Trying to Grasp a Sketch of a Brain for Grasping

Ritter H, Haschke R, Steil JJ. Trying to Grasp a Sketch of a Brain for Grasping. In: Sendhoff B, ed. Creating Brain-Like Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence; 5436. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer; 2009: 84-102

The Limits of Thought and the Mind-Body Problem

This paper gives an account of Colin McGinn's essay: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?". McGinn's answer to his own essay title is that the problem is forever beyond us due to the particular nature of our cognitive abilities.The present author offers a number of criticisms of the arguments which support this conclusion

Soft hand exoskeleton actuated with SMA fibres

The current project is based on developing a wearable and comfortable soft hand exoskeleton actuated with Shape Memory Alloy (SMA) fibres. The main purpose of this device is both, to be involved in rehabilitation exercises and assistive therapies for patients suffering from hands’ damage. This innovative idea presents an affordable and convenient alternative in the exoskeletons’ field, combining a light and non-expensive actuation along with biocompatible materials specifically tailored to patient’s hand anatomy. To generate the perfectly fitting glove, plastic moulds were 3D-printed after sketching them with Creo Parametric software. Then, silicone was poured into the casts and it cured maintaining the desired shape. Taking advantage of Joule’s effect, the current which flows though the SMA wires is capable of increasing temperature, causing a microstructure change and thus inducing contraction. This motion can be accurately controlled by a MATLAB-Simulink interface, achieving both flexion and extension so as to perform pincer grip. Furthermore, a force sensor embedded on silicone finger’s tip is used as a force feedback to evaluate the pressure applied by the subject when holding distinct objects.Ingeniería Biomédica (Plan 2010

Cognitive science and epistemic openness

Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism

Did Aristotle have a concept of 'intuition'? Some thoughts on translating 'nous'.

In this paper Baltussen proposes to review existing translations of 'nous' in Aristotle in order to show that translating it as 'intuition' is problematic. A proposal to find a new direction for interpreting the term is given, based on a richer understanding of the modern notion of intuition in cognitive psychology. The paper ends by adding some passages to the usual set which deserve further investigation

The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory

A dynamic model for action understanding and goal-directed imitation

The understanding of other individuals' actions is a fundamental cognitive skill for all species living in social groups. Recent neurophysiological evidence suggests that an observer may achieve the understanding by mapping visual information onto his own motor repertoire to reproduce the action effect. However, due to differences in embodiment, environmental constraints or motor skills, this mapping very often cannot be direct. In this paper, we present a dynamic network model which represents in its layers the functionality of neurons in different interconnected brain areas known to be involved in action observation/execution tasks. The model aims at substantiating the idea that action understanding is a continuous process which combines sensory evidence, prior task knowledge and a goal-directed matching of action observation and action execution. The model is tested in variations of an imitation task in which an observer with dissimilar embodiment tries to reproduce the perceived or inferred end-state of a grasping-placing sequence. We also propose and test a biologically plausible learning scheme which allows establishing during practice a goal-directed organization of the distributed network. The modeling results are discussed with respect to recent experimental findings in action observation/execution studies.European Commission JAST project IST-2-003747-I

Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development

On standard readings of Grice, Gricean communication requires (a) possession of a concept of belief, (b) the ability to make complex inferences about others’ goal-directed behaviour, and (c) the ability to entertain fourth order meta-representations. To the extent that these abilities are pre-requisites of Gricean communication they are inconsistent with the view that Gricean communication could play a role in their development. In this paper, I argue that a class of ‘minimally Gricean acts’ satisfy the intentional structure described by Grice, but require none of abilities (a)-(c). As a result, Gricean communicative abilities may indeed contribute to the development of (a)-(c) – in particular, by enabling language development. This conclusion has important implications for our theorising about cognitive development