Actuating (Auto)Poiesis

This paper claims that the use of the computer as generative methodological tool for designing urban and building scenarios (when perceived systematically) is a misnomer, because the typical approach does not account for the incompleteness of computational processes. We will argue that the computerisation of architectural and urban scenarios with autopoietic and/or artificial life simulations does not account for what Edsger W. Dijkstra called “radical novelty”; and Gilles Deleuze termed “line of flight”. Typical computational methods do not open up genuine alternatives that produce radical morphologies. Our argument is predicated on the dominant notion of computation as opposed to a critique of computation per se. A critical analysis of the perception of novelty is made to support our view, and its connection with the incompleteness of axiomatic systems is explored in relation to three phases of cybernetic enquiry. Our argument draws on the ontologies of Alfred North Whitehead and Gilles Deleuze, which we utilise to reorient computational design to emphasise the potential of generating radical novelty and identify the inherent locus therein a matter of nonhuman decision-making

The External Tape Hypothesis: a Turing machine based approach to cognitive computation

The symbol processing or "classical cognitivist" approach to mental computation suggests that the cognitive architecture operates rather like a digital computer. The components of the architecture are input, output and central systems. The input and output systems communicate with both the internal and external environments of the cognizer and transmit codes to and from the rule governed, central processing system which operates on structured representational expressions in the internal environment. The connectionist approach, by contrast, suggests that the cognitive architecture should be thought of as a network of interconnected neuron-like processing elements (nodes) which operates rather like a brain. Connectionism distinguishes input, output and central or "hidden" layers of nodes. Connectionists claim that internal processing consists not of the rule governed manipulation of structured symbolic expressions, but of the excitation and inhibition of activity and the alteration of connection strengths via message passing within and between layers of nodes in the network. A central claim of the thesis is that neither symbol processing nor connectionism provides an adequate characterization of the role of the external environment in cognitive computation. An alternative approach, called the External Tape Hypothesis (ETH), is developed which claims, on the basis of Turing's analysis of routine computation, that the Turing machine model can be used as the basis for a theory which includes the environment as an essential part of the cognitive architecture. The environment is thought of as the tape, and the brain as the control of a Turing machine. Finite state automata, Turing machines, and universal Turing machines are described, including details of Turing's original universal machine construction. A short account of relevant aspects of the history of digital computation is followed by a critique of the symbol processing approach as it is construed by influential proponents such as Allen Newell and Zenon Pylyshyn among others. The External Tape Hypothesis is then developed as an alternative theoretical basis. In the final chapter, the ETH is combined with the notion of a self-describing Turing machine to provide the basis for an account of thinking and the development of internal representations

Computations and Computers in the Sciences of Mind and Brain

Computationalism says that brains are computing mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that perform computations. At present, there is no consensus on how to formulate computationalism precisely or adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, or between different versions of computationalism. An important reason for the current impasse is the lack of a satisfactory philosophical account of computing mechanisms. The main goal of this dissertation is to offer such an account. I also believe that the history of computationalism sheds light on the current debate. By tracing different versions of computationalism to their common historical origin, we can see how the current divisions originated and understand their motivation. Reconstructing debates over computationalism in the context of their own intellectual history can contribute to philosophical progress on the relation between brains and computing mechanisms and help determine how brains and computing mechanisms are alike, and how they differ. Accordingly, my dissertation is divided into a historical part, which traces the early history of computationalism up to 1946, and a philosophical part, which offers an account of computing mechanisms. The two main ideas developed in this dissertation are that (1) computational states are to be identified functionally not semantically, and (2) computing mechanisms are to be studied by functional analysis. The resulting account of computing mechanism, which I call the functional account of computing mechanisms, can be used to identify computing mechanisms and the functions they compute. I use the functional account of computing mechanisms to taxonomize computing mechanisms based on their different computing power, and I use this taxonomy of computing mechanisms to taxonomize different versions of computationalism based on the functional properties that they ascribe to brains. By doing so, I begin to tease out empirically testable statements about the functional organization of the brain that different versions of computationalism are committed to. I submit that when computationalism is reformulated in the more explicit and precise way I propose, the disputes about computationalism can be adjudicated on the grounds of empirical evidence from neuroscience

