7,396 research outputs found
Theorem Proving in Intel Hardware Design
For the past decade, a framework combining model checking (symbolic trajectory evaluation) and higher-order logic theorem proving has been in production use at Intel. Our tools and methodology have been used to formally verify execution cluster functionality (including floating-point operations) for a number of Intel products, including the Pentium(Registered TradeMark)4 and Core(TradeMark)i7 processors. Hardware verification in 2009 is much more challenging than it was in 1999 - today s CPU chip designs contain many processor cores and significant firmware content. This talk will attempt to distill the lessons learned over the past ten years, discuss how they apply to today s problems, outline some future directions
Robust Computer Algebra, Theorem Proving, and Oracle AI
In the context of superintelligent AI systems, the term "oracle" has two
meanings. One refers to modular systems queried for domain-specific tasks.
Another usage, referring to a class of systems which may be useful for
addressing the value alignment and AI control problems, is a superintelligent
AI system that only answers questions. The aim of this manuscript is to survey
contemporary research problems related to oracles which align with long-term
research goals of AI safety. We examine existing question answering systems and
argue that their high degree of architectural heterogeneity makes them poor
candidates for rigorous analysis as oracles. On the other hand, we identify
computer algebra systems (CASs) as being primitive examples of domain-specific
oracles for mathematics and argue that efforts to integrate computer algebra
systems with theorem provers, systems which have largely been developed
independent of one another, provide a concrete set of problems related to the
notion of provable safety that has emerged in the AI safety community. We
review approaches to interfacing CASs with theorem provers, describe
well-defined architectural deficiencies that have been identified with CASs,
and suggest possible lines of research and practical software projects for
scientists interested in AI safety.Comment: 15 pages, 3 figure
Automated Reasoning and Presentation Support for Formalizing Mathematics in Mizar
This paper presents a combination of several automated reasoning and proof
presentation tools with the Mizar system for formalization of mathematics. The
combination forms an online service called MizAR, similar to the SystemOnTPTP
service for first-order automated reasoning. The main differences to
SystemOnTPTP are the use of the Mizar language that is oriented towards human
mathematicians (rather than the pure first-order logic used in SystemOnTPTP),
and setting the service in the context of the large Mizar Mathematical Library
of previous theorems,definitions, and proofs (rather than the isolated problems
that are solved in SystemOnTPTP). These differences poses new challenges and
new opportunities for automated reasoning and for proof presentation tools.
This paper describes the overall structure of MizAR, and presents the automated
reasoning systems and proof presentation tools that are combined to make MizAR
a useful mathematical service.Comment: To appear in 10th International Conference on. Artificial
Intelligence and Symbolic Computation AISC 201
Using ACL2 to Verify Loop Pipelining in Behavioral Synthesis
Behavioral synthesis involves compiling an Electronic System-Level (ESL)
design into its Register-Transfer Level (RTL) implementation. Loop pipelining
is one of the most critical and complex transformations employed in behavioral
synthesis. Certifying the loop pipelining algorithm is challenging because
there is a huge semantic gap between the input sequential design and the output
pipelined implementation making it infeasible to verify their equivalence with
automated sequential equivalence checking techniques. We discuss our ongoing
effort using ACL2 to certify loop pipelining transformation. The completion of
the proof is work in progress. However, some of the insights developed so far
may already be of value to the ACL2 community. In particular, we discuss the
key invariant we formalized, which is very different from that used in most
pipeline proofs. We discuss the needs for this invariant, its formalization in
ACL2, and our envisioned proof using the invariant. We also discuss some
trade-offs, challenges, and insights developed in course of the project.Comment: In Proceedings ACL2 2014, arXiv:1406.123
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