38,980 research outputs found
Interactive Unawareness Revisited
We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (HMS). We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which
capture different notions of validity. These axiomatizations allow us to
compare the HMS approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and two
other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica
and Rustichini. We show that the differences between the HMS approach and the
others are mainly due to the notion of validity used and the fact that the HMS
is based on a 3-valued propositional logic.Comment: 26 page
Multi-Agent Only-Knowing Revisited
Levesque introduced the notion of only-knowing to precisely capture the
beliefs of a knowledge base. He also showed how only-knowing can be used to
formalize non-monotonic behavior within a monotonic logic. Despite its appeal,
all attempts to extend only-knowing to the many agent case have undesirable
properties. A belief model by Halpern and Lakemeyer, for instance, appeals to
proof-theoretic constructs in the semantics and needs to axiomatize validity as
part of the logic. It is also not clear how to generalize their ideas to a
first-order case. In this paper, we propose a new account of multi-agent
only-knowing which, for the first time, has a natural possible-world semantics
for a quantified language with equality. We then provide, for the propositional
fragment, a sound and complete axiomatization that faithfully lifts Levesque's
proof theory to the many agent case. We also discuss comparisons to the earlier
approach by Halpern and Lakemeyer.Comment: Appears in Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning 201
Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism in Paolo Parrini's Positive Philosophy
In this work, I discuss the role of Husserlās phenomenology in Paolo Parriniās positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parriniās anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parriniās acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parriniās reflection, through a comparison of Husserlās genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesseās network model and the tradition of neutral monism
Agent-Based Models and Simulations in Economics and Social Sciences: from conceptual exploration to distinct ways of experimenting
Now that complex Agent-Based Models and computer simulations
spread over economics and social sciences - as in most sciences of complex
systems -, epistemological puzzles (re)emerge. We introduce new
epistemological tools so as to show to what precise extent each author is right
when he focuses on some empirical, instrumental or conceptual significance of
his model or simulation. By distinguishing between models and simulations,
between types of models, between types of computer simulations and between
types of empiricity, section 2 gives conceptual tools to explain the rationale of
the diverse epistemological positions presented in section 1. Finally, we claim
that a careful attention to the real multiplicity of denotational powers of
symbols at stake and then to the implicit routes of references operated by
models and computer simulations is necessary to determine, in each case, the
proper epistemic status and credibility of a given model and/or simulation
Cognitive context and arguments from ontologies for learning
The deployment of learning resources on the web by different experts has resulted in the accessibility of multiple viewpoints about the same topics. In
this work we assume that learning resources are underpinned by ontologies. Different formalizations of domains may result from different contexts, different use of
terminology, incomplete knowledge or conflicting knowledge. We define the notion of cognitive learning context which describes the cognitive context of an agent who refers to multiple and possibly inconsistent ontologies to determine the truth of a proposition. In particular we describe the cognitive states of ambiguity and inconsistency
resulting from incomplete and conflicting ontologies respectively. Conflicts between ontologies can be identified through the derivation of conflicting arguments
about a particular point of view. Arguments can be used to detect inconsistencies between ontologies. They can also be used in a dialogue between a human learner and a software tutor in order to enable the learner to justify her views and detect inconsistencies between her beliefs and the tutorās own. Two types of arguments are discussed, namely: arguments inferred directly from taxonomic relations
between concepts, and arguments about the necessary an
Belief as Willingness to Bet
We investigate modal logics of high probability having two unary modal
operators: an operator expressing probabilistic certainty and an operator
expressing probability exceeding a fixed rational threshold . Identifying knowledge with the former and belief with the latter, we may
think of as the agent's betting threshold, which leads to the motto "belief
is willingness to bet." The logic for has an
modality along with a sub-normal modality that extends
the minimal modal logic by way of four schemes relating
and , one of which is a complex scheme arising out of a theorem due to
Scott. Lenzen was the first to use Scott's theorem to show that a version of
this logic is sound and complete for the probability interpretation. We
reformulate Lenzen's results and present them here in a modern and accessible
form. In addition, we introduce a new epistemic neighborhood semantics that
will be more familiar to modern modal logicians. Using Scott's theorem, we
provide the Lenzen-derivative properties that must be imposed on finite
epistemic neighborhood models so as to guarantee the existence of a probability
measure respecting the neighborhood function in the appropriate way for
threshold . This yields a link between probabilistic and modal
neighborhood semantics that we hope will be of use in future work on modal
logics of qualitative probability. We leave open the question of which
properties must be imposed on finite epistemic neighborhood models so as to
guarantee existence of an appropriate probability measure for thresholds
.Comment: Removed date from v1 to avoid confusion on citation/reference,
otherwise identical to v
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