Pragmatic Languages with Universal Grammars

This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information transmission. The Language is pragmatic in the sense that the Receiver’ best response depends on the context, i.e, on the payoffs and on the initial probability distribution of the states of nature of the underlying game. The Language has a universal grammar because the coding rule does not depend on such specific parameters and can then be applied to any Sender-Receiver game with noisy communication.grammar, pragmatic language, prototypes, separating equilibria

Strategic Vagueness and Appropriate Contexts

This paper brings together several approaches to vagueness, and ends by suggesting a new approach. The common thread in these approaches is the crucial role played by context. Using a single example where there is a conflict of interest between speaker and listener, we start by treating game-theoretic rationales for vagueness, and for the related concepts of generality and ambiguity. We argue that the most plausible application of these models to vagueness in natural language is one where the listener only imperfectly observes the context in which the speaker makes her utterances. We next look at a rationale for vagueness when there is no conflict between speaker and listener, and which is an application of Horn's rule. Further, we tackle the Sorites paradox. This paradox apparently violates standard axioms of rational behaviour. Yet, once it is taken into account that vague language is used in an appropriate context, these axioms are no longer violated. We end with a behavioural approach to vagueness, where context directly enters agents. preferences. In an application of prospect theory, agents think in terms of gains and losses with respect to a reference point. Vague predicates now allow agents to express their subjective valuations, without necessarily specifying the context.Vagueness, signalling games, decision theory, prospect theory

Bridging production and comprehension: Toward an integrated computational model of error correction

Error correction in production and comprehension has traditionally been studied sepa- rately. In real-time communication, however, correction may not only depend on speaker or comprehender-internal preferences, but also the interlocutors’ knowledge of each other’s strategies. We present an integrated computational framework for error correction in both production and comprehension systems. Modeling error correction as Bayesian inference, we propose that both speaker and comprehender’s correction strategies are influenced by their prior expectations about the intended message and their knowledge of a noise monitoring model. Our results indicate that speakers and comprehenders tend to weigh phonological and semantic cues differently, and these different strategies illuminate the asymmetries and potential interactions between the two systems

Autoencoders for strategic decision support

In the majority of executive domains, a notion of normality is involved in most strategic decisions. However, few data-driven tools that support strategic decision-making are available. We introduce and extend the use of autoencoders to provide strategically relevant granular feedback. A first experiment indicates that experts are inconsistent in their decision making, highlighting the need for strategic decision support. Furthermore, using two large industry-provided human resources datasets, the proposed solution is evaluated in terms of ranking accuracy, synergy with human experts, and dimension-level feedback. This three-point scheme is validated using (a) synthetic data, (b) the perspective of data quality, (c) blind expert validation, and (d) transparent expert evaluation. Our study confirms several principal weaknesses of human decision-making and stresses the importance of synergy between a model and humans. Moreover, unsupervised learning and in particular the autoencoder are shown to be valuable tools for strategic decision-making

Don’t blame the norms! On the challenges of ecological rationality

Enlightenment thinkers viewed logic and mathematical probability as the hallmarks of rationality. In psychological research on human (ir)rationality, human subjects are typically held accountable to this arcane ideal of Reason. If people fall short of these traditional standards, as indeed they often do, they are biased or irrational. Recent work in the program of ecological rationality, however, aims to rehabilitate human reason, and to upturn our traditional conception of rationality in the process. Put bluntly, these researchers are turning the tables on the traditionalist, showing that human reasoning often outperforms complex algorithms based on the traditional canons of rationality. If human reason still appears paltry from the vantage point of capital-R Rationality, then so much the worse for Rationality. Maybe the norms themselves are in need of revision. Perhaps human reasoning is better than rational. Though we welcome the naturalization of human reason, we argue that this backlash against the classical norms of rationality is uncalled for. Ecological rationality presents two apparent challenges to the traditional canons of rationality. In both cases, we contend, the norms emerge unscathed. In the first category, norms of rationality that appear violated by individual reasoners, re-emerge at the level of evolutionary adaptation. In the second category, the norms under challenge simply turn out to be not applicable to the case at hand. Moreover, we should keep in mind that, when they are assessing the efficiency of human reasoning, advocates of ecological rationality still use the traditional norms of rationality as a benchmark. We conclude that, even if we accept all the fascinating findings garnered by the advocates of ecological rationality (and there is ample reason to do so), we need not be taken in by the rhetoric against classical rationality, or the false opposition between logical and ecological rationality. When the dust has settled, the norms are still standing

Experimental Economics: Contributions, Recent Developments, and New Challenges

Although economics has long been considered as a non-experimental science, the development of experimental economics and behavioral economics is amazingly rapid and affects most fields of research. This paper first attempts at defining the main contributions of experiments to economics. It also identifies four main trends in the development of experimental research in economics. The third contribution of this paper is to identify the major theoretical and methodological challenges faced by behavioral and experimental economics.behavioral economy ; Experimental economics ; field experiment ; quantitative methods