Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic

This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties. The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connection between thought about properties and our grasp of causation. This way of bridging the gap promises to introduce substantive constraints on right accounts of perception and perception-based thought

Grafting Hypersequents onto Nested Sequents

We introduce a new Gentzen-style framework of grafted hypersequents that combines the formalism of nested sequents with that of hypersequents. To illustrate the potential of the framework, we present novel calculi for the modal logics $\mathsf{K5}$ and $\mathsf{KD5}$, as well as for extensions of the modal logics $\mathsf{K}$ and $\mathsf{KD}$ with the axiom for shift reflexivity. The latter of these extensions is also known as $\mathsf{SDL}^+$ in the context of deontic logic. All our calculi enjoy syntactic cut elimination and can be used in backwards proof search procedures of optimal complexity. The tableaufication of the calculi for $\mathsf{K5}$ and $\mathsf{KD5}$ yields simplified prefixed tableau calculi for these logic reminiscent of the simplified tableau system for $\mathsf{S5}$, which might be of independent interest

Why Quantum Theory is Possibly Wrong

Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense)

The Grail theorem prover: Type theory for syntax and semantics

As the name suggests, type-logical grammars are a grammar formalism based on logic and type theory. From the prespective of grammar design, type-logical grammars develop the syntactic and semantic aspects of linguistic phenomena hand-in-hand, letting the desired semantics of an expression inform the syntactic type and vice versa. Prototypical examples of the successful application of type-logical grammars to the syntax-semantics interface include coordination, quantifier scope and extraction.This chapter describes the Grail theorem prover, a series of tools for designing and testing grammars in various modern type-logical grammars which functions as a tool . All tools described in this chapter are freely available

Extending the theory of Owicki and Gries with a logic of progress

This paper describes a logic of progress for concurrent programs. The logic is based on that of UNITY, molded to fit a sequential programming model. Integration of the two is achieved by using auxiliary variables in a systematic way that incorporates program counters into the program text. The rules for progress in UNITY are then modified to suit this new system. This modification is however subtle enough to allow the theory of Owicki and Gries to be used without change