The omega-rule interpretation of transfinite provability logic

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Turing jumps through provability

Fixing some computably enumerable theory $T$, the Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington (FGH) theorem says that over elementary arithmetic, each $\Sigma_1$ formula is equivalent to some formula of the form $\Box_T \varphi$ provided that $T$ is consistent. In this paper we give various generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular, for $n>1$ we relate $\Sigma_{n}$ formulas to provability statements $[n]_T^{\sf True}\varphi$ which are a formalization of "provable in $T$ together with all true $\Sigma_{n+1}$ sentences". As a corollary we conclude that each $[n]_T^{\sf True}$ is $\Sigma_{n+1}$-complete. This observation yields us to consider a recursively defined hierarchy of provability predicates $[n+1]^\Box_T$ which look a lot like $[n+1]_T^{\sf True}$ except that where $[n+1]_T^{\sf True}$ calls upon the oracle of all true $\Sigma_{n+2}$ sentences, the $[n+1]^\Box_T$ recursively calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the form $\langle n \rangle_T^\Box\phi$. As such we obtain a `syntax-light' characterization of $\Sigma_{n+1}$ definability whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended beyond the finite. Moreover, we observe that the corresponding provability predicates $[n+1]_T^\Box$ are well behaved in that together they provide a sound interpretation of the polymodal provability logic ${\sf GLP}_\omega$

Hilbert's Program Then and Now

Hilbert's program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In order to "dispose of the foundational questions in mathematics once and for all, "Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, "finitary" means, one should give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Godel's incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be carried out, it had many partial successes, and generated important advances in logical theory and meta-theory, both at the time and since. The article discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert's program, its philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development and influences since the 1930s.Comment: 43 page

Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte. Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only $\omega$-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a $\Pi^1_1$ complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than $\Pi^1_1\text{-}\mathsf{CA}_0$.Comment: Submitted. 41 page

Turing-Taylor expansions for arithmetic theories

Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic strength of mathematical theories. Turing progressions based on $n$-provability give rise to a $\Pi_{n+1}$ proof-theoretic ordinal. As such, to each theory $U$ we can assign the sequence of corresponding $\Pi_{n+1}$ ordinals $\langle |U|_n\rangle_{n>0}$. We call this sequence a \emph{Turing-Taylor expansion} of a theory. In this paper, we relate Turing-Taylor expansions of sub-theories of Peano Arithmetic to Ignatiev's universal model for the closed fragment of the polymodal provability logic ${\mathbf{GLP}}_\omega$. In particular, in this first draft we observe that each point in the Ignatiev model can be seen as Turing-Taylor expansions of formal mathematical theories. Moreover, each sub-theory of Peano Arithmetic that allows for a Turing-Taylor expression will define a unique point in Ignatiev's model.Comment: First draf

Well-orders in the transfinite Japaridze algebra

This paper studies the transfinite propositional provability logics \glp_\Lambda and their corresponding algebras. These logics have for each ordinal $\xi< \Lambda$ a modality \la \alpha \ra. We will focus on the closed fragment of \glp_\Lambda (i.e., where no propositional variables occur) and \emph{worms} therein. Worms are iterated consistency expressions of the form \la \xi_n\ra \ldots \la \xi_1 \ra \top. Beklemishev has defined well-orderings $<_\xi$ on worms whose modalities are all at least $\xi$ and presented a calculus to compute the respective order-types. In the current paper we present a generalization of the original $<_\xi$ orderings and provide a calculus for the corresponding generalized order-types $o_\xi$. Our calculus is based on so-called {\em hyperations} which are transfinite iterations of normal functions. Finally, we give two different characterizations of those sequences of ordinals which are of the form \la {\formerOmega}_\xi (A) \ra_{\xi \in \ord} for some worm $A$. One of these characterizations is in terms of a second kind of transfinite iteration called {\em cohyperation.}Comment: Corrected a minor but confusing omission in the relation between Veblen progressions and hyperation