Maximizing the Value of Information Technology Investment Based on Strategic Alignment, Risk Control and Real OptionsA Case Study of Enterprise System Implementation at PT. Pegadaian (Persero)

The world of IT market has experienced fast growth by9.7% worth US$527.9 billion (Rp 5.015,1 trillion) in 1995, but still IT value realization is questioned with the advent of IT Productivity Paradox phenomenon. In 2002, Gartner survey stated that 20 to 70$ 600 billion (Rp6,315.8 trillion) was wasted. However, the phenomenon was fading with the rise of IT governance and management field, including IT investment management best-practice. Latest research from PwC and ITGI in 2011 has shown that the practice brought 27.1% increased value and 28.1% improved business competitiveness. Recently, PT. Pegadaian (Persero) has planned to invest on a new centralized real-time online Enterprise System. Considering this is a large scale IT investment which estimated TCO is around Rp 1.1 trillion (16% of Total Gross Revenue and 1100% of Total Investment in 2011), while the world historical data has shown many of its failures, in fact Pegadaian itself has experienced ES implementation failure in 2009-2011 which has wasted significant resources, therefore the management is very concerned about how to prevent project failures while maximizing the value from it. The author has proposed the combination use of strategic alignment, risk control and real options valuation methods which enhanced the conventional investment analysis methods such as IRR, NPV, ROI and Payback Period to solve Pegadaian\u27s problem. This paper result showed that the combination of those methods has maximized the value of IT investment by making sure that the investment is aligned with business objectives, able to control its risks and offered managerial flexibility through viable investment option configurations which maximizing the value

The work value of information

We present quantitative relations between work and information that are valid both for finite sized and internally correlated systems as well in the thermodynamical limit. We suggest work extraction should be viewed as a game where the amount of work an agent can extract depends on how well it can guess the micro-state of the system. In general it depends both on the agent's knowledge and risk-tolerance, because the agent can bet on facts that are not certain and thereby risk failure of the work extraction. We derive strikingly simple expressions for the extractable work in the extreme cases of effectively zero- and arbitrary risk tolerance respectively, thereby enveloping all cases. Our derivation makes a connection between heat engines and the smooth entropy approach. The latter has recently extended Shannon theory to encompass finite sized and internally correlated bit strings, and our analysis points the way to an analogous extension of statistical mechanics.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figure

The Value of Information Concealment

We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbitrarily more revenue could potentially be extracted than if the signal is leaked or revealed. We then show that, if the seller is not allowed to make payments to the buyer, the gap between the two is bounded by a multiplicative factor of 3, if the value distribution conditioning on each signal is regular. We give examples showing that both conditions are necessary for a constant bound to hold. We connect this scenario to multi-bidder single-item auctions where bidders' values are correlated. Similarly to the setting above, we show that the revenue of a Bayesian incentive compatible, ex post individually rational auction can be arbitrarily larger than that of a dominant strategy incentive compatible auction, whereas the two are no more than a factor of 5 apart if the auctioneer never pays the bidders and if each bidder's value conditioning on the others' is drawn according to a regular distribution. The upper bounds in both settings degrade gracefully when the distribution is a mixture of a small number of regular distributions

The value of implementation and the value of information: combined and uneven development

<i>Aim</i>: In a budget-constrained health care system, the decision to invest in strategies to improve the implementation of cost-effective technologies must be made alongside decisions regarding investment in the technologies themselves and investment in further research. This article presents a single, unified framework that simultaneously addresses the problem of allocating funds between these separate but linked activities. <i>Methods</i>: The framework presents a simple 4-state world where both information and implementation can be either at the current level or "perfect". Through this framework, it is possible to determine the maximum return to further research and an upper bound on the value of adopting implementation strategies. The framework is illustrated through case studies of health care technologies selected from those previously considered by the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). <i>Results</i>: Through the case studies, several key factors that influence the expected values of perfect information and perfect implementation are identified. These factors include the maximum acceptable cost-effectiveness ratio, the level of uncertainty surrounding the adoption decision, the expected net benefits associated with the technologies, the current level of implementation, and the size of the eligible population. <i>Conclusions</i>: Previous methods for valuing implementation strategies have not distinguished the value of efficacy research and the value of strategies to change the level of implementation. This framework demonstrates that the value of information and the value of implementation can be examined separately but simultaneously in a single framework. This can usefully inform policy decisions about investment in health care services, further research, and adopting implementation strategies that are likely to differ between technologies

