4,391 research outputs found

    The Relationship Between Employee Perceptions of the Employment Game and Their Perceptions of Cooperative Knowledge Behavior in High Tech Firms

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    The relationship between knowledge sharing and organizational performance for high technology start-up companies is not well understood. Using game theory and the concept of competitive advantage through human resource management, I examine employee perceptions of the employment game relating to cooperative knowledge behavior and firm performance as an entry point into researching organizational knowledge utilization. I draw upon classical game theory to develop four measures of perceptions critical to game playing and apply these to organizational situations via a survey instrument. I propose that perceptions of the employment game held by organization members are determinants of cooperative knowledge sharing and subsequently firm performance. I analyze survey data gathered from high-tech workers using both regression and path analysis techniques. The results from this study offer new insights into methods for measuring both the connections between knowledge work and firm performance and the perceptions critical for fostering collaborative knowledge work in high tech firms. Results of the study show a significant relationship between the game theory construct of reciprocity, knowledge building behavior and firm performance. The mediation model was weakly supported but shows potential usefulness for further research in the field of strategic human resource management

    Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

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    Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

    Assessing the Relevancy of National Culture in Predicting the Efficacy of Constraints in the Information Systems Consulting Domain

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    Opportunism is present in professional services and, as a result, organizations adopt mechanisms to constrain it. Despite the work on constraining opportunistic consultants, researchers have generally ignored the potential impact of national culture on the efficacy of constraint mechanisms. Using the theory of relationship constraints (TRC), this study examines the effectiveness of different constraint mechanisms for information systems (IS) consultants in the United States and China based on different levels of information asymmetry, tacit and explicit knowledge. While we found support in both cultures for the salience of these dimensions, we also found important distinctions for the effectiveness of different constraints between the cultures. Legal constraints are more effective in China while social constraints are more effective in the United States. While TRC is relevant in both cultures, national culture moderates the effectiveness of various constraint mechanisms and highlights the need for additional study

    Multi-agent opportunism

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    The real world is a complex place, rife with uncertainty; and prone to rapid change. Agents operating in a real-world domain need to be capable of dealing with the unexpected events that will occur as they carry out their tasks. While unexpected events are often related to failures in an agent\u27s plan, or inaccurate knowledge in an agent\u27s memory, they can also be opportunities for the agent. For example, an unexpected event may present the opportunity to achieve a goal that was previously unattainable. Similarly, real-world multi-agent systems (MASs) can benefit from the ability to exploit opportunities. These benefits include the ability for the MAS itself to better adapt to its changing environment, the ability to ensure agents obtain critical information in a timely fashion, and improvements in the overall performance of the system. In this dissertation we present a framework for multi-agent opportunism that is applicable to open systems of heterogeneous planning agents. The contributions of our research are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we provide an analysis of the critical issues that must be addressed in order to successfully exploit opportunities in a multi-agent system. This analysis can provide MAS designers and developers important guidance to incorporate multi-agent opportunism into their own systems. It also provides the fundamental underpinnings of our own specific approach to multi-agent opportunism. On the practical side, we have developed, implemented, and evaluated a specific approach to multi-agent opportunism for a particular class of multi-agent system. Our evaluation demonstrates that multi-agent opportunism can indeed be effective in systems of heterogeneous agents even when the amount of knowledge the agents share is severely limited. Our evaluation also demonstrates that agents that are capable of exploiting opportunities for their own goals are also able, using the same mechanisms, to recognize and respond to potential opportunities for the goals of other agents. Further and perhaps more interesting, we show that under some circumstances, multi-agent opportunism can be effective even when the agents are not themselves capable of single-agent opportunism

    Embodied Robot Models for Interdisciplinary Emotion Research

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    Due to their complex nature, emotions cannot be properly understood from the perspective of a single discipline. In this paper, I discuss how the use of robots as models is beneficial for interdisciplinary emotion research. Addressing this issue through the lens of my own research, I focus on a critical analysis of embodied robots models of different aspects of emotion, relate them to theories in psychology and neuroscience, and provide representative examples. I discuss concrete ways in which embodied robot models can be used to carry out interdisciplinary emotion research, assessing their contributions: as hypothetical models, and as operational models of specific emotional phenomena, of general emotion principles, and of specific emotion ``dimensions''. I conclude by discussing the advantages of using embodied robot models over other models.Peer reviewe

    Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies

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    Economic theories are increasingly popular in political science, and in particular in research on the relations between the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches of government. Among these theories, principal-agent (´PA´) and transaction cost economics (´TCE´) feature particularly high in our research agenda. Yet, pushed by the view that "the content of ´science´ is primarily the methods and rules" (King et al. 1994: 9), and working with limited resources, political scientists have tended to neglect careful theorizing. PA and TCE are taken off-the-shelf without much prior scrutiny, and past conceptual mistakes are perpetuated. This paper aims at introducing and explaining the real PA, positive agency, TCE, and incomplete contracts theories for the purposes of political analysis. In a companion paper, I show the serious mistakes perpetuated by political scientists, and I argue that, faced with a choice between those four economic theories, we should place our bets on a revised version of TCE.Theory of delegation, political science, principal-agent models, transaction costs economics

