Modelo de Autentificación de Doble Factor

The main objective of this paper is the development of a model that allows the authentication of a user for access control using the Two-Factor Authentication model. For the development of such a model we present a secure two-factor authentication (TFA) scheme based on the user's possession of a password and a cryptographically capable device. The security of this model is end-to-end in the sense that whoever wants to access in a fraudulent way is going to find it difficult and thus guarantee the security of the user of the system, the algorithm used was Cryptographic Networks, which is a double authentication model. Also the programming language cakephp 4.0 was used, in addition to using the visual studio code program to perform the algorithms required for the double authentication model to work.El presente artículo tiene como objetivo principal el desarrollo de un modelo que permita la autentificación de un usuario para el control de accesos mediante el modelo de Autentificación de doble factor. Para el desarrollo de dicho modelo presentamos un esquema seguro de autentificación de dos factores(TFA) basado en la posesión por el usuario de una contraseña y un dispositivo con capacidad criptográfica. La seguridad de este modelo es de extremo a extremo en el sentido de que el que quiera acceder de una manera fraudulenta se le va a complicar y asi garantizar la seguridad del usuario de dicho sistema, se tuvo como algoritmo Redes criptográficas, el cual es un modelo de doble autentificación. Así mismo se utilizó el lenguaje de programación cakephp 4.0, además de utilizar el programa visual studio code para poder realizar los algoritmos requeridos para que funciones el modelo de doble autentificación

Highly-Efficient and Composable Password-Protected Secret Sharing (Or: How to Protect Your Bitcoin Wallet Online)

PPSS is a central primitive introduced by Bagherzandi et al [BJSL10] which allows a user to store a secret among n servers such that the user can later reconstruct the secret with the sole possession of a single password by contacting t+1 servers for t<n. At the same time, an attacker breaking into t of these servers - and controlling all communication channels - learns nothing about the secret (or the password). Thus, PPSS schemes are ideal for on-line storing of valuable secrets when retrieval solely relies on a memorizable password. We show the most efficient Password-Protected Secret Sharing (PPSS) to date (and its implied Threshold-PAKE scheme), which is optimal in round communication as in Jarecki et al [JKK14] but which improves computation and communication complexity over that scheme requiring a single per-server exponentiation for the client and a single exponentiation for the server. As with the schemes from [JKK14] and Camenisch et al [CLLN14], we do not require secure channels or PKI other than in the initialization stage. We prove the security of our PPSS scheme in the Universally Composable (UC) model. For this we present a UC definition of PPSS that relaxes the UC formalism of [CLLN14] in a way that enables more efficient PPSS schemes (by dispensing with the need to extract the user\u27s password in the simulation) and present a UC-based definition of Oblivious PRF (OPRF) that is more general than the (Verifiable) OPRF definition from [JKK14] and is also crucial for enabling our performance optimization