Speculative Trade and the Value of Public Information

In environments with expected utility, it has long been established that speculative trade cannot occur (Milgrom and Stokey [1982]), and that the value of public information is negative in economies with risk-sharing and no aggregate uncertainty (Hirshleifer [1971], Schlee [2001]). We show that these results are still true even if we relax expected utility, so that either Dynamic Consistency (DC) or Consequentialism is violated. We characterise no speculative trade in terms of a weakening of DC and find that Consequentialism is not required. Moreover, we show that a weakening of both DC and Consequentialism is sufficient for the value of public information to be negative. We therefore generalise these important results for convex preferences which contain several classes of ambiguity averse preferences

The Value-of-Information in Matching with Queues

We consider the problem of \emph{optimal matching with queues} in dynamic systems and investigate the value-of-information. In such systems, the operators match tasks and resources stored in queues, with the objective of maximizing the system utility of the matching reward profile, minus the average matching cost. This problem appears in many practical systems and the main challenges are the no-underflow constraints, and the lack of matching-reward information and system dynamics statistics. We develop two online matching algorithms: Learning-aided Reward optimAl Matching ($\mathtt{LRAM}$) and Dual-$\mathtt{LRAM}$ ($\mathtt{DRAM}$) to effectively resolve both challenges. Both algorithms are equipped with a learning module for estimating the matching-reward information, while $\mathtt{DRAM}$ incorporates an additional module for learning the system dynamics. We show that both algorithms achieve an $O(\epsilon+\delta_r)$ close-to-optimal utility performance for any $\epsilon>0$, while $\mathtt{DRAM}$ achieves a faster convergence speed and a better delay compared to $\mathtt{LRAM}$, i.e., $O(\delta_{z}/\epsilon + \log(1/\epsilon)^2))$ delay and $O(\delta_z/\epsilon)$ convergence under $\mathtt{DRAM}$ compared to $O(1/\epsilon)$ delay and convergence under $\mathtt{LRAM}$ ($\delta_r$ and $\delta_z$ are maximum estimation errors for reward and system dynamics). Our results reveal that information of different system components can play very different roles in algorithm performance and provide a systematic way for designing joint learning-control algorithms for dynamic systems

Irreversible investment and the value of information gathering

This note develops a model in which a firm has to decide whether to undertake an irreversible investment. The firm has the option to delay it's decision in an effort to observe the actions of other firms. It is shown that a problem, akin to the herding phenomenon also applies, despite the endogenous time framework. In the context of an investment decision this manifests itself as the failure of a positive-payoff project to be undertaken. The most novel finding is that attempts to overcome this difficulty by further information gathering will, as a side effect, generate additional delay which may be enough to offset the gains of any new information

The Value of Information Technology-Enabled Diabetes Management

Reviews different technologies used in diabetes disease management, as well as the costs, benefits, and quality implications of technology-enabled diabetes management programs in the United States

The value of hydrologic information for watershed management programs: The case of Camboriú, Brazil

Article explores the value of hydrologic modeling and monitoring with respect to two dimensions: scientific credibility and use of generated knowledge in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the watershed management program in the Camboriú watershed, Brazil

The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition

In a beauty contest framework, we show that more precise public information contributes to higher welfare when the precision of private information is endogenous. We consider a Stackelberg game in which public authorities decide the accuracy of public information taking into account how this affects the acquisition of private information and the choice of individual actions in equilibrium. Because the acquisition of private information is costly, an increase in the precision of public information increases welfare by reducing the incentives for acquisition of private information, thereby inducing socially valuable savings of private resources.Public information, private information, coordination, welfare