An Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: The Income Effect Channel

The paper provides an alternative explanation for the “resource curse” based on the income effect resulting from high government current spending in resource rich economies. Using a simple life cycle framework, we show that private investment in the non-resource sector is adversely affected if private agents expect extra government current spending financed through resource sector revenues in the future. This income channel of the resource curse is stronger for countries with lower degrees of openness and forward altruism. We empirically validate these findings by estimating non-hydrocarbon sector growth regressions using a panel of 25 oil-exporting countries over 1992–2005.resource curse, fiscal policy, investment and growth

On the Resilience of Superstition

The concept of “belief” has always been taken seriously by anthropologists and philosophers; nevertheless, it has led to a long series of perplexities. To the contrary, the concept of “superstition” has simply been discarded as ethnocentric. The first has been pushed aside for its logical uncertainty; the second for its ethical uncertainty. Yet, the two concepts seem to be surprisingly resilient in face of the continued exercise of anthropological questioning. Furthermore, their capacity for survival appears to be connected precisely to that which connects them: superstition is unfounded belief but the issue of the foundation of belief is at the centre of the anthropological and philosophical perplexities that have haunted the concept of belief. In this paper I examine two examples – one of them a short story by Joseph Conrad – in order to show that today we can look differently at what superstition may be

The Illusory Leader: Natural Resources, Taxation and Accountability

This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which the natural resource curse can operate. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The theory is tested using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents, taxation and election proximity. It is found that an increase in natural resource rents decreases perceived tax enforcement, which in turn reduces the demand for regular, open and honest elections. Results are robust to alternative specifications. A supplementary analysis reveals that, consistent with the two-period model proposed, the effects are more acute closer to national elections. The findings support political-economy explanations of how natural resources affect economies, in which resource rents are purported to influence the decisions of the political elite through increased returns to staying in power.Democracy; Political Economy; Natural Resources; Curses; Africa

What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?

Since 2001, hundreds of academic studies have examined the “resource curse, ” meaning the claim that natural resource wealth tends to perversely affect a country’s governance. There is now robust evidence that one type of mineral wealth, petroleum, has at least three harmful effects: it tends to make authoritarian regimes more durable, to increase certain types of corruption, and to help trigger violent conflict in low and middle income countries. Scholars have also made progress toward understanding the mechanisms that lead to these outcomes, and the conditions that make them more likely. This essay reviews the evidence behind these claims, the debates over their validity, and some of the unresolved puzzles for future research.

Avoiding the Resource Curse: The Role of Institutions

This paper investigates empirically whether the natural resource curse exists and if institutions can help alleviate this curse. Both cross-country and dynamic panel regressions confirm the important role of institutional quality (measured by either institutional design or institutional performance) in turning natural resources into an economic boon. In terms of influencing the impact of natural resource abundance on growth, a democratic governance system is better than a non-democratic one, a parliamentary democracy is superior to a presidential democracy and, although a majoritarian system tends to contribute more to growth, it suffers more from the resource curse than a proportional system.

The curse of aid

Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the “curse of natural resources” literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.6 and one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. The fall in democracy if oil revenues reach the 75th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse than oil.Foreign aid, democracy, conditionality

The Impact of the Terms of Trade on Economic Development in the Periphery, 1870-1939: Volatility and Secular Change

Most countries in the periphery specialized in the export of just a handful of primary products for most of their history. Some of these commodities have been more volatile than others, and those with more volatile prices have grown slowly relative both to the industrial leaders and to other primary product exporters. This fact helps explain the growth puzzle noted by Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers more than a decade ago: that the contending fundamental determinants of growth—institutions, geography and culture—exhibit far more persistence than do the growth rates they are supposed to explain. Using a new panel database for 35 countries, this paper estimates the impact of terms of trade volatility and secular change on country performance between 1870 and 1939. Volatility was much more important for accumulation and growth than was secular change. Additionally, both effects were asymmetric between Core and Periphery, findings that speak directly to the terms of trade debates that have raged since Prebisch and Singer wrote more than 50 years ago. The paper also investigates one channel of impact, and finds that foreign capital inflows declined steeply where commodity prices were volatile.