On the structure of intractable sets

There are two parts to this dissertation. The first part is motivated by nothing less than a reexamination of what it means for a set to be NP-complete. Are there sets in NP that in a mathematically meaningful sense should be considered to be complete for NP, but that are not NP-complete in the usual sense that every set in NP is ≤q[subscript]spmP-reducible to it? We define a noneffective binary relation that makes precise the notion that the complexity of A is polynomially related to the complexity of B, This relation yields new completeness and hardness notions for complexity classes, and we show that there are sets that are hard for NP that are not NP-hard in the usual sense. We also show that there are sets that must be considered to be complete for E that are not even ≤q[subscript]spTP-complete for E;In a certain way, hardness and completeness with respect to the relation we define is related to the notion of almost everywhere (a.e.) complexity, and so we initiate this study by first investigating this notion. We state and prove a deterministic time hierarchy theorem for a.e. complexity that is as tight as the Hartmanis-Stearns hierarchy theorem for infinitely often complexity. This result is a significant improvement over all previously known hierarchy theorems for a.e. complex sets. We derive similar, very tight, hierarchy theorems for sets that cannot be a.e. complex for syntactic reasons, but for which, intuitively, a.e. complex notions should exit. Similar results are applied to the study of P-printable sets and sets of low generalized Kolmogorov complexity;The second part of this study deals with relativization. Does the fact that DTIME(O (n)) ≠ NTIME(n) help in leading us to a proof that P ≠ NP? Does one imply the other? We seek evidence that this is a hard . We construct an oracle that answers this question in the affirmative, and we construct an oracle that answers this question in the negative. We conclude that the result that DTIME(O (n)) ≠ NTIME(n) does not imply P ≠ NP by recursive theoretic techniques;Finally, we study the relationships between P, NP, and the unambiguous and random time classes UP, and RP. Questions concerning these relationships are motivated by complexity issues to public-key cryptosystems. We prove that there exists a recursive oracle A such that P[superscript]A ≠ UP[superscript]A≠ NP[superscript]A, and such that the first inequality is strong, i.e., there exists a P[superscript]A-immune set in UP[superscript]A. Further, we constructed a recursive oracle B such that UP[superscript]B contains an RP[superscript]B-immune set. As a corollary we obtain P[superscript]B ≠ RB[superscript]B≠ NP[superscript]B and both inequalities are strong. By use of the techniques employed in the proof that P[superscript]A≠ UP[superscript]A≠ NP[superscript]A, we are also able to solve an open problem raised by Book, Long and Selman

Stepping Beyond the Newtonian Paradigm in Biology. Towards an Integrable Model of Life: Accelerating Discovery in the Biological Foundations of Science

