Human-Machine Cooperative Decision Making

Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der gemeinsamen Entscheidungsfindung in der Mensch-Maschine-Kooperation und liefert neue Erkenntnisse, welche von der theoretischen Modellierung bis zu experimentellen Untersuchungen reichen. Zunächst wird eine methodische Klassifikation bestehender Forschung zur Mensch-Maschine-Kooperation vorgenommen und der Forschungsfokus dieser Dissertation mithilfe eines vorgestellten Taxonomiemodells der Mensch-Maschine-Kooperation, dem Butterfly-Modell, abgegrenzt. Darauffolgend stellt die Dissertation zwei mathematische Verhaltensmodelle der gemeinsamen Entscheidungsfindung von Mensch und Maschine vor: das Adaptive Verhandlungsmodell und den n-stufigen War of Attrition. Beide modellieren den Einigungsprozess zweier emanzipierter Kooperationspartner und unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich ihrer Ursprünge, welche in der Verhandlungs- beziehungsweise Spieltheorie liegen. Zusätzlich wird eine Studie vorgestellt, die die Eignung der vorgeschlagenen mathematischen Modelle zur Beschreibung des menschlichen Nachgebeverhaltens in kooperativen Entscheidungsfindungs-Prozessen nachweist. Darauf aufbauend werden zwei modellbasierte Automationsdesigns bereitgestellt, welche die Entwicklung von Maschinen ermöglichen, die an einem Einigungsprozess mit einem Menschen teilnehmen können. Zuletzt werden zwei experimentelle Untersuchungen der vorgeschlagenen Automationsdesigns im Kontext von teleoperierten mobilen Robotern in Such- und Rettungsszenarien und anhand einer Anwendung in einem hochautomatisierten Fahrzeug präsentiert. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse liefern empirische Evidenz für die Überlegenheit der vorgestellten modellbasierten Automationsdesigns gegenüber den bisherigen Ansätzen in den Aspekten der objektiven kooperativen Performanz, des menschlichen Vertrauens in die Interaktion mit der Maschine und der Nutzerzufriedenheit. So zeigt diese Dissertation, dass Menschen eine emanzipierte Interaktion mit Bezug auf die Entscheidungsfindung bevorzugen, und leistet einen wertvollen Beitrag zur vollumfänglichen Betrachtung und Verwirklichung von Mensch-Maschine-Kooperationen

Human-Machine Cooperative Decision Making

The research reported in this thesis focuses on the decision making aspect of human-machine cooperation and reveals new insights from theoretical modeling to experimental evaluations: Two mathematical behavior models of two emancipated cooperation partners in a cooperative decision making process are introduced. The model-based automation designs are experimentally evaluated and thereby demonstrate their benefits compared to state-of-the-art approaches

Driving style recognition for intelligent vehicle control and advanced driver assistance: a survey

Driver driving style plays an important role in vehicle energy management as well as driving safety. Furthermore, it is key for advance driver assistance systems development, toward increasing levels of vehicle automation. This fact has motivated numerous research and development efforts on driving style identification and classification. This paper provides a survey on driving style characterization and recognition revising a variety of algorithms, with particular emphasis on machine learning approaches based on current and future trends. Applications of driving style recognition to intelligent vehicle controls are also briefly discussed, including experts' predictions of the future development

Human-Machine Cooperative Decision Making

The research reported in this thesis focuses on the decision making aspect of human-machine cooperation and reveals new insights from theoretical modeling to experimental evaluations: Two mathematical behavior models of two emancipated cooperation partners in a cooperative decision making process are introduced. The model-based automation designs are experimentally evaluated and thereby demonstrate their benefits compared to state-of-the-art approaches

End games, time inconsistency and European economic and monetary union

The vision of a monetary union in Europe is as old as the European Community itself, and yet despite the vast amounts of time, effort and political capital spent to build such a system, little progress has to date been made. Most recently, the Maastricht Treaty has set out a strategy and a timetable for monetary union in the Community. One can only ask if there is the likelihood that the process be once more obstructed and if so what the causes might be. This paper, presented in the form of a descriptive analysis of the issues, was motivated by this line of thought. Clearly, there would be endless adjustment difficulties involved in the transitionary process: most have been well documented. To date though, the consequences of the uncontrollable behaviour of rational economic agents within the context of this situation has been left largely unchallenged. The aim of this paper is to attempt to shed light on this issue. The analysis described is within a simple game theoretic framework. When it is declared that monetary union is to be formed. the various games begin. Unlike before, rational agents - or the players in the game - now face finite time horizons. They engage in activities that enable them to exploit the incentives that have become available to them under these conditions. These end game activities have detrimental effects on the old and new regimes and invariably render the plan (proposed monetary union) time inconsistent. And they, clearly are inevitable: rational agents will always seek to maximise their welfare no matter what the circumstances are. As such and depending of course on the type of end game played. monetary union in its transitionary phases will always be in danger of being derailed. All that the policy makers and negotiators can do is to seek ways of minimising these activities. While strongly endorsing the convergence criteria and the penalties for any intentional deviating activity, every attempt should be made by these bodies to build up a credible reputation for the transitionary process and institutional set up once the monetary union has been established. If the monetary union is deemed credible, i.e. the players perceive it to be a worthwhile goal, then rational agents will seek to avoid engaging themselves in these activities