Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims

We propose and study a new axiom, restricted endowment additivity, for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. This axiom requires that awards be additively decomposable with respect to the endowment whenever no agent’s claim is filled. For two-claimant problems, restricted endowment additivity essentially characterizes weighted extensions of the proportional rule. With additional agents, however, the axiom is satisfied by a great variety of rules. Further imposing versions of continuity and consistency, we characterize a new family of rules which generalize the proportional rule. Defined by a priority relation and a weighting function, each rule aims, as nearly as possible, to assign awards within each priority class in proportion to these weights. We also identify important subfamilies and obtain new characterizations of the constrained equal awards and proportional rules based on restricted endowment additivity

Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem

In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.Publicad

On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws

Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles: (i) proportionality (PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL). However, most real life bankruptcy procedures implement only the proportionality principle. We construct a noncooperative investment game to explore whether the explanation lies in the alternative implications of these principles on investment behavior. Our results are as follows (i) EL always induces higher total investment than PRO which in turn induces higher total investment than EA; (ii) PRO always induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both EA and EL in interior equilibria; (iii) PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EL in interior equilibria but its relation to EA depends on the parameter values (however, a numerical analysis shows that on a large part of the parameter space, PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EA)

Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration

This article seeks to bring the submerged issue of arbitration\u27s relationship to democracy to the surface of the mandatory arbitration debate. Its goal is relatively modest: To recognize and articulate the relationship between democracy and arbitration as an issue worth considering, to analyze the democratic character of arbitration and to suggest some implications of this assessment

Use of Enforcement Techniques in Eliminating Glass Ceiling Barriers

Glass Ceiling ReportGlassCeilingBackground9UseofEnforcement.pdf: 3253 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Bridging the funding gap - The economics of cost shifting, fee arrangements and legal expenses insurance and their prospects for improving the access to civil justice

The right of access to civil justice is a cornerstone of the Belgian legal order. At present time, however, financial barriers prevent about three quarters of the Belgian population from fully asserting their subjective rights. As traditionally, apart from legal aid, private funding is the dominant method of funding a civil claim in Belgium, alternative funding options in between private and public funding might hold some prospects for improving the access to civil ustice. Therefore this paper aims to provide an in-depth economic analysis of the effects of cost shifting, client-lawyer fee arrangements and legal expenses insurance on the various dimensions of the access to civil justice. In summary, the main results from the analysis are that theoretically all three alternative funding methods may hold certain prospects for improving the accessibility of civil justice. But, as far as empirical data are available, cost shifting fits least the requirements for solving the policy issue addressed in this paper. However, the validity of this empirical observation is subject to certain limitations. Both contingency fees and legal expenses insurance hold clear prospects for overcoming risk aversion and liquidity constraints. Also, relative to hourly fees, the incentive scheme inherent to contingency fees appears most appropriate to curb lawyer opportunism. The involvement of a legal expenses insurer may lead lawyers to behave less opportunistically too. Finally, within the current legal framework, insurers' control of costs and quality requires their direct or indirect involvement in the civil justice administration system. This may pose some challenging policy issues as the market for legal expenses insurance further develops in the future.