The INBIOSA project brings together a group of experts across many disciplines who believe that science requires a revolutionary transformative step in order to address many of the vexing challenges presented by the world. It is INBIOSA’s purpose to enable the focused collaboration of an interdisciplinary community of original thinkers. This paper sets out the case for support for this effort. The focus of the transformative research program proposal is biology-centric. We admit that biology to date has been more fact-oriented and less theoretical than physics. However, the key leverageable idea is that careful extension of the science of living systems can be more effectively applied to some of our most vexing modern problems than the prevailing scheme, derived from abstractions in physics. While these have some universal application and demonstrate computational advantages, they are not theoretically mandated for the living. A new set of mathematical abstractions derived from biology can now be similarly extended. This is made possible by leveraging new formal tools to understand abstraction and enable computability. [The latter has a much expanded meaning in our context from the one known and used in computer science and biology today, that is "by rote algorithmic means", since it is not known if a living system is computable in this sense (Mossio et al., 2009).] Two major challenges constitute the effort. The first challenge is to design an original general system of abstractions within the biological domain. The initial issue is descriptive leading to the explanatory. There has not yet been a serious formal examination of the abstractions of the biological domain. What is used today is an amalgam; much is inherited from physics (via the bridging abstractions of chemistry) and there are many new abstractions from advances in mathematics (incentivized by the need for more capable computational analyses). Interspersed are abstractions, concepts and underlying assumptions “native” to biology and distinct from the mechanical language of physics and computation as we know them. A pressing agenda should be to single out the most concrete and at the same time the most fundamental process-units in biology and to recruit them into the descriptive domain. Therefore, the first challenge is to build a coherent formal system of abstractions and operations that is truly native to living systems. Nothing will be thrown away, but many common methods will be philosophically recast, just as in physics relativity subsumed and reinterpreted Newtonian mechanics. This step is required because we need a comprehensible, formal system to apply in many domains. Emphasis should be placed on the distinction between multi-perspective analysis and synthesis and on what could be the basic terms or tools needed. The second challenge is relatively simple: the actual application of this set of biology-centric ways and means to cross-disciplinary problems. In its early stages, this will seem to be a “new science”. This White Paper sets out the case of continuing support of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for transformative research in biology and information processing centered on paradigm changes in the epistemological, ontological, mathematical and computational bases of the science of living systems. Today, curiously, living systems cannot be said to be anything more than dissipative structures organized internally by genetic information. There is not anything substantially different from abiotic systems other than the empirical nature of their robustness. We believe that there are other new and unique properties and patterns comprehensible at this bio-logical level. The report lays out a fundamental set of approaches to articulate these properties and patterns, and is composed as follows. Sections 1 through 4 (preamble, introduction, motivation and major biomathematical problems) are incipient. Section 5 describes the issues affecting Integral Biomathics and Section 6 -- the aspects of the Grand Challenge we face with this project. Section 7 contemplates the effort to formalize a General Theory of Living Systems (GTLS) from what we have today. The goal is to have a formal system, equivalent to that which exists in the physics community. Here we define how to perceive the role of time in biology. Section 8 describes the initial efforts to apply this general theory of living systems in many domains, with special emphasis on crossdisciplinary problems and multiple domains spanning both “hard” and “soft” sciences. The expected result is a coherent collection of integrated mathematical techniques. Section 9 discusses the first two test cases, project proposals, of our approach. They are designed to demonstrate the ability of our approach to address “wicked problems” which span across physics, chemistry, biology, societies and societal dynamics. The solutions require integrated measurable results at multiple levels known as “grand challenges” to existing methods. Finally, Section 10 adheres to an appeal for action, advocating the necessity for further long-term support of the INBIOSA program. The report is concluded with preliminary non-exclusive list of challenging research themes to address, as well as required administrative actions. The efforts described in the ten sections of this White Paper will proceed concurrently. Collectively, they describe a program that can be managed and measured as it progresses

Chiasmic Rhetoric: Alan Turing Between Bodies and Words

This Dissertation analyzes the life and writing of inventor and scientist Alan Turing in order to identify and theorize chiasmic relations between bodies and texts. Chiasmic rhetoric, as I develop throughout the Dissertation, is the dynamic processes between materials and discourses that interact to construct powerful rhetorical effect, shape bodies, and also compose new knowledges. My research here extends our knowledge of the rhetoric of science by demonstrating the ways that Alan Turing\u27s embodied experiences shape his rhetoric. Turing is an unusual figure for research on bodily rhetoric and embodied knowledge. He is often associated with disembodied knowledge and as his inventions are said to move intelligence towards greater abstraction and away from human bodies. However, this Dissertation exposes the many ways that bodies are active in shaping and producing knowledge even within Turing\u27s scientific and technical writing. I identify how, in every text that Turing produces, chiasmic interactions between bodies and texts actively compose Turing\u27s scientific knowledge and technical innovations towards digital computation and artificial intelligence. His knowledge, thus, is not composed out of abstract logic, or neutral technological advances. Rather, his knowledge and invention are composed and in through discourses and embodied experiences. Given that bodies and discourses are also composed within social and political power dynamics, then the political, social, and personal embodied experiences that compose Turing\u27s life and his embodiment also compose his texts, rhetoric, inventions, and science. Throughout the Dissertation, I develop chiasmic rhetoric as it develops in the rhetorical figure of chiasmus, as intersecting bodies and discourse, dynamic and productive, and potentially destabilizing. I conclude by proposing a pedagogy of care and disorientation that are attuned to the complex embodiment of students interacting with texts in our technical writing and composition classrooms