75,523 research outputs found
Theories of vagueness and theories of law
It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, the metaphysics/metasemantics of (legal) content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law
Locating Vagueness
The claim that all vagueness must be a feature of language or thought is the current orthodoxy. This is a claim about the âlocationâ of vagueness. âLocating Vaguenessâ argues that this claim is false, largely by defending the possibility of borderline cases in the absence of language and thought. If the orthodoxy about the location of vagueness is false, then so too is any account of the ânatureâ of vagueness that implies that orthodoxy. So this paper concludes that various accounts of the nature of vagueness are false. Among such accounts, so this paper argues, are the standard versions of supervaluationism and the standard versions of epistemicism. So I conclude that those accounts are false. Along the way, I present, and uncover ways to motivate, several heretical accounts of the nature of vagueness, including nonstandard versions of both supervaluationism and epistemicism
An Interactive Fuzzy Satisficing Method for Fuzzy Random Multiobjective 0-1 Programming Problems through Probability Maximization Using Possibility
In this paper, we focus on multiobjective 0-1 programming problems under the situation where stochastic uncertainty and vagueness exist at the same time. We formulate them as
fuzzy random multiobjective 0-1 programming problems where coefficients of objective functions are fuzzy random variables. For the formulated problem, we propose an interactive fuzzy satisficing method through probability maximization using of possibility
Against 'Against 'Against Vague Existence''
Alessandro Torza argues that Ted Siderâs Lewisian argument against vague existence is insufficient to rule out the possibility of what he calls âsuper-vague existenceâ, that is the idea that existence is higher-order vague, for all orders. In this chapter it is argued that the possibility of super-vague existence is ineffective against the conclusion of Siderâs argument since super-vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to be a kind of linguistic vagueness. Torzaâs idea of super-vague existence seems to be better suited to model vague existence under the assumption that vague existence is instead a form of ontic indeterminacy, contra what Ted Sider and David Lewis assume
Fundamental Nomic Vagueness
If there are fundamental laws of nature, can they fail to be exact? In this paper, I consider the possibility that some fundamental laws are vague. I call this phenomenon 'fundamental nomic vagueness.' I characterize fundamental nomic vagueness as the existence of borderline lawful worlds and the presence of several other accompanying features. Under certain assumptions, such vagueness prevents the fundamental physical theory from being completely expressible in the mathematical language. Moreover, I suggest that such vagueness can be regarded as 'vagueness in the world.' For a case study, we turn to the Past Hypothesis, a postulate that (partially) explains the direction of time in our world. We have reasons to take it seriously as a candidate fundamental law of nature. Yet it is vague: it admits borderline (nomologically) possible worlds. An exact version would lead to an untraceable arbitrariness absent in any other fundamental laws. However, the dilemma between fundamental nomic vagueness and untraceable arbitrariness is dissolved in a new quantum theory of time's arrow
Incoherent and Indefensible: An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Supreme Court\u27s Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The Supreme Court\u27s void-for-vagueness (or simply vagueness ) doctrine, rooted in the substantive due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is occasionally used to strike down statutes that fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute and encourage arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.
This Article first argues that the doctrine contains no unique element that separates it from other substantive due process principles. Then, the Article briefly discusses the concept of vagueness as understood by linguists and philosophers working outside the legal community. Finally, the Article concludes that a major contributing factor to the conceptual incoherence of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is that the doctrine hasdespite its name-nothing whatsoever to do with vagueness. Vagueness (and indeterminacy generally) is pervasive in law and hardly confined to the handful of statutes that the Supreme Court has struck down on voidfor- vagueness grounds. The Article proposes that the Justices\u27 commitment to the fundamental rights framework of due process has led them to couch some results that do not fit this framework in terms of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, so as to avoid reopening the possibility of broader, more robust judicial review of all statutes, regardless of their subject matter, on substantive due process grounds
Vagueness, Indiscernibility, and Pragmatics: Comments on Burns
I am sympathetic with Ms. Burnsâ general philosophy of vagueness as a pervasive, multidimensional phenomenon with a variety of sources. I am not, however, all that comfortable with some of the specific arguments she offers in support of this view. In particular, I am uneasy with Burnsâ central arguments to the effect that the borderline case variety of vaguenessâthat which produces the sorites paradoxes and puzzles concerning the possibility of higher-order vaguenessâis in fact less extraordinary (and less disastrous) than people in the tradition of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright have alleged. The point is crucial, of course, because it provides necessary grounds for resisting the objection that this type of vagueness is irremediably more âinquiry resistantâ than mere informational vagueness. All the same, it seems to me that the proposed treatment involves presuppositions that cannot be taken for granted. My purpose here is to take a closer look at some of these presuppositions, to weigh them against the arguments, and to show that they mayâwhen left ungroundedâundermine much of Burnsâ general program
Nomic Vagueness
If there are fundamental laws of nature, can they fail to be exact? In this
paper, I consider the possibility that some fundamental laws are vague. I call this phenomenon nomic vagueness. I propose to characterize nomic vagueness as the
existence of borderline lawful worlds. The existence of nomic vagueness raises
interesting questions about the mathematical expressibility and metaphysical
status of fundamental laws.
For a case study, we turn to the Past Hypothesis, a postulate that (partially)
explains the direction of time in our world. We have reasons to take it seriously
as a candidate fundamental law of nature. Yet it is vague: it admits borderline
(nomologically) possible worlds. An exact version would lead to an untraceable
arbitrariness absent in any other fundamental laws. However, the dilemma
between nomic vagueness and untraceable arbitrariness is dissolved in a new
quantum theory of timeâs arrow
Nomic Vagueness
If there are fundamental laws of nature, can they fail to be exact? In this
paper, I consider the possibility that some fundamental laws are vague. I call this phenomenon nomic vagueness. I propose to characterize nomic vagueness as the
existence of borderline lawful worlds. The existence of nomic vagueness raises
interesting questions about the mathematical expressibility and metaphysical
status of fundamental laws.
For a case study, we turn to the Past Hypothesis, a postulate that (partially)
explains the direction of time in our world. We have reasons to take it seriously
as a candidate fundamental law of nature. Yet it is vague: it admits borderline
(nomologically) possible worlds. An exact version would lead to an untraceable
arbitrariness absent in any other fundamental laws. However, the dilemma
between nomic vagueness and untraceable arbitrariness is dissolved in a new
quantum theory of timeâs arrow
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