    A framework for a multi-agent planning support system : principles and illustrations

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    Contracting with General Dental Services: a mixed-methods study on factors influencing responses to contracts in English general dental practice

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    Background: Independent contractor status of NHS general dental practitioners (GDPs) and general medical practitioners (GMPs) has meant that both groups have commercial as well as professional identities. Their relationship with the state is governed by a NHS contract, the terms of which have been the focus of much negotiation and struggle in recent years. Previous study of dental contracting has taken a classical economics perspective, viewing practitioners’ behaviour as a fully rational search for contract loopholes. We apply institutional theory to this context for the first time, where individuals’ behaviour is understood as being influenced by wider institutional forces such as growing consumer demands, commercial pressures and challenges to medical professionalism. Practitioners hold values and beliefs, and carry out routines and practices which are consistent with the field’s institutional logics. By identifying institutional logics in the dental practice organisational field, we expose where tensions exist, helping to explain why contracting appears as a continual cycle of reform and resistance. Aims: To identify the factors which facilitate and hinder the use of contractual processes to manage and strategically develop General Dental Services, using a comparison with medical practice to highlight factors which are particular to NHS dental practice. Methods: Following a systematic review of health-care contracting theory and interviews with stakeholders, we undertook case studies of 16 dental and six medical practices. Case study data collection involved interviews, observation and documentary evidence; 120 interviews were undertaken in all. We tested and refined our findings using a questionnaire to GDPs and further interviews with commissioners. Results: We found that, for all three sets of actors (GDPs, GMPs, commissioners), multiple logics exist. These were interacting and sometimes in competition. We found an emergent logic of population health managerialism in dental practice, which is less compatible than the other dental practice logics of ownership responsibility, professional clinical values and entrepreneurialism. This was in contrast to medical practice, where we found a more ready acceptance of external accountability and notions of the delivery of ‘cost-effective’ care. Our quantitative work enabled us to refine and test our conceptualisations of dental practice logics. We identified that population health managerialism comprised both a logic of managerialism and a public goods logic, and that practitioners might be resistant to one and not the other. We also linked individual practitioners’ behaviour to wider institutional forces by showing that logics were predictive of responses to NHS dental contracts at the dental chair-side (the micro level), as well as predictive of approaches to wider contractual relationships with commissioners (the macro level) . Conclusions: Responses to contracts can be shaped by environmental forces and not just determined at the level of the individual. In NHS medical practice, goals are more closely aligned with commissioning goals than in general dental practice. The optimal contractual agreement between GDPs and commissioners, therefore, will be one which aims at the ‘satisfactory’ rather than the ‘ideal’; and a ‘successful’ NHS dental contract is likely to be one where neither party promotes its self-interest above the other. Future work on opportunism in health care should widen its focus beyond the self-interest of providers and look at the contribution of contextual factors such as the relationship between the government and professional bodies, the role of the media, and providers’ social and professional networks. Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme

    Vendor Firm Characteristics and Buyers\u27 Perceptions of Transaction Costs and Relationship Governance

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    The utilization of outsourced business services continues to grow as organizations focus on core competencies. Outsourced services span the gamut from financial services to information processing to engagement of third party logistic services by enterprise customers. When outsourcing business services, organizational buyers often have to select from a plethora of small, mid-sized, and large vendors that offer competing services at comparable prices. Given this choice conundrum, what factors influence buyers’ perceptions of vendors and their capacity to deliver expected value? The current research integrates three distinct, yet related, theoretical streams including transaction cost, vendor selection, and buyer-seller relational exchange in studying how vendor firm attributes affect buyers’ perceptions of the vendor as well as their willingness-to-engage in a particular type of relationship exchange with the vendor. Two separate, but conceptually-related essays are offered to add some clarity to variables influencing vendor assessment and selection. Essay 1 introduces vendor firm attributes as antecedents to the opportunism and uncertainty constructs thereby extending the transaction cost research. Specifically, Essay 1 examines how vendor firm size and reputation influence organizational buyers’ a priori perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty. Essay 2 examines the influence of buyers’ opportunism and uncertainty perceptions on their relationship governance choices. Concomitantly, Essay 2 studies how opportunism and uncertainty perceptions on the part of the buyer mediate the relationship between vendor firm characteristics and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in contractual and relational exchange/governance with a given vendor. A panel of IT buyers, across various industries, was surveyed to determine the impact of vendor attributes on buyers’ perceptions of opportunism and technological uncertainty associated with the vendor. In addition, the survey also tested the relationship between buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty and their willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds and relational exchange with the vendor. Results support the linkages between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ perceptions of opportunism and technological uncertainty. Moreover, a direct linkage was found between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ relationship preferences. Implications are discussed along with limitations and areas of future research
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