Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation

Comparisons of resource assessments suggest resource constraints are not an obstacle to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. Economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from market structure, competition in an uneven playing field and various non-market place barriers. However, even if these barriers are removed, the problem of ‘technology lock-out’ remains. The key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased R&D support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience. The paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies, but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share

State Efforts to Cap the Commons: Regulating Sources or Consumers?

California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (Assembly Bill 32) requires the state to reduce aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. One of the challenges California faces is how the state should regulate the electricity sector. About 80 percent of the state’s electricity consumption is generated in the state, but about 52 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity consumption comes from outside the state. The question addressed in this paper is where to locate the point of compliance in the electricity sector—that is, where in the supply chain linking fuel suppliers to generators to the transmission system to retail load-serving entities should the obligation for measurement and compliance be placed. The conclusion offered is that one particular approach to regulating the electricity sector—the “first-seller approach”—would be best for California. The alternative “load-based approach” has a running head start in the policy process but would undermine an economywide marketbased emissions trading program.electricity, climate, state level, CO2, cap and trade, market-based approaches, load-based, first seller, point of regulation, California, Western Climate Initiative

Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation

Comparisons of resource assessments suggest resource constraints are not an obstacle to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. Economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from market structure, competition in an uneven playing field and various non-market place barriers. However, even if these barriers are removed, the problem of ‘technology lock-out’ remains. The key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased R&D support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience. The paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies, but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share.technology policy, renewable energy, learning externalities, market structure

Local Options on Global Stocks: How the States are affecting the U.S. Debate on Climate Policy

This paper examines some of the implications of local policy-making with regard to the global issue of climate change. First, we assess what one may expect when small open economies, such as states, implement policies designed to affect global pollutants. Next, we briefly analyze some of the legal constraints on state actions. We then catalog some of the specific technologies used in the states to address carbon emissions. Finally, we provide some analysis of how states might implement emission control policies in a way that compensates important interests for some of their increased costs without losing the benefits of efficient policy design.climate policy; environmental federalism; laboratories of democracy; states

Allowance Allocation in a CO2 Emissions Cap-and-Trade Program for the Electricity Sector in California

The regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector within a cap-and-trade system poses significant policy questions about how to allocate tradable emission allowances. Allocation conveys tremendous value and can have efficiency consequences. This research uses simulation modeling for the electricity sector to examine different approaches to allocation under a cap-and-trade program in California. The decision affects prices and other aspects of the electricity sector, as well as implications for the overall cost of climate policy. An important issue is the opportunity for emission reductions in California to be offset by emission increases in neighboring regions that supply electricity to the state. The amount of emission leakage (i.e. an increase in CO2 emissions outside of California as a result of the program) varies with the regulatory design of the program.cap-and-trade, electricity generation, electricity sector, emissions, regulation, governance, allocation, California

Free Trade in Electric Power

This Article develops the core legal framework of a new electricity-trading ecosystem in which anyone, anytime, anywhere, can trade electricity in any amount with anyone else. The proliferation of solar and other distributed energy resources, business model innovation in the sharing economy, and climate change present enormous challenges — and opportunities — for America’s energy economy. But the electricity industry is ill equipped to adapt to and benefit from these transformative forces, with much of its physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business models a relic of the early days of electrification. We suggest a systematic rethinking to usher in a new trading paradigm and propel the electric utility industry into the 21st century.Our model has the potential to revolutionize the way electricity is generated, delivered, and used without requiring dramatic legal reform or radically new technologies. Instead, this Article draws on recent Supreme Court precedent and readily available technologies to democratize the electric grid and unlock free trade in electric power. We refine and expand pilot initiatives currently under way in California and New York to combine existing wholesale markets with new trading platforms similar to Airbnb and Uber. Enhanced market access will empower previously captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local utilities while also ensuring the proper valuation and integration of a diverse portfolio of energy resources. Transformative change, however necessary and beneficial in the long run, will not come easy in an industry famous for its resistance to reform efforts of any kind. Accordingly, our proposal does not start with a clean slate but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets coexist with traditional utility governance structures while regulators and stakeholders adjust to the new trading paradigm

Free Trade in Electric Power

This Article develops the core legal framework of a new electricity-trading ecosystem in which anyone, anytime, anywhere, can trade electricity in any amount with anyone else. The proliferation of solar and other distributed energy resources, business model innovation in the sharing economy, and climate change present enormous challenges — and opportunities — for America’s energy economy. But the electricity industry is ill equipped to adapt to and benefit from these transformative forces, with much of its physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business models a relic of the early days of electrification. We suggest a systematic rethinking to usher in a new trading paradigm and propel the electric utility industry into the 21st century. Our model has the potential to revolutionize the way electricity is generated, delivered, and used without requiring dramatic legal reform or radically new technologies. Instead, this Article draws on recent Supreme Court precedent and readily available technologies to democratize the electric grid and unlock free trade in electric power. We refine and expand pilot initiatives currently under way in California and New York to combine existing wholesale markets with new trading platforms similar to Airbnb and Uber. Enhanced market access will empower previously captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local utilities while also ensuring the proper valuation and integration of a diverse portfolio of energy resources. Transformative change, however necessary and beneficial in the long run, will not come easy in an industry famous for its resistance to reform efforts of any kind. Accordingly, our proposal does not start with a clean slate but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets coexist with traditional utility governance structures while regulators and stakeholders adjust to the new trading paradigm

