Truthful Mechanisms for Delivery with Agents

We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ packages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in an undirected graph, and $k$ mobile heterogeneous agents, each being able to transport one package at a time. Following a recent model [Baertschi et al. 2017], each agent i has a different rate of energy consumption per unit distance traveled, i.e., its weight. We are interested in optimizing or approximating the total energy consumption over all selected agents. Unlike previous research, we assume the weights to be private values known only to the respective agents. We present three different mechanisms which select, route and pay the agents in a truthful way that guarantees voluntary participation of the agents, while approximating the optimum energy consumption by a constant factor. To this end, we analyze a previous structural result and an approximation algorithm given in [Baertschi et al. 2017]. Finally, we show that for some instances in the case of a single package, the sum of the payments can be bounded in terms of the optimum

Collective fast delivery by energy-efficient agents

We consider k mobile agents initially located at distinct nodes of an undirected graph (on n nodes, with edge lengths) that have to deliver a single item from a given source node s to a given target node t. The agents can move along the edges of the graph, starting at time 0 with respect to the following: Each agent i has a weight w_i that defines the rate of energy consumption while travelling a distance in the graph, and a velocity v_i with which it can move. We are interested in schedules (operating the k agents) that result in a small delivery time T (time when the package arrives at t), and small total energy consumption E. Concretely, we ask for a schedule that: either (i) Minimizes T, (ii) Minimizes lexicographically (T,E) (prioritizing fast delivery), or (iii) Minimizes epsilon*T + (1-epsilon)*E, for a given epsilon, 0<epsilon<1. We show that (i) is solvable in polynomial time, and show that (ii) is polynomial-time solvable for uniform velocities and solvable in time O(n + k log k) for arbitrary velocities on paths, but in general is NP-hard even on planar graphs. As a corollary of our hardness result, (iii) is NP-hard, too. We show that there is a 3-approximation algorithm for (iii) using a single agent.Comment: In an extended abstract of this paper [MFCS 2018], we erroneously claimed the single agent approach for variant (iii) to have approximation ratio