7,726 research outputs found
Usability of Humanly Computable Passwords
Reusing passwords across multiple websites is a common practice that
compromises security. Recently, Blum and Vempala have proposed password
strategies to help people calculate, in their heads, passwords for different
sites without dependence on third-party tools or external devices. Thus far,
the security and efficiency of these "mental algorithms" has been analyzed only
theoretically. But are such methods usable? We present the first usability
study of humanly computable password strategies, involving a learning phase (to
learn a password strategy), then a rehearsal phase (to login to a few
websites), and multiple follow-up tests. In our user study, with training,
participants were able to calculate a deterministic eight-character password
for an arbitrary new website in under 20 seconds
Why Do Developers Get Password Storage Wrong? A Qualitative Usability Study
Passwords are still a mainstay of various security systems, as well as the
cause of many usability issues. For end-users, many of these issues have been
studied extensively, highlighting problems and informing design decisions for
better policies and motivating research into alternatives. However, end-users
are not the only ones who have usability problems with passwords! Developers
who are tasked with writing the code by which passwords are stored must do so
securely. Yet history has shown that this complex task often fails due to human
error with catastrophic results. While an end-user who selects a bad password
can have dire consequences, the consequences of a developer who forgets to hash
and salt a password database can lead to far larger problems. In this paper we
present a first qualitative usability study with 20 computer science students
to discover how developers deal with password storage and to inform research
into aiding developers in the creation of secure password systems
Towards Human Computable Passwords
An interesting challenge for the cryptography community is to design
authentication protocols that are so simple that a human can execute them
without relying on a fully trusted computer. We propose several candidate
authentication protocols for a setting in which the human user can only receive
assistance from a semi-trusted computer --- a computer that stores information
and performs computations correctly but does not provide confidentiality. Our
schemes use a semi-trusted computer to store and display public challenges
. The human user memorizes a random secret mapping
and authenticates by computing responses
to a sequence of public challenges where
is a function that is easy for the
human to evaluate. We prove that any statistical adversary needs to sample
challenge-response pairs to recover , for
a security parameter that depends on two key properties of . To
obtain our results, we apply the general hypercontractivity theorem to lower
bound the statistical dimension of the distribution over challenge-response
pairs induced by and . Our lower bounds apply to arbitrary
functions (not just to functions that are easy for a human to evaluate),
and generalize recent results of Feldman et al. As an application, we propose a
family of human computable password functions in which the user
needs to perform primitive operations (e.g., adding two digits or
remembering ), and we show that .
For these schemes, we prove that forging passwords is equivalent to recovering
the secret mapping. Thus, our human computable password schemes can maintain
strong security guarantees even after an adversary has observed the user login
to many different accounts.Comment: Fixed bug in definition of Q^{f,j} and modified proofs accordingl
GOTCHA Password Hackers!
We introduce GOTCHAs (Generating panOptic Turing Tests to Tell Computers and
Humans Apart) as a way of preventing automated offline dictionary attacks
against user selected passwords. A GOTCHA is a randomized puzzle generation
protocol, which involves interaction between a computer and a human.
Informally, a GOTCHA should satisfy two key properties: (1) The puzzles are
easy for the human to solve. (2) The puzzles are hard for a computer to solve
even if it has the random bits used by the computer to generate the final
puzzle --- unlike a CAPTCHA. Our main theorem demonstrates that GOTCHAs can be
used to mitigate the threat of offline dictionary attacks against passwords by
ensuring that a password cracker must receive constant feedback from a human
being while mounting an attack. Finally, we provide a candidate construction of
GOTCHAs based on Inkblot images. Our construction relies on the usability
assumption that users can recognize the phrases that they originally used to
describe each Inkblot image --- a much weaker usability assumption than
previous password systems based on Inkblots which required users to recall
their phrase exactly. We conduct a user study to evaluate the usability of our
GOTCHA construction. We also generate a GOTCHA challenge where we encourage
artificial intelligence and security researchers to try to crack several
passwords protected with our scheme.Comment: 2013 ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec
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Human Factors Standards and the Hard Human Factor Problems: Observations on Medical Usability Standards
With increasing variety and sophistication of computer-based medical devices, and more diverse users and use environments, usability is essential, especially to ensure safety. Usability standards and guidelines play an important role. We reviewed several, focusing on the IEC 62366 and 60601 sets. It is plausible that these standards have reduced risks for patients, but we raise concerns regarding: (1) complex design trade-offs that are not addressed, (2) a focus on user interface design (e.g., making alarms audible) to the detriment of other human factors (e.g., ensuring users actually act upon alarms they hear), and (3) some definitions and scope restrictions that may create “blind spots”. We highlight potential related risks, e.g. that clear directives on “easier to understand” risks, though useful, may preclude mitigating other, more “difficult” ones; but ask to what extent these negative effects can be avoided by standard writers, given objective constraints. Our critique is motivated by current research and incident reports, and considers standards from other domains and countries. It is meant to highlight problems, relevant to designers, standards committees, and human factors researchers, and to trigger discussion about the potential and limits of standards
ActiveRemediation: The Search for Lead Pipes in Flint, Michigan
We detail our ongoing work in Flint, Michigan to detect pipes made of lead
and other hazardous metals. After elevated levels of lead were detected in
residents' drinking water, followed by an increase in blood lead levels in area
children, the state and federal governments directed over $125 million to
replace water service lines, the pipes connecting each home to the water
system. In the absence of accurate records, and with the high cost of
determining buried pipe materials, we put forth a number of predictive and
procedural tools to aid in the search and removal of lead infrastructure.
Alongside these statistical and machine learning approaches, we describe our
interactions with government officials in recommending homes for both
inspection and replacement, with a focus on the statistical model that adapts
to incoming information. Finally, in light of discussions about increased
spending on infrastructure development by the federal government, we explore
how our approach generalizes beyond Flint to other municipalities nationwide.Comment: 10 pages, 10 figures, To appear in KDD 2018, For associated
promotional video, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbIn_axYu9
Ensuring patients privacy in a cryptographic-based-electronic health records using bio-cryptography
Several recent works have proposed and implemented cryptography as a means to
preserve privacy and security of patients health data. Nevertheless, the
weakest point of electronic health record (EHR) systems that relied on these
cryptographic schemes is key management. Thus, this paper presents the
development of privacy and security system for cryptography-based-EHR by taking
advantage of the uniqueness of fingerprint and iris characteristic features to
secure cryptographic keys in a bio-cryptography framework. The results of the
system evaluation showed significant improvements in terms of time efficiency
of this approach to cryptographic-based-EHR. Both the fuzzy vault and fuzzy
commitment demonstrated false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0%, which reduces the
likelihood of imposters gaining successful access to the keys protecting
patients protected health information. This result also justifies the
feasibility of implementing fuzzy key binding scheme in real applications,
especially fuzzy vault which demonstrated a better performance during key
reconstruction
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