Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead

Conscious robots: what happens when a philosophical confusion becomes a societal reality?

This thesis is an investigation into philosophical issues surrounding the production of human-like robots. I will argue that there is no reason to think conscious robots will ever be built, but that supposedly conscious robots that are able to emulate consciously guided behaviour will cause severe problems for societies of the future. In chapter one, I look at the history of machines and robots and show how changing conceptions of the body, along with technological development, has led us to expect conscious robots. In chapter two, I look at some philosophical theories of mind – behaviourism, identity theory, functionalism, eliminativism - to see how they encourage the idea of conscious robots and conclude that functionalism is the theory which mainly does. In chapter three, I discuss the main objections to functionalism that have arisen in the literature and conclude they are mainly correct and cannot be answered. So, a robot that satisfies the functionalist theory of mind will only be a supposedly conscious robot. In chapter 4, I look at the main ethical theories of Western philosophy and conclude that they make the idea of robots as moral agents very dubious. In chapter 5, I look at the harm that supposedly conscious robots may inflict on societies of the future. Then finally in chapter 6, I argue that a Singularity will never happen – supposedly conscious robots will never outdo the intelligence of human beings

Soziale Roboter, Empathie und Emotionen : eine Untersuchung aus interdisziplinärer Perspektive

Bericht: «Soziale Roboter, Empathie und Emotionen»Robots, empathy, emotions, technology assessmen