The Parched Earth of Cooperation: How to Solve the Tragedy of the Commons in International Environmental Governance

This article proposes a way to strengthen international environmental agreements, such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol. Multilateral environmental agreements such as these are extremely fragile. At the heart of the problem is what is known as the tragedy of the commons—a unique dynamic that viciously sabotages cooperation. The cause of this tragedy is that no one can trust that other actors will conserve the common resource, which triggers a race to the bottom—a race to deplete. Global warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale. On a domestic level, the tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. However, on a supranational level, where there is no overarching authority, governance mechanisms tend to collapse. The hard truth is that without robust enforcement of some kind, international cooperation is extremely difficult to maintain. This article proposes the following idea: governments joining (or already party to) an agreement, contribute an upfront deposit to an international regulatory body (the Commons Management Fund (“CMF”)) with the understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to honor their treaty commitments. The idea, while ostensibly simple, is deceptively complex. The focus is not the penalty, but rather the ability of governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible signaling can prevent a tragedy of the commons by generating confidence that everyone will stick to their commitments. The CMF is designed to exploit this effect. Now, more than ever, a solution to the tragedy of the commons on a supranational level is desperately needed—the CMF is such a solution

Examining the Tragedy of the Commons Dilemma: Looking at the New Hampshire Fishing Industry

The Tragedy of the Commons is a widely known problem debated amongst economists for years. Even the topic of the Tragedy of the Commons when applied to fishing has been debated several times. The fishing industry is a major part of the culture and economy here in New Hampshire and the conversation how to properly tax and regulate it to combat this problem is one that has been taking place and will continue to take place for several years. The purpose of this project was to examine this problem at a state level and look at the relationship between State Tax Collections from fishing licenses, the number of Paid Fishing License Holders in New Hampshire and the GDP of the fishing industry. I overall had mixed results with some datasets representing significant statistical relationships, while others had marginal results. More research would need to be done in this area to make any certain conclusions. There are several areas in this topic that I couldn’t analyze for a variety of reasons, and this project merely scratches the surface of the amount of research left to be done

What About BOEM? The Need to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing

The nature of offshore oil and gas activities is changing as companies are forced into difficult and remote areas, including the U.S. Arctic Ocean. As evidenced by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell\u27s error-plagued efforts to drill exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012, the rules governing whether and under what conditions to allow offshore drilling in frontier areas have not kept pace with environmental and technical changes. These rules were implemented in 1979 and have remained substantively the same since. Recent changes to at the Department of the Interior to disband the Minerals Management Service, improve certain safety requirements, and move toward implementing Arctic-specific spill prevention and response requirements are important steps. Those changes, however, apply only after the decision to allow oil and gas activity has been made. Congress has not amended the governing statute, and the agency has not modified in any meaningful way the regulations that govern the initial processes through which it decides whether and under what circumstances to allow offshore oil and gas activities in a given area. This Article argues that the regulations that govern offshore oil and gas planning and leasing should be fundamentally revised to account for changes in the industry and agency, remedy broadly acknowledged deficiencies, and reflect new administrative policies. It also recommends a path to achieve the needed change

SHRIMP MARICULTURE DEVELOPMENT IN ECUADOR: SOME RESOURCE POLICY ISSUES

During the past 15 years, Ecuador has become the Western Hemisphere's leading producer and exporter of shrimp. Growth has come about largely through mariculture development. About 8,000 metric tons (MT) of shrimp have been captured off the Ecuadorian coast each year since the late 1970s. Meanwhile, pond output has increased several-fold, from less than 5,000 MT in 1979 to over 100,000 MT 12 years later (Table 1). Mariculture has expanded largely at the expense of renewable natural resources. Mangrove swamps, characterized by extremely high biological productivity and, therefore, a critical element of coastal ecosystems, have been displaced. In addition, shrimp postlarvae (PL) collection has at times been excessive and wastewater emissions from some enterprises harm the environment. Mariculture also suffers from water pollution from agricultural, urban, and industrial sources. This paper first describes the extent and consequences of coastal ecosystem disturbance; then presents a causal analysis of environmental problems. Policies contributing to depletive management of wetlands and related resources are similar to policies stimulating tropical deforestation. The tenurial regime rewards those who convert coastal ecosystems into shrimp ponds, just as frontier property arrangements encourage agricultural colonists to convert natural ecosystems into farmland (Southgate 1990). In addition, mariculture's geographic expansion, like agriculture's, has been accelerated by inadequate spending on education, research, and extension (Southgate 1991). If this policy regime remains unchanged, continued deterioration of Ecuador's coastal ecosystems is inevitable.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The ethics of responsible acting - a systemic perspective

