in our previous report arXiv:1401.652
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets
We study out-of-equilibrium price dynamics in Fisher markets. We develop a general framework in which sellers have (a) a set of atomic price update rules (APU), which are simple responses to a price vector; (b) a belief-formation procedure that simulates actions of other sellers (themselves using the APU) to some finite horizon in the future. Sellers use an APU to respond to a price vector they generate with the belief formation procedure. The framework allows sellers to have inconsistent and time-varying beliefs about each other. Under mild and natural assumptions on the APU, we show that despite the inconsistent and time-varying nature of beliefs, the market converges to a unique equilibrium at a linear rate (distance to equilibrium decreases exponentially in time). If the APU are driven by weak-gross substitutes demands, the equilibrium point is the same as predicted by those demands
Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control.
In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched
to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents
it can be matched with. Agents can match arbitrarily, and they learn about
possible partners dynamically based on their current neighborhood. We consider
convergence of dynamics to locally stable matchings -- states that are stable
with respect to their imposed information structure in the network. In the
two-sided case of stable marriage in which existence is guaranteed, we show
that the existence of a path to stability becomes NP-hard to decide. This holds
even when the network exists only among one partition of agents. In contrast,
if one partition has no network and agents remember a previous match every
round, a path to stability is guaranteed and random dynamics converge with
probability 1. We characterize this positive result in various ways. For
instance, it holds for random memory and for cache memory with the most recent
partner, but not for cache memory with the best partner. Also, it is crucial
which partition of the agents has memory. Finally, we present results for
centralized computation of locally stable matchings, i.e., computing maximum
locally stable matchings in the two-sided case and deciding existence in the
roommates case.Comment: Conference version in ICALP 2013; to appear in SIAM J. Disc Mat
Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions, while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisonerâs dilemma game
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment
In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agentsâ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio