How to confuse with statistics or: the use and misuse of conditional probabilities

The article shows by various examples how consumers of statistical information may be confused when this information is presented in terms of conditional probabilities. It also shows how this confusion helps others to lie with statistics, and it suggests how either confusion or lies can be avoided by using alternative modes of conveying statistical information. --

The role of causal reasoning in understanding Simpson's paradox, Lord's paradox, and the suppression effect: covariate selection in the analysis of observational studies

Tu et al present an analysis of the equivalence of three paradoxes, namely, Simpson's, Lord's, and the suppression phenomena. They conclude that all three simply reiterate the occurrence of a change in the association of any two variables when a third variable is statistically controlled for. This is not surprising because reversal or change in magnitude is common in conditional analysis. At the heart of the phenomenon of change in magnitude, with or without reversal of effect estimate, is the question of which to use: the unadjusted (combined table) or adjusted (sub-table) estimate. Hence, Simpson's paradox and related phenomena are a problem of covariate selection and adjustment (when to adjust or not) in the causal analysis of non-experimental data. It cannot be overemphasized that although these paradoxes reveal the perils of using statistical criteria to guide causal analysis, they hold neither the explanations of the phenomenon they depict nor the pointers on how to avoid them. The explanations and solutions lie in causal reasoning which relies on background knowledge, not statistical criteria

Simpson's paradox: A logically benign, empirically treacherous hydra

This article examines Simpson's paradox as applied to the theory of probabilites and percentages. The author discusses possible flaws in the paradox and compares it to the Sure Thing Principle, statistical inference, causal inference and probabilistic analyses of causation

The illusion of data validity : Why numbers about people are likely wrong

This reflection article addresses a difficulty faced by scholars and practitioners working with numbers about people, which is that those who study people want numerical data about these people. Unfortunately, time and time again, this numerical data about people is wrong. Addressing the potential causes of this wrongness, we present examples of analyzing people numbers, i.e., numbers derived from digital data by or about people, and discuss the comforting illusion of data validity. We first lay a foundation by highlighting potential inaccuracies in collecting people data, such as selection bias. Then, we discuss inaccuracies in analyzing people data, such as the flaw of averages, followed by a discussion of errors that are made when trying to make sense of people data through techniques such as posterior labeling. Finally, we discuss a root cause of people data often being wrong – the conceptual conundrum of thinking the numbers are counts when they are actually measures. Practical solutions to address this illusion of data validity are proposed. The implications for theories derived from people data are also highlighted, namely that these people theories are generally wrong as they are often derived from people numbers that are wrong.© 2022 Wuhan University. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed