Experiment Luxembourg

The earlier orbits and ephemerides for the Soviet satellites were not sufficiently accurate to be very useful in making observations in Alaska. Extrapolations from our own observations gave better predictions. This merely pointed out the fact that rough observations of meridian transits at high latitudes will give better values of the inclination of the orbit than precision observations at low latitudes. Hence, it was decided to observe visually the meridian transits estimating the altitude by noting the position with respect to the stars or using crude alidade measurements. The times of the earlier observations were observed on a watch or clock and the clock correction obtained from WWV. Later the times were determined with the aid of stop watches, taking time intervals from WWV signals. This rather meager program of optical observations of the Soviet satellites was undertaken to give supplementary data for use of the radio observations, and particularly to assist in the prediction of position of the satellite so that the 61-foot radar of Stanford Research Institute could be set accurately enough to observe it (the beam width at the half-power points is about 3°). This report contains primarily the visual observations made at the Geophysical Institute by various members of the staff, and a series of observations by Olaf Halverson at Nome, Alaska. In addition there is a short discussion of the geometry of the trajectory, the illumination of a circumpolar satellite, and a note on the evaluation of Brouwer's moment factors.The research reported In this document has been sponsored by the Geophysics Research Directorate of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center* Air Research and Development Command, under Contract AF 19(604)-3880.List of Figures -- Introduction -- Present knowledge of the electron densities and collision frequencies in the D region of the ionosphere. -- The theory of radio wave interaction. -- The outline of the planned experiment. -- Some comments about the planned experiment. Some comments about gyrointeraction. -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- ReferencesYe

Scientific Report Number 2

I. INTRODUCTION The earlier orbits and ephemerides for the Soviet satellites were not sufficiently accurate to be very useful in making observations in Alaska. Extrapolations from our own observations gave better predictions. This merely pointed out the fact that rough observations of meridian transits at high latitudes will give better values of the inclination of the orbit than precision observations at low latitudes. Hence, it was decided to observe visually the meridian transits estimating the altitude by noting the position with respect to the stars or using crude alidade measurements. The times of the earlier observations were observed on a watch or clock and the clock correction obtained from WWV. Later the times were determined with the aid of stop watches, taking time intervals from WWV signals. This rather meager program of optical observations of the Soviet satellites was undertaken to give supplementary data for use of the radio observations, and particularly to assist in the prediction of position of the satellite so that the 61-foot radar of Stanford Research Institute could be set accurately enough to observe it (the beam width at the half-power points is about 3°). This report contains primarily the visual observations made at the Geophysical Institute by various members of the staff, and a series of observations by Olaf Halverson at Nome, Alaska. In addition there is a short discussion of the geometry of the trajectory, the illumination of a circumpolar satellite, and a note on the evaluation of Brouwer's moment factors.Air Force Contract No. AF 30(635)-2887 Project No. 5535 - Task 45774 Rome Air Development Center Griffiss Air Force Base Rome, New YorkI. Introduction -- II. Visual Observations -- III. Geometry of the Trajectory -- IV. Seasonal Illumination of a Circumpolar Earth Satellite at its Extreme Latitude Orbit-Point. -- V. Tentative Evaluation of Brouwer's Moment Factors.Ye

The Mobile Striking Force and Continental Defence, 1948–1955

The need to project land force power within the confines of the northern portion of the North American continent may appear, at first glance, ridiculous in today’s world. In the early years of the Cold War, both Canada and the United States gave credibility to a land supported air threat to North America and took steps to meet such a contingency. The Canadian response was to configure the small, almost token, active Canadian Army into an airtransportable formation called the Mobile Striking Force (MSF). Some have suggested that the creation of the MSF and its operations in the 1948–1955 period was not only a waste of resources but distracted the Canadian Army from training for other, more important tasks which would become apparent in the 1950s.1 This may be an accurate assessment, but only in hindsight. The MSF did provide many positive benefits within the greater context of post-1945 Canadian defencec policy. The aim of this study is to examine the MSF’s organization, mission and planning in order to provide insight into these positive benefits

Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force “Forever” to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World

