Stepwise Green Investment under Policy Uncertainty

We analyse how market price and policy uncertainty, in the form of random provision or retraction of a subsidy, interact to affect the optimal time of investment and the size of a renewable energy (RE) project that can be completed in either a single (lumpy investment) or multiple stages (stepwise investment). The subsidy takes the form of a fixed premium on top of the electricity price, and, therefore, investment is subject to electricity price uncertainty. We show that the risk of a permanent retraction (provision) of a subsidy increases (decreases) the incentive to invest, yet lowers (raises) the amount of installed capacity, and that this result is more pronounced as the size of the subsidy increases. Additionally, we show that increasing the number of policy interventions lowers the expected value of a subsidy and the size of the project. Furthermore, we illustrate that, although an increase in the size of a subsidy lowers the relative value of the stepwise investment strategy, the expected value of a lumpy investment strategy is still lower than that of stepwise investment

Optimal regime switching under risk aversion and uncertainty

echnology adoption is key for corporate strategy, often determining the success or failure of a company as a whole. However, risk aversion often raises the reluctance to make a timely technology switch, particularly when this entails the abandonment of an existing market regime and entry in a new one. Consequently, which strategy is most suitable and the optimal timing of regime switch depends not only on market factors, such as the definition of the market regimes, as well as economic and technological uncertainty, but also on attitudes towards risk. Therefore, we develop a utility-based, regime-switching framework for evaluating different technology-adoption strategies under price and technological uncertainty. We assume that a decisionmaker may invest in each technology that becomes available (compulsive) or delay investment until a new technology arrives and then invest in either the older (laggard) or the newer technology (leapfrog). Our results indicate that, if market regimes are asymmetric, then greater risk aversion and price uncertainty in a new regime may accelerate regime switching. In addition, the feasibility of a laggard strategy decreases (increases) as price uncertainty in an existing (new) regime increases. Finally, although risk aversion typically favours a compulsive and a laggard strategy, a leapfrog strategy may be feasible under risk aversion provided that the output price and the rate of innovation are sufficiently high

Risk-sensitive sizing of responsive facilities

We develop a risk-sensitive strategic facility sizing model that makes use of readily obtainable data and addresses both capacity and responsiveness considerations. We focus on facilities whose original size cannot be adjusted over time and limits the total production equipment they can hold, which is added sequentially during a finite planning horizon. The model is parsimonious by design for compatibility with the nature of available data during early planning stages. We model demand via a univariate random variable with arbitrary forecast profiles for equipment expansion, and assume the supporting equipment additions are continuous and decided ex-post. Under constant absolute risk aversion, operating profits are the closed-form solution to a nontrivial linear program, thus characterizing the sizing decision via a single first-order condition. This solution has several desired features, including the optimal facility size being eventually decreasing in forecast uncertainty and decreasing in risk aversion, as well as being generally robust to demand forecast uncertainty and cost errors. We provide structural results and show that ignoring risk considerations can lead to poor facility sizing decisions that deteriorate with increased forecast uncertainty. Existing models ignore risk considerations and assume the facility size can be adjusted over time, effectively shortening the planning horizon. Our main contribution is in addressing the problem that arises when that assumption is relaxed and, as a result, risk sensitivity and the challenges introduced by longer planning horizons and higher uncertainty must be considered. Finally, we derive accurate spreadsheet-implementable approximations to the optimal solution, which make this model a practical capacity planning tool.© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/58077/1/20278_ftp.pd

Investment decision making under uncertainty: the impact of risk aversion, operational flexibility, and competition

Traditional real options analysis addresses investment under uncertainty assuming a risk-neutral decision maker and complete markets. In reality, however, decision makers are often risk averse and markets are incomplete. Additionally, capital projects are seldom now-or-never investments and can be abandoned, suspended, and resumed at any time. In this thesis, we develop a utility-based framework in order to examine the impact of operational flexibility, via suspension and resumption options, on optimal investment policies and option values. Assuming a risk-averse decision maker with perpetual options to suspend and resume a project costlessly, we confirm that risk aversion lowers the probability of investment and demonstrate how this effect can be mitigated by incorporating operational flexibility. Also, we illustrate how increased risk aversion may facilitate the abandonment of a project while delaying its temporary suspension prior to permanent resumption. Besides timing, a firm may have the freedom to scale the investment’s installed capacity. We extend the traditional real options approach to investment under uncertainty with discretion over capacity by allowing for a constant relative risk aversion utility function and operational flexibility in the form of suspension and resumption options. We find that, with the option to delay investment, increased risk aversion facilitates investment and decreases the required investment threshold price by reducing the amount of installed capacity. We explore strategic aspects of decision making under uncertainty by examining how duopolistic competition affects the entry decisions of risk-averse investors. Depending on the discrepancy between the market share of the leader and the follower, greater uncertainty may increase or decrease the discrepancy in the non-pre-emptive leader’s relative value. Furthermore, risk aversion does not affect the loss in the value of the leader for the pre-emptive duopoly setting, but it makes the loss in value relatively less for the leader in a non-preemptive duopoly setting

