Courage and the soul in Plato

In the Introduction I briefly lay out the history of the value terms that I will be considering in my thesis and consider the philosophical relevance of the development of such values in the 5th century. The infiltration of modern ideas of morality into what was considered to be good to the Greeks has a great influence on the literature and philosophy of this period. Plato prioritises these quiet moral virtues, but also tries to hang on to some of what had come before, and thus faces difficulties with his moral theory. I will show that courage presents Plato with an acute difficulty when attempting to develop a consistent ethical theory. In Chapter 2 I look at the Protagoras where the main issues about courage that Plato will continue to discuss throughout his life are introduced. The questions of the extent to which the virtues can be taught and the unity of the virtues are introduced early on. What follows is an attempt to explain and justify the Socratic idea that the virtues are co-dependent and that they all in some way boil down to knowledge. In Chapter 3 on the Laches I will show that the discussion focuses more particularly on the virtue of courage and is mostly a more sophisticated attempt to understand courage than the one presented in the Protagoras. In the following three chapters (4-6) I examine the position taken in the Republic in detail, which I take to be more representative of the Platonic rather than Socratic position. Plato’s psychological model – which includes direct influence from the lower soul – is a more reasonable interpretation of the internal workings of the agent than the simpler model in the early dialogues of the only direct motivator being beliefs or knowledge. The chapter on the Laws considers the idea that some of the apparent differences between the Republic and the Laws are due to Plato’s growing realisation that courage will not be assimilated into a unified ethical theory of the type that he wishes to propose

Some remarks on Plato on emotions

A paper is an attempt at reassessing the role of emotions in Plato's dialogues cannot be assessed. A standard view identifying (or translating or interpreting) to logistikon with (as) reason, to thumoeides with (as) the irascible and to epithumetikon with (as) the concupiscent is challenged so far as each of the three parts possesses emotions (affectivity) of its own. The opinion that Plato is responsible for the negative view of emotion is rejected. Plato's views on emotions are understood more accurately understood from a hierarchical perspective, i.e. when three parts of the soul are analyzed as three strata of the feeling-thinking-desiring linkages.Este artigo é uma tentativa de reavaliar o papel das emoções nos diálogos de Platão. Uma visão padronizada de identificação (ou tradução ou interpretação) para logistikon com (como) razão, a thumoeides com (como) o irascível e epithumetikon com (como) o concupiscente é desafiada à medida em que cada uma das três partes possui emoções (afetividade) próprias. A opinião de que Platão é responsável pela visão negativa da emoção é rejeitada. Os pontos de vista de Platão sobre as emoções são entendidos de forma mais precisa, vista de uma perspectiva hierárquica, ou seja, quando três partes da alma são analisadas em três estratos das ligações sentimento-pensamento-que desejam

Algunas observaciones de Platón a respecto de las emociones

A paper is an attempt at reassessing the role of emotions in Plato’s dialogues cannot be assessed. A standard view identifying (or translating or interpreting) to logistikon with (as) reason, to thumoeides with (as) the irascible and to epithumetikon with (as) the concupiscent is challenged so far as each of the three parts possesses emotions (affectivity) of its own. The opinion that Plato is responsible for the negative view of emotion is rejected. Plato’s views on emotions are understood more accurately understood from a hierarchical perspective, i. e. when three parts of the soul are analyzed as three strata of the feeling–thinking–desiring linkages

The nature and value of emotion

"What is the nature of emotional states"? This thesis attempts to answer that question, by offering a "cognitive" theory of the emotions. That is; it emphasises the cognitive component of emotional states, and therefore argues that theories of emotion which regard them as falling outwith the category of the rational are mistaken. Against some current versions of cognitivism, however, I argue that the cognitive element is not a belief. The alternative account offered here argues that the cognitive element should be thought of as a "seeing-as". This account of the nature of emotional states leads to two further points. Firstly, it suggests an account of why emotional states are valuable. In elaborating such an account, I defend the claim that emotions offer a distinct kind of cognitive grasp not afforded by mere belief. I then consider an Aristotelian defence of this point in terms of the relationship between emotion and character. This sort of defence, I claim, is, however only partially successful; there remains a class of emotions whose value cannot be assessed in terms of the contribution they make to character. The second main point for which I argue is that psychological explanation generally must allow room for cognitive states other than belief. One result of a failure to do so, is, I claim, an inaccurate conception of the nature of rationality. In addition, a failure to acknowledge the role of other cognitive states leads to a tendency to ignore a range of types of conflict, both between emotional and beliefs and, more generally, between beliefs and other cognitive states. Lastly, I claim that, given the forgoing account of emotional understanding, we can see how the experience of artworks can offer understanding and contribute to the process of emotional education

Naturalism and Moral Expertise in the Zhuangzi

This essay will examine scholarly attempts at distilling a proto-ethical philosophy from the Daoist classic known as the Zhuangzi. In opposition to interpretations of the text which characterize it as amoralistic, I will identify elements of a natural normativity in the Zhuangzi. My examination features passages from the Zhuangzi – commonly known as the “knack” passages – which are often interpreted through some sort of linguistic, skeptical, or relativistic lens. Contra such readings, I believe the Zhuangzi prescribes an art of living – or shù [術] – which incorporates a few motifs familiar to certain threads of philosophical naturalism. Building on existing scholarship which treats of the praxeology of the text, I argue that the naturalist themes present in the Zhuangzi support an unusual, but robust, view of moral expertise