Large Perceptual Distortions Of Locomotor Action Space Occur In Ground-Based Coordinates: Angular Expansion And The Large-Scale Horizontal-Vertical Illusion

What is the natural reference frame for seeing large-scale spatial scenes in locomotor action space? Prior studies indicate an asymmetric angular expansion in perceived direction in large-scale environments: Angular elevation relative to the horizon is perceptually exaggerated by a factor of 1.5, whereas azimuthal direction is exaggerated by a factor of about 1.25. Here participants made angular and spatial judgments when upright or on their sides to dissociate egocentric from allocentric reference frames. In Experiment 1, it was found that body orientation did not affect the magnitude of the up-down exaggeration of direction, suggesting that the relevant orientation reference frame for this directional bias is allocentric rather than egocentric. In Experiment 2, the comparison of large-scale horizontal and vertical extents was somewhat affected by viewer orientation, but only to the extent necessitated by the classic (5%) horizontal-vertical illusion (HVI) that is known to be retinotopic. Large-scale vertical extents continued to appear much larger than horizontal ground extents when observers lay sideways. When the visual world was reoriented in Experiment 3, the bias remained tied to the ground-based allocentric reference frame. The allocentric HVI is quantitatively consistent with differential angular exaggerations previously measured for elevation and azimuth in locomotor space. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved

Exocentric direction judgements in computer-generated displays and actual scenes

One of the most remarkable perceptual properties of common experience is that the perceived shapes of known objects are constant despite movements about them which transform their projections on the retina. This perceptual ability is one aspect of shape constancy (Thouless, 1931; Metzger, 1953; Borresen and Lichte, 1962). It requires that the viewer be able to sense and discount his or her relative position and orientation with respect to a viewed object. This discounting of relative position may be derived directly from the ranging information provided from stereopsis, from motion parallax, from vestibularly sensed rotation and translation, or from corollary information associated with voluntary movement. It is argued that: (1) errors in exocentric judgements of the azimuth of a target generated on an electronic perspective display are not viewpoint-independent, but are influenced by the specific geometry of their perspective projection; (2) elimination of binocular conflict by replacing electronic displays with actual scenes eliminates a previously reported equidistance tendency in azimuth error, but the viewpoint dependence remains; (3) the pattern of exocentrically judged azimuth error in real scenes viewed with a viewing direction depressed 22 deg and rotated + or - 22 deg with respect to a reference direction could not be explained by overestimation of the depression angle, i.e., a slant overestimation

Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive

In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.

Establishing the boundaries: the hippocampal contribution to imagining scenes

When we visualize scenes, either from our own past or invented, we impose a viewpoint for our “mind's eye” and we experience the resulting image as spatially coherent from that viewpoint. The hippocampus has been implicated in this process, but its precise contribution is unknown. We tested a specific hypothesis based on the spatial firing properties of neurons in the hippocampal formation of rats, that this region supports the construction of spatially coherent mental images by representing the locations of the environmental boundaries surrounding our viewpoint. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that hippocampal activation increases parametrically with the number of enclosing boundaries in the imagined scene. In contrast, hippocampal activity is not modulated by a nonspatial manipulation of scene complexity nor to increasing difficulty of imagining the scenes in general. Our findings identify a specific computational role for the hippocampus in mental imagery and episodic recollection

What do we perceive in a glance of a real-world scene?

