Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner

Single-elimination (SE) brackets appear commonly in both sports tournaments and the voting theory literature. In certain tournament models, they have been shown to select the unambiguously-strongest competitor with optimum probability. By contrast, we reevaluate SE brackets through the lens of approximation, where the goal is to select a winner who would beat the most other competitors in a round robin (i.e., maximize the Copeland score), and find them lacking. Our primary result establishes the approximation ratio of a randomly-seeded SE bracket is 2^{- Theta(sqrt{log n})}; this is underwhelming considering a 1/2 ratio is achieved by choosing a winner uniformly at random. We also establish that a generalized version of the SE bracket performs nearly as poorly, with an approximation ratio of 2^{- Omega(sqrt[4]{log n})}, addressing a decade-old open question in the voting tree literature

Compositional Algorithms for Succinct Safety Games

We study the synthesis of circuits for succinct safety specifications given in the AIG format. We show how AIG safety specifications can be decomposed automatically into sub specifications. Then we propose symbolic compositional algorithms to solve the synthesis problem compositionally starting for the sub-specifications. We have evaluated the compositional algorithms on a set of benchmarks including those proposed for the first synthesis competition organised in 2014 by the Synthesis Workshop affiliated to the CAV conference. We show that a large number of benchmarks can be decomposed automatically and solved more efficiently with the compositional algorithms that we propose in this paper.Comment: In Proceedings SYNT 2015, arXiv:1602.0078

Dynamics of Three Agent Games

We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the probabilities that the team with the highest, middle or lowest accumulated score wins. We study the full family of solutions in the regime, where the number of agents and competitions is large, which can be regarded as a hydrodynamic limit. Depending on the parameter values $(p,q,t)$, we find six qualitatively different asymptotic score distributions and we also provide a qualitative understanding of these results. We checked our analytical results against numerical simulations of the microscopic model and find these to be in excellent agreement. The three agent game can be regarded as a social model where a player can be favored or disfavored for advancement, based on his/her accumulated score. It is also possible to decide the outcome of a three agent game through a mini tournament of two-a gent competitions among the participating players and it turns out that the resulting possible score distributions are a subset of those obtained for the general three agent-games. We discuss how one can add a steady and democratic decline rate to the model and present a simple geometric construction that allows one to write down the corresponding score evolution equations for $n$-agent games

Dynamics of Three Agent Games

We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the probabilities that the team with the highest, middle or lowest accumulated score wins. We study the full family of solutions in the regime, where the number of agents and competitions is large, which can be regarded as a hydrodynamic limit. Depending on the parameter values $(p,q,t)$, we find six qualitatively different asymptotic score distributions and we also provide a qualitative understanding of these results. We checked our analytical results against numerical simulations of the microscopic model and find these to be in excellent agreement. The three agent game can be regarded as a social model where a player can be favored or disfavored for advancement, based on his/her accumulated score. It is also possible to decide the outcome of a three agent game through a mini tournament of two-a gent competitions among the participating players and it turns out that the resulting possible score distributions are a subset of those obtained for the general three agent-games. We discuss how one can add a steady and democratic decline rate to the model and present a simple geometric construction that allows one to write down the corresponding score evolution equations for $n$-agent games