Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization

Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues.Xunta de GaliciaFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. PTDC/CCI-INF/7366/2020Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. UIDB/50021/202

Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

The evolution and long-term sustenance of cooperation has consistently piqued scholarly interest across the disciplines of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental studies on collective risk social dilemma games have revealed that the risk of collective failure will affect the evolution of cooperation. In the real world individuals usually adjust their decisions based on environmental factors such as risk intensity and cooperation level. However, it is still not well understood how such conditional behaviors affect the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions scenario from a theoretical perspective. Here, we construct an evolutionary game model with repeated interactions, in which defectors decide whether to cooperate in subsequent rounds of the game based on whether the risk exceeds their tolerance threshold and whether the number of cooperators exceeds the collective goal in the early rounds of the game. We find that the introduction of conditional cooperation strategy can effectively promote the emergence of cooperation, especially when the risk is low. In addition, the risk threshold significantly affects the evolutionary outcomes, with a high risk promoting the emergence of cooperation. Importantly, when the risk of failure to reach collective goals exceeds a certain threshold, the timely transition from a defective strategy to a cooperative strategy by conditional cooperators is beneficial for maintaining high-level cooperation.Comment: Accepted by Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Science

Delegation to autonomous agents promotes cooperation in collective-risk dilemmas

Home assistant chat-bots, self-driving cars, drones or automated negotiations are some of the several examples of autonomous (artificial) agents that have pervaded our society. These agents enable the automation of multiple tasks, saving time and (human) effort. However, their presence in social settings raises the need for a better understanding of their effect on social interactions and how they may be used to enhance cooperation towards the public good, instead of hindering it. To this end, we present an experimental study of human delegation to autonomous agents and hybrid human-agent interactions centered on a public goods dilemma shaped by a collective risk. Our aim to understand experimentally whether the presence of autonomous agents has a positive or negative impact on social behaviour, fairness and cooperation in such a dilemma. Our results show that cooperation increases when participants delegate their actions to an artificial agent that plays on their behalf. Yet, this positive effect is reduced when humans interact in hybrid human-agent groups. Finally, we show that humans are biased towards agent behaviour, assuming that they will contribute less to the collective effort

Conditional cooperation in group contests

In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants' contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This environment allows us to identify new determinants of conditional cooperation. We observe conditional cooperation in successful groups and in groups where members contribute more than rivals (even if they lose), but it vanishes in those groups that lose the contest due to low group performance. A random-effect linear panel regression analysis with an extensive set of controls confirms the findings

A Prophylactic Approach to Compact Constitutionality

From COVID-19 to climate change, immigration to health insurance, firearms control to electoral reform: state politicians have sought to address all these hot-button issues by joining forces with other states. The U.S. Constitution, however, forbids states to “enter into any Agreement or Compact” with each other “without the Consent of Congress,” a requirement that proponents of much interstate action, especially around controversial topics, would hope to circumvent. The Supreme Court lets them do just that. By interpreting “any Agreement or Compact” so narrowly that it is difficult to see what besides otherwise unlawful coordination qualifies, the Court has essentially read the Compact Clause out of existence. Scholars have offered substitute standards. But those efforts serve to corroborate the analytical point on which current caselaw rests: that the infinite variety of ways in which states can collaborate makes separating constitutionally suspect from safe agreements impossible. This Article presents a prophylactic path forward focused not on what “any Agreement or Compact” means, but on how “the Consent of Congress” works. It argues that Congress should encourage possible-compact reporting by establishing a system where submission plus silence can equal consent. This approach is prophylactic because it avoids difficult constitutional questions by preventing debatable constitutional violations. And it does so while preserving much of the state-favoring functionality of the current system. The Article contends that this approach makes theoretical sense given situations supporting regulatory safe harbors and juridical and political sense given court and congressional precedent. It also argues that the proposed approach facilitates balancing the efficiency, democracy, and community values underlying regional-governance mechanisms better than the current system does

Theory of Provocation

The present volume discusses the subject of provocation and its various applications in the field of political science. Provocation itself combines the artificial induction of events, attitudes and human behavior, and the unilateral prejudging of issues, resulting in the interlocutor being surprised, trapped, manipulated or extorted. A political provocation manifests itself in various forms: productive or parasitic; pointed, collective or networked influence; initiative or reactive and reflexive; causal, deceptive or discrediting; constructive or destructive. The author brings forth real-world examples to illuminate the various intricacies of this concept, its applications, aims, and much more

A Leadership Perspective on Decision Making

This book is concerned with helping you improve your approach to decision-making. The author examines judgement in a selection of managerial contexts and provides important understanding that can help you make better leadership decisions. The book also pinpoints the in-house politics of organisational decision-making. Drawing on the very latest research, it introduces practical techniques that show you how to analyse and develop your own decision-making style. It will help you to deliver sharp and insightful analyses of your business and develop effective solutions. In addition, it presents simple checklists that will give you vital insights throughout the decision-making process. Students and practitioners of leadership, management, and allied fields will find this book useful in order to understand and implement useful methods

Theory of Provocation

The present volume discusses the subject of provocation and its various applications in the field of political science. Provocation itself combines the artificial induction of events, attitudes and human behavior, and the unilateral prejudging of issues, resulting in the interlocutor being surprised, trapped, manipulated or extorted. A political provocation manifests itself in various forms: productive or parasitic; pointed, collective or networked influence; initiative or reactive and reflexive; causal, deceptive or discrediting; constructive or destructive. The author brings forth real-world examples to illuminate the various intricacies of this concept, its applications, aims, and much more

Addressing Global Threat: Exploring the Relationship between Common Purpose and Leadership

While the mention of common purpose is prevalent in leadership studies, there are few attempts to explore the relationship between common purpose and leadership. This study delves into the questions of if and how common purpose and leadership inform one another. How leaders adapt purpose and leadership approaches in response to evolving and turbulent conditions may foster the depth and sustainment of immediate and subsequent accomplishments. Through phenomenological research in the venue of nuclear weapons reduction, a common purpose that is both globally pervasive and imbued with a sense of urgency, the lived essence of those engaged in common purpose can be illustrated. Exploring the symbiosis of the nuclear weapons reduction common purpose and associated leadership may have theoretical implications or provide lessons that can be utilized within other common purpose settings. The electronic version of this dissertation is available through the OhioLink ETD Center at http://ohiolink.edu/et