To share or withhold? contract negotiation in buyer-supplier-supplier triads

Purpose: This paper seeks to fill the literature gap that lacks of exploring negotiation strategy with competing partners under asymmetric production-cost information. The purpose of this paper is to examine firms’ optimal contract negotiation strategies in buyer–supplier–supplier triads where there are concurrent negotiations between the retailer and two competing manufacturers. Design/methodology/approach: The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain, in which the retailer has the option of segmented or unified negotiation policy, whereas the two competing manufacturers can withhold or share production cost information in the negotiation. Based on game theory, the authors derive the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices with eight possible scenarios. Optimal strategic choices and operational decisions are then explored through the comparative analysis of equilibriums of eight possible scenarios. Findings: The authors find that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies depending on manufacturers’ decisions on sharing or withholding their production-cost information. When both manufacturers share their production-cost information, the retailer will adopt a unified negotiation policy. The high-efficiency manufacturer should adopt the same information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order to gain more profit. Originality/value: The modelling helps to bring further clarity in supply chain contract negotiation by offering a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy and negotiation policy in the negotiation process form the perspectives of all engaging parties. Managerial insights derived from the research will enable retailers and manufacturers to make informed and better strategic and operational decisions to improve market competitiveness

Advances in the sociology of trust and cooperation: theory, experiments, and field studies

The problem of cooperation and social order is one of the core issues in the social sciences. The key question is how humans, groups, institutions, and countries can avoid or overcome the collective good dilemmas that could lead to a Hobbesian war of all against all. Using the general set of social dilemmas as a paradigmatic example, rigorous formal analysis can stimulate scientific progress in several ways. The book, consisting of original articles, provides state of the art examples of research along these lines: theoretical, experimental, and field studies on trust and cooperation. The theoretical work covers articles on trust and control, reputation formation, and paradigmatic articles on the benefits and caveats of abstracting reality into models. The experimental articles treat lab based tests of models of trust and reputation, and the effects of the social and institutional embeddedness on behavior in cooperative interactions and possibly emerging inequalities. The field studies test these models in applied settings such as cooperation between organizations, informal care, and different kinds of collaboration networks. The book will be exemplary for rigorous sociology and social sciences more in general in a variety of ways: There is a focus on effects of social conditions, in particular different forms of social and institutional embeddedness, on social outcomes. Theorizing about and testing of effects of social contexts on individual and group outcomes is one of the main aims of sociological research. Modelling efforts include formal explications of micro-macro links that are typically easily overlooked when argumentation is intuitive and impressionistic Extensive attention is paid to unintended effects of intentional behavior, another feature that is a direct consequence of formal theoretical modelling and in-depth data-analyses of the social processe

Advances in the Sociology of Trust and Cooperation

The book identifies conditions for trust and cooperation. It highlights unintended consequences of individually rational behavior, and shows how trust and cooperation change dependent on social embeddedness. Such analyses inspire experimental tests in lab conditions, but also tests through empirical applications in field studies. The results of this mixed-method approach can in turn be used to inspire further theoretical work

Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2016: Technische Universität Ilmenau, 09. - 11. März 2016; Band I

Übersicht der Teilkonferenzen Band I: • 11. Konferenz Mobilität und Digitalisierung (MMS 2016) • Automated Process und Service Management • Business Intelligence, Analytics und Big Data • Computational Mobility, Transportation and Logistics • CSCW & Social Computing • Cyber-Physische Systeme und digitale Wertschöpfungsnetzwerke • Digitalisierung und Privacy • e-Commerce und e-Business • E-Government – Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien im öffentlichen Sektor • E-Learning und Lern-Service-Engineering – Entwicklung, Einsatz und Evaluation technikgestützter Lehr-/Lernprozess

The political economy of Japanese and Chinese infrastructure financing governance in Indonesia: Organising alliances, institutions, and ideology

In recent years, Chinese and Japanese infrastructure financing in Southeast Asia has taken different forms, ranging from Official Development Assistance (ODA), commercial loan, export credits, direct outward investment like business-to-business (B-to-B) and public private partnership (PPP). Much of the international relations literature on Chinese and Japanese infrastructure financing argues that these forms of financing are a kind of geoeconomic statecraft. For instance, skeptical accounts tend to identify Chinese infrastructure loans with ‘debt-trap’ phenomena while seeing Japanese loans as balancing Chinese influence. This thesis contests this outside-in perspective and argues that these different forms of infrastructure financing reflect wider power relationships among socio-political and economic groups that are bound together within ideological framework of risk and technical rules. From this perspective, I argue that forms of infrastructure are not a tool to gain leverage over host countries. Neither is it a functional toolkit as the scholarly literature argues. Rather, different forms of infrastructure financing are distinct regulatory strategies by which different social groups develop alliances and unevenly distribute material benefits among them. Therefore, these regulatory strategies are not a given. They are reproduced – materially and ideologically – within the host state over time. To explain the process, the thesis introduces the term ‘regulatory complex’ which denotes an assemblage of institutions as well as ideological frameworks through which different social class forces negotiate compromises and formulate shared interests to sustain particular regulatory strategy. Essential conditions for project financing – the shifting formation of alliances, preferential policies, certain rules and mechanisms, and regulatory reforms – are reshaped through and within the regulatory complex. Regulatory organisations, financing institutions, as well as technocratic agents in infrastructure (or urban development) such as the master plan study team, ad-hoc committee, technical task forces and the like are important parts of this regulatory complex. Using qualitative comparative analysis methods, the thesis traces the dynamics of alliances and the reproduction of Japanese and Chinese regulatory complexes in Indonesia. Supported by case studies, I show how the concept of the regulatory complex offers an understanding of how the social alliances underpinning Japanese and Chinese infrastructure are managed. Crucially, these alliances are undergirded by the broader ideological projects that further build legitimacy for given regulatory strategies. Key findings extend the geographic and comparative research of the current study. Infrastructure financing is inextricably conflict-ridden. Its variegated forms are embedded within complex realities of social and political power structures in host countries and enforced by regulatory complexes over time. Intrinsic to the regulatory complex is that there is a fine line between risk management and conflict management for which both may be locked in the same institutional frame within a given period of time. Within this institutional frame, negotiated compromises among forces take shape – who gets what, when, and how

Theorising organisational power and politics

Abstract available : p.vi

UTPA Undergraduate Catalog 2007-2009

https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/edinburglegacycatalogs/1074/thumbnail.jp

UTPA Undergraduate Catalog 2013-2015

https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/edinburglegacycatalogs/1077/thumbnail.jp