This paper stems from work with research in organic farming, especially the philosophy and methodology of systemic research. In this work, the relations between science and values are pivotal issues of inquiry. The presentation will include the following topics: – sustainability and precautionary acting – conceptions of nature and of the relationship between human and nature – the historical extension of ethics – moral responsibility and moral considerability – moral significance and concepts of value – two paths of extending moral considerability – a cybernetic model of ethical acting – four dimensions of extension of ethics – towards a systemic ethic

Notes from the Greenhouse World: A Study in Coevolution, Planetary Sustainability, and Community Structure

This paper explores coevolution and governance of common goods using models of coevolving biospheres, in which adapting populations must collectively regulate their planet's climate or face extinction. The results support the Gaia hypothesis against challenges based on the tragedy of the commons: model creatures are often able to work together to maintain the common good (a suitable climate) without being undermined by "free riders." A long-term dynamics appears in which communities that cannot sustain Gaian cooperation give way to communities that can. This result provides an argument why a Gaia scenario should generally be observed, rather than a tragedy of the commons scenario. Second, a close look at how communities fail reveals failures that do not fit the tragedy of the commons framework and are better described in terms of conflict between differently positioned parties, with power over different aspects of the system. In the context of Norgaard's work, all these observations can be read as narratives of coevolution relevant to social communities as well as ecological ones, contrasting with pessimistic scenarios about common governance and supporting respect for traditional arrangements and restraint in intervention.Comment: To appear in a special issue of Ecological Economics in honor of Richard B. Norgaar

Strategic Review of Tropical Fisheries Management

This project addresses the constraints to tropical fisheries development with sustainable exploitation through a strategic assessment of tropical fisheries management with the following purposes: (1) To evaluate relevant research methods for the development of assessment models appropriate to the circumstances of tropical coastal fisheries; and (2) To evaluate the utility of existing strategies for the implementation of management advice. The report consists of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 contains a detailed socio-economic assessment of various instruments and implementation strategies applicable to tropical capture fisheries. In Chapter 3, a detailed assessment of the fisheries for tropical large marine ecosystems has been conducted using a technique developed by FAO (Granger & Garcia 1996). The data used were the FAO statistics published regularly by FAO. This analysis has been conducted for each of the tropical large marine ecosystems and indicates that there is the potential for increased fishing in a number of these ecosystems. One of the clear requirements identified in Chapter 2 and implicit in Chapter 3, is that there is a significant need for simple and robust fisheries assessment methods which can estimate the potential of a particular resource, its capacity in terms of the level of fishing effort and its current status ie whether it is currently exploited sustainably or not. In Chapter 4, these problems are addressed directly and, using two approaches, significant simplification of fishery methods is developed. In the first approach, simple empirical relationships between the life history parameters of a species are used to develop models of potential yield which can be determined by a simple assessment of fish growth. In the second approach, optimal life history theory is applied to the key demographic parameters of exploited fish populations and using estimates of the Beverton & Holt invariants a significant simplifying of the basic stock assessment equations is developed

Apprenticeship and Conservation Incentives

Apprentice programs offer a method to encourage responsible individual behavior by laying the foundation for successful collective property rights. Apprenticeship has three purposes: to restrict the rate of entry, to affect the quality of the participant, and to create the conditions for collective action for sustainability. Apprenticeship could be an important fishery management tool, particularly in decentralized, adaptive management regimes that require ongoing, multi-party negotiation for success. It is not vocational training; instead it serves a public purpose: to create the conditions for stewardship and participation in management. This perception of collective property right mimics customary practice in some successful traditional fisheries such as the Maine lobster fishery where customary practice has been demonstrated both to have conservation benefits and to lower enforcement costs. Case information from Maine’s new, statutory lobster apprentice program is discussed. Apprenticeship creates conditions for responsible behavior by creating a stable population that can develop long term assurances about expected behavior and can develop credible internal monitoring and sanctions. In addition to requiring a personal investment of time, it provides information about fishing ethics and non-fishing information about basic biology, ecology, and participation in the management system. This, because it changes the frame of reference, should affect individual behavior both fishing and as participants in management. Apprenticeship focuses on the individual fishing as the principal actor in conservation. The apprenticeship approach bolsters both co-management and, for that matter, conventional limited entry programs as well