A bi-level model for optimal capacity investment and subsidy design under risk aversion and uncertainty

Meeting ambitious sustainability targets motivated by climate change concerns requires the structural transformation of many industries and the careful alignment of firm- and Government-level policymaking. While private firms rely on Government support to achieve timely the necessary green investment intensity, Governments rely on private firms to tackle financial constraints and technology transfer. This interaction is analysed in the real options literature only under risk neutrality, and, consequently, the implications of risk aversion due to the idiosyncratic risk that green technologies entail are overlooked. To analyse how this interaction impacts a firm’s investment policy and a Government’s subsidy design under uncertainty and risk aversion, we develop a real options framework, whereby: (i) we solve the firm’s investment problem assuming an exogenous subsidy; (ii) conditional on the firm’s optimal investment policy, we address the Government’s optimisation objective and derive the optimal subsidy level; (iii) we insert the optimal subsidy level in (i) to derive the firm’s endogenous investment policy. Contrary to existing literature, results indicate that greater risk aversion lowers the amount of installed capacity yet postpones investment. Also, although greater uncertainty raises the optimal subsidy under risk neutrality, the impact of uncertainty is reversed under high levels of risk aversion

Differentiating entrepreneurs from family business founders

This paper develops a theoretical model predicting the difference in investment policy between entrepreneurs and family founders based on the firm ownership flexibility. Moreover, this paper provides evidence on the fact that small business with less flexible ownership structure does not exploit all their growth potential.Small business, Growth, Ownership structure, Investment, Risk, Performance.

Risk management in solar-based power plants with storage: a comparative study

Investment in solar generation is essential to achieve EU climate neutrality by 2050. Using stochastic programming, we study the management of solar power plants considering trading in the spot and future markets, weather derivatives based on solar radiation, storage, and risk management. We provide a comparative study of two technologies: a concentrated solar power plant with thermal storage and a photovoltaic power plant with electrical batteries. The significant managerial contributions can be classified into four levels. First, regarding trading and generation decisions, we proved that: a) plants sell energy in the spot market during the night and store energy in the morning; b) storage happens at the same time as electricity is purchased in the spot market; c) in the Summer the plants sell more in the futures market; d) storage, in both types of technology, increases trading in futures and spot markets and creates value for generators. Second, regarding the use of options on solar radiation, we show that a) the value of put and call options depends on the expected solar radiation; b) the radiation option prices are correlated with generation and storage levels and with the anticipated trading in spot and futures markets; c) the optimal strategy is to sell calls and buy put options; d) generators with a storage system sell significantly more call options. Third, regarding risk aversion, we proved that: a) the higher the risk aversion, the more the generator sells in the futures market and the higher the number of purchased put contracts; b) the risk-adjusted profit from options trading is zero. Finally, in comparing both technologies, even though the operation and financial management patterns are similar, the photovoltaic power plant is more profitable, and the batteries create more value

Efficient Supply Chain Contracting with Loss-averse Players in Presence of Multiple Plausible Breaches

The legal literature distinguishes between the liquidated damage and the penalty clauses in contracts, and holds that penalties designed for the prevention of breach are excessive compared to the liquidated damages. In an efficient supply chain contract, the penalty must satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the signatories. Considering loss-averse players, we have calculated optimal penalties in a supply chain contract and compared those with the liquidated damages. Two possible breaches are considered – a breach in quality of the delivery and a breach in the process. In the absence of any penalty, a process breach reduces the supplier’s delivery risk and cost of delivery. Determining the parametric conditions for efficient contracts, numerically we show the effects of various variables on the zone of efficient contract. We show that the optimal penalties need not be excessive compared to the liquidated damages