Free Trade in Electric Power

This Article develops the core legal framework of a new electricity trading ecosystem in which anyone, anytime, anywhere, can trade electricity in any amount with anyone else. The proliferation of solar and other distributed energy resources, business model innovation in the sharing economy, and climate change present enormous challenges—and opportunities—for America’s energy economy. But the electricity industry is ill-equipped to adapt to and benefit from these transformative forces, with much of its physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business models relics of the early days of electrification. This Article suggests a systematic rethinking to usher in a new trading paradigm and propel the electric utility industry into the twenty-first century. This model has the potential to revolutionize the way electricity is generated, delivered, and used without requiring dramatic legal reform or radically new technologies. Instead, this Article draws on recent Supreme Court precedent and readily available technologies to democratize the electric grid and unlock free trade in electric power. It refines and expands pilot initiatives currently under way in California and New York to combine existing wholesale markets with new trading platforms similar to Airbnb and Uber. Enhanced market access will empower previously captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local utilities while also ensuring the proper valuation and integration of a diverse portfolio of energy resources. Transformative change, however necessary and beneficial in the long run, will not come easily in an industry famous for its resistance to reform efforts of any kind. Accordingly, this proposal does not start with a clean slate, but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets coexist with traditional utility governance structures while regulators and stakeholders adjust to the new trading paradig

Experience with Carbon Taxes and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems

Carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETSs) to limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are increasingly common. At the end of 2015, 17 GHG ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions, and 18 jurisdictions collected at least one carbon tax. This paper assesses the performance of carbon taxes and ETSs with respect to environmental effectiveness (reduction of emissions regulated by the instrument), cost-effectiveness (marginal abatement cost), economic efficiency, public finance, and administrative issues. Data on emissions subject to carbon taxes are rarely reported. We estimate the taxed emissions for 17 taxes in 12 jurisdictions from 1991 through the end of 2015. All 17 taxes have reduced emissions relative to business-as-usual. Six of the jurisdictions actually reduced emissions, although in at least three of those jurisdictions the reductions appear to be due to other policies. The small sizes of reduction in almost all 17 cases are partially due to the low tax rates; the modest and uncertain changes in tax rates over time; and the limited response of taxed sources, such as fossil fuels, to price changes. Actual emissions declined for at least six of 10 ETSs. Other policies and developments, such as the 2009 recession, contributed to the reductions, but estimates of the share of the reduction attributable to the instrument are rare. All of the ETSs have accumulated banks of surplus allowances and most have implemented measures to reduce these banks. On average, the marginal cost of compliance is substantially lower for ETSs than carbon taxes. ETS experience has been shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions. As a result, most ETSs have increased the share of allowances auctioned; adopted declining emissions caps; specified future caps and floor prices several years into the future; shifted to benchmarking for free allowance allocations to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sources; reduced accessibility to foreign offset credits; and established market stability reserves. By contrast, there is little evidence of shared learning and virtually no change to the design of carbon taxes. We found no jurisdiction that routinely tracks the taxed emissions. Very few jurisdictions regularly assess the effectiveness of the tax in achieving emission reductions. Additionally, adjustments to the tax rate often are unpredictable after an introductory period of three to five years. Both instruments reduce emissions, but ETSs have performed better than carbon taxes on the principal criteria of environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Many jurisdictions have implemented both a carbon tax and a GHG ETS, and every jurisdiction that has adopted either instrument has also implemented other policies. More research is needed to improve the design of both instruments and their interaction with non-market-based carbon policies because the use of multiple instruments produces complex interactive and distributional effects. While economically inefficient, market-based policies should be supplemented by non-market-based policies to ensure sustained political support

Power in global agriculture: economics, politics, and natural resources

Recent events, such as the 2008 food price crisis, have focussed global attention on the agriculture and food sectors. In particular, many countries have become increasingly concerned with the issue of ensuring the security of their food supply and one key element of this is who has power within the food supply chain. Through examining three dimensions of power – Economic, Political, and Natural Resources – this paper explores where power currently lies in world agriculture and how this might change in the future. Whilst recognising that power is a somewhat abstract concept, through a process of deriving potential indicators, a picture of the distribution of power is drawn. These indicators were also used to develop a simple 'global power index'. The power index indicates that the US and the EU dominate world agriculture in terms of economics and politics, but are potentially vulnerable in terms of their possession of natural resources. On the other hand, the emerging economies have lower political and corporate power, but seem better placed in terms of natural resources. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for the main food producing regions