Each year approximately 2,000 new detailed development plans are accepted in Sweden. When an area is covered by a new detailed development plan, it is often necessary that land has to be acquired to adjust the property units to the new plan. The owner conditions of the property units can usually be adjusted through negotiations between the seller and the buyer. But in some situations, when no agreements can be reached, it is possible to use coercive measures to purchase the land. Compulsory purchases are only permitted when certain legal criteria’s are met. The legal ability of compulsory purchases also affects voluntary negotiations since they function as "game rules". The compensations that are given in compulsory purchases then functions as a sort of minimum level of the compensations given in voluntary negotiations. The purpose of this thesis is to study the compensation that should be given in different situations when land is being compulsory purchased. Furthermore, the purpose is also to study the motives behind the legislation regarding compulsory purchases. In order to find an answer to the purpose of this thesis, a study has been made with a representative property unit. In the study, land was taken with coercive measures in four different situations from the property unit when a new detailed development plan covered the property unit. The four different situations were chosen to illustrate the differences between the given compensations. In the four different situations two different legal systems were applied. First, the existing legal system in Sweden was applied and then an alternative system based on principles that earlier could be found in the, now no longer existing, Act regarding development cooperation units (SFS 1987:11, lag om exploateringssamverkan) was applied. The result of the study shows that the compensation given depends upon the allowed land use in the new detailed development plan and upon which legal system that is applied. In the current Swedish legal system, the allowed land use for the specific property unit in the detailed development plan had the largest impact on the compensation given. In the alternative system, the total allowed land use in the detailed development plan was of importance for the given compensation together with what the property owner had contributed to the development area.Varje år antas cirka 2000 detaljplaner i Sverige. När ett område detaljplaneläggs behöver mark vanligtvis förvärvas för att anpassa fastigheterna till de nya förhållandena. Ägarförhållandena kan vanligtvis anpassas via förhandlingar mellan köpare och säljare. Men i vissa situationer, om ingen överenskommelse kan nås, är det tillåtet att använda tvångsregler för att förvärva marken. Tvångsreglerna får bara användas när kriterier uppställda i lagen är uppfyllda. Även vid frivilliga förhandlingar fyller tvångsreglerna en funktion eftersom de då fungerar som spelregler. Lagstiftningens ersättningsbestämmelser utgör en slags miniminivå för ersättningens storlek. Syftet med denna uppsats är dels att studera vilken ersättning som betalas i olika situationer när mark tvångsförvärvas inom detaljplanelagt område och dels att studera de motiv som ligger till grund för lagstiftningens utformning. För att besvara syftet har en typfallsstudie genomförts där mark frångick en typfastighet för fyra olika markåtkomstsituationer när en ny detaljplan blev gällande över området. Situationerna valdes för att tydliggöra att ersättningen som utgår vid olika markåtkomstsituationer kan variera. I studien tillämpades både dagens ersättningssystem samt ett konstruerat ersättningssystem som baserades på den upphävda lagen om exploateringssamverkan (ESL). Framkomna resultat visar att ersättningen kan variera dels beroende av vad marken ska användas till och dels beroende av vilket ersättningssystem som tillämpas. I det nu gällande ersättningssystemet är den största påverkan på ersättningen vad marken får användas till enligt detaljplanen. I det alternativa ersättningssystemet är det detaljplanens totala utformning som styr ersättningsbeloppet tillsammans med vad respektive fastighetsägare bidragit med till planområdet

The Continuing Quest for Missile Defense: When Lofty Goals Confront Reality

For almost three quarters of a century, the United States has spent billions of dollars and countless person-hours in the pursuit of a national missile defense system that would protect the country from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) carrying nuclear warheads. The system currently in place consists of 44 long-range antiballistic missiles stationed in Alaska and California to protect the United States from a possible nuclear weapon carrying ICBM attack from North Korea. After all this effort, this system is still imperfect, being successful only 10 out of 18 tests. This book will provide an historical description of past efforts in national missile defenses to understand the technical difficulties involved. It will also explain how national security concerns, the evolving international environment, and the complexities of US politics have all affected the story. The book will also describe the current systems in place to protect allies and troops in the field from the threat of shorter range missiles. Finally, the book will describe the current US vision for the future of missile defenses and provide some suggestions for alternative paths.https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books/1142/thumbnail.jp

Fighting the Mujahideen: Lessons from the Soviet Counter-Insurgency Experience if Afghanistan

The Canadian Forces currently in Afghanistan as part of a NATO coalition are playing a major role in a counter-insurgency campaign directed against a resurgent Taliban threat. Dealing with this menace will not be easy as the Taliban, realizing they cannot defeat NATO’s superior military strength, have resorted to asymmetric actions that strike at the coalition’s will through the cumulative effects of terror and small-scale “hit and run” military operations. Although NATO must contend with these tactics, concentrating solely on the military aspects of the problem will not address the real danger. The true nature of the Taliban’s threat rests in its political strength and not in its military capability. In order to destroy the Taliban’s influence in the region a combination of political, social, economic, and military means are necessary. The complexities of dealing with these issues in a coherent manner are significant, but in the case of Afghanistan there is no precedent. Interestingly, the Soviets faced many of these same challenges while fighting a counter-insurgency campaign against the Mujahideen through much of the 1980s.1 The Soviet experience should be of interest to coalition members as it provides a contemporary example of the challenges of conducting counter-insurgency operations within that country. Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets followed a logical and multifaceted, if somewhat brutal, counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. A critical examination of the Soviet performance reveals that many of their failings can be directly attributed to a lack of resources and in this respect, there are a surprising number of similarities between the operational environment the Soviets faced and the situation that now confronts NATO. This paper will explore aspects of Soviet counterinsurgency operations during their occupation of Afghanistan, and assess strengths and weaknesses relevant to current operations in that country.