What do we see when we glance at a natural scene and how does it change as the glance becomes longer? We asked naive subjects to report in a free-form format what they saw when looking at briefly presented real-life photographs. Our subjects received no specific information as to the content of each stimulus. Thus, our paradigm differs from previous studies where subjects were cued before a picture was presented and/or were probed with multiple-choice questions. In the first stage, 90 novel grayscale photographs were foveally shown to a group of 22 native-English-speaking subjects. The presentation time was chosen at random from a set of seven possible times (from 27 to 500 ms). A perceptual mask followed each photograph immediately. After each presentation, subjects reported what they had just seen as completely and truthfully as possible. In the second stage, another group of naive individuals was instructed to score each of the descriptions produced by the subjects in the first stage. Individual scores were assigned to more than a hundred different attributes. We show that within a single glance, much object- and scene-level information is perceived by human subjects. The richness of our perception, though, seems asymmetrical. Subjects tend to have a propensity toward perceiving natural scenes as being outdoor rather than indoor. The reporting of sensory- or feature-level information of a scene (such as shading and shape) consistently precedes the reporting of the semantic-level information. But once subjects recognize more semantic-level components of a scene, there is little evidence suggesting any bias toward either scene-level or object-level recognition

Human experience in the natural and built environment : implications for research policy and practice

22nd IAPS conference. Edited book of abstracts. 427 pp. University of Strathclyde, Sheffield and West of Scotland Publication. ISBN: 978-0-94-764988-3

Change blindness: eradication of gestalt strategies

Arrays of eight, texture-defined rectangles were used as stimuli in a one-shot change blindness (CB) task where there was a 50% chance that one rectangle would change orientation between two successive presentations separated by an interval. CB was eliminated by cueing the target rectangle in the first stimulus, reduced by cueing in the interval and unaffected by cueing in the second presentation. This supports the idea that a representation was formed that persisted through the interval before being 'overwritten' by the second presentation (Landman et al, 2003 Vision Research 43149–164]. Another possibility is that participants used some kind of grouping or Gestalt strategy. To test this we changed the spatial position of the rectangles in the second presentation by shifting them along imaginary spokes (by ±1 degree) emanating from the central fixation point. There was no significant difference seen in performance between this and the standard task [F(1,4)=2.565, p=0.185]. This may suggest two things: (i) Gestalt grouping is not used as a strategy in these tasks, and (ii) it gives further weight to the argument that objects may be stored and retrieved from a pre-attentional store during this task

Seeing, Sensing, and Scrutinizing

Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this <i>change blindness</i> can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and to cast new light on the way that it is—and is not—involved in visual perception. To illustrate the power of this approach, this paper surveys its use in exploring three different aspects of vision. The first concerns the general nature of <i>seeing</i>. To explain why change blindness can be easily induced in experiments but apparently not in everyday life, it is proposed that perception involves a <i>virtual representation</i>, where object representations do not accumulate, but are formed as needed. An architecture containing both attentional and nonattentional streams is proposed as a way to implement this scheme. The second aspect concerns the ability of observers to detect change even when they have no visual experience of it. This <i>sensing</i> is found to take on at least two forms: detection without visual experience (but still with conscious awareness), and detection without any awareness at all. It is proposed that these are both due to the operation of a nonattentional visual stream. The final aspect considered is the nature of visual attention itself—the mechanisms involved when <i>scrutinizing</i> items. Experiments using controlled stimuli show the existence of various limits on visual search for change. It is shown that these limits provide a powerful means to map out the attentional mechanisms involved

On The Anisotropy Of Perceived Ground Extents And The Interpretation Of Walked Distance As A Measure Of Perception

Two experiments are reported concerning the perception of ground extent to discover whether prior reports of anisotropy between frontal extents and extents in depth were consistent across different measures (visual matching and pantomime walking) and test environments (outdoor environments and virtual environments). In Experiment 1 it was found that depth extents of up to 7 m are indeed perceptually compressed relative to frontal extents in an outdoor environment, and that perceptual matching provided more precise estimates than did pantomime walking. In Experiment 2, similar anisotropies were found using similar tasks in a similar (but virtual) environment. In both experiments pantomime walking measures seemed to additionally compress the range of responses. Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis that range compression in walking measures of perceived distance might be due to proactive interference (memory contamination). It is concluded that walking measures are calibrated for perceived egocentric distance, but that pantomime walking measures may suffer range compression. Depth extents along the ground are perceptually compressed relative to frontal ground extents in a manner consistent with the angular scale expansion hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)(journal abstract