10,354 research outputs found
Information sharing in emerging credit markets
This paper examines the lack of information flow in the credit markets of developing countries. We show that the miscoordination among financial intermediaries might explain why lenders don't share their information about the borrowers. The competition effect of more transparency in the market leads to a higher probability of default of the firm, also generating credit rationing.Coordination.
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and the Risk of Runs
The effectiveness of deposit insurance in eliminating panic runs varies with the size of coverage and the degree of supervisory involvement of the agency in charge of insurance. When the agency is not involved in the supervision of banks, partial insurance preserves the monitoring role of depositors and reduces the region for which runs occur, but it is unable of completely eliminating them. When the agency has a high degree of supervisory involvement, even with partial insurance panic runs disappear as the regulator's signal becomes more precise. However, the smaller the protection offered to depositors, the higher is forbearance. Deposit insurance induces moral hazard by increasing the equilibrium value of the demand deposit contract in the interim period, though this effect seems to be smaller under a broad mandate. Therefore, a scheme where the insurance agency has more supervisory involvement should be preferred.
Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time
We examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of public information. Attacks succeeded in 233 of 344 possible cases. When speculators have symmetric size and access to information: (a) weaker fundamentals increase the likelihood of successful speculative attacks and hasten their onset, and (b) contrary to some theory, success is enhanced by public access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals. The presence of a larger speculator further enhances success, and experience with large speculators increases small speculatorsâ response to the public information. However, giving the large speculator increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact.currency crisis, speculative attack, laboratory experiment, coordination game, pre-emption, large player
Collective reputation, social norms, and participation:
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust. The optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium, (3) customers' information regarding firms' quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup information about firms' quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into account direct implementation costs.collective reputation, free riding, public monitoring, peer monitoring, peer sanction,
Distributed coordination of self-organizing mechanisms in communication networks
The fast development of the Self-Organizing Network (SON) technology in
mobile networks renders the problem of coordinating SON functionalities
operating simultaneously critical. SON functionalities can be viewed as control
loops that may need to be coordinated to guarantee conflict free operation, to
enforce stability of the network and to achieve performance gain. This paper
proposes a distributed solution for coordinating SON functionalities. It uses
Rosen's concave games framework in conjunction with convex optimization. The
SON functionalities are modeled as linear Ordinary Differential Equation
(ODE)s. The stability of the system is first evaluated using a basic control
theory approach. The coordination solution consists in finding a linear map
(called coordination matrix) that stabilizes the system of SON functionalities.
It is proven that the solution remains valid in a noisy environment using
Stochastic Approximation. A practical example involving three different SON
functionalities deployed in Base Stations (BSs) of a Long Term Evolution (LTE)
network demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed method.Comment: submitted to IEEE TCNS. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap
with arXiv:1209.123
Optimal bank transparency
Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-term debt that has to be refinanced before the asset matures. We show that in this setting maximal transparency is not socially optimal, and that the existence of social externalities of bank failures further lowers the optimal level of transparency. Moreover, asset risk taking recedes as the level of transparency declines towards the socially optimal level. As for the sign of the transparency impact on refinancing risk, it is negative given the risk associated with the asset, but ambiguous if one accounts for its indirect effect via risk taking.financial stability; information disclosure; market discipline; Basel III; global games
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