21 research outputs found
Unconditionally Secure Oblivious Transfer from Real Network Behavior
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) deals with the problem of shared computation between parties that do not trust each other: they are interested in performing a joint task, but they also want to keep their respective inputs private. In a world where an ever-increasing amount of computation is outsourced, for example to the cloud, MPC is a subject of crucial importance. However, unconditionally secure MPC protocols have never found practical application: the lack of realistic noisy channel models, that are required to achieve security against computationally unbounded adversaries, prevents implementation over real-world, standard communication protocols. In this paper we show for the first time that the inherent noise of wireless communication can be used to build multi-party protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting. In order to do so, we propose a new noisy channel, the Delaying-Erasing Channel (DEC), that models network communication in both wired and wireless contexts. This channel integrates erasures and delays as sources of noise, and models reordered, lost and corrupt packets. We provide a protocol that uses the properties of the DEC to achieve Oblivious Transfer (OT), a fundamental primitive in cryptography that implies any secure computation. In order to show that the DEC reflects the behavior of wireless communication, we run an experiment over a 802.11n wireless link, and gather extensive experimental evidence supporting our claim. We also analyze the collected data in order to estimate the level of security that such a network can provide in our model. We show the flexibility of our construction by choosing for our implementation of OT a standard communication protocol, the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). Since the RTP is used in a number of multimedia streaming and teleconference applications, we can imagine a wide variety of practical uses and application settings for our construction
Feasibility and Infeasibility of Secure Computation with Malicious PUFs
A recent line of work has explored the use of physically uncloneable functions (PUFs) for secure computation, with the goals of (1) achieving universal composability without additional setup, and/or (2) obtaining unconditional security (i.e., avoiding complexity-theoretic assumptions). Initial work assumed that all PUFs, even those created by an attacker, are honestly generated. Subsequently, researchers have investigated models in which an adversary can create malicious PUFs with arbitrary behavior. Researchers have considered both malicious PUFs that might be stateful, as well as malicious PUFs that can have arbitrary behavior but are guaranteed to be stateless.
We settle the main open questions regarding secure computation in the malicious-PUF model:
* We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious) stateful PUFs.
* If the attacker is limited to creating (malicious) stateless PUFs, then universally composable two-party computation is possible without computational assumptions
Impossibility of Growing Quantum Bit Commitments
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is often, more correctly, called key growing.
Given a short key as a seed, QKD enables two parties, connected by an insecure
quantum channel, to generate a secret key of arbitrary length. Conversely, no
key agreement is possible without access to an initial key. Here, we consider
another fundamental cryptographic task, commitments. While, similar to key
agreement, commitments cannot be realized from scratch, we ask whether they may
be grown. That is, given the ability to commit to a fixed number of bits, is
there a way to augment this to commitments to strings of arbitrary length?
Using recently developed information-theoretic techniques, we answer this
question to the negative.Comment: 10 pages, minor change
On the Oblivious Transfer Capacity of Generalized Erasure Channels against Malicious Adversaries
Noisy channels are a powerful resource for cryptography as they can be used
to obtain information-theoretically secure key agreement, commitment and
oblivious transfer protocols, among others. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a
fundamental primitive since it is complete for secure multi-party computation,
and the OT capacity characterizes how efficiently a channel can be used for
obtaining string oblivious transfer. Ahlswede and Csisz\'{a}r (\emph{ISIT'07})
presented upper and lower bounds on the OT capacity of generalized erasure
channels (GEC) against passive adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure
probability at least 1/2, the upper and lower bounds match and therefore the OT
capacity was determined. It was later proved by Pinto et al. (\emph{IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory 57(8)}) that in this case there is also a protocol against
malicious adversaries achieving the same lower bound, and hence the OT capacity
is identical for passive and malicious adversaries. In the case of GEC with
erasure probability smaller than 1/2, the known lower bound against passive
adversaries that was established by Ahlswede and Csisz\'{a}r does not match
their upper bound and it was unknown whether this OT rate could be achieved
against malicious adversaries as well. In this work we show that there is a
protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same OT rate that was
obtained against passive adversaries.
In order to obtain our results we introduce a novel use of interactive
hashing that is suitable for dealing with the case of low erasure probability
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