Brady Statute Data: Adjudicated Mental Defectives and Involuntary Mental Commitments

Currently, Alaska law enforcement agencies do not obtain data on four noncriminal categories prohibited by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 from obtaining firearms. This, the first of four reports on these categories, describes how adjudicated mental defectives and involuntary mental commitments can be identified within an Alaska context and discusses possible procedures, problems, and solutions associated with data collection. The report discussed federal statutory definitions of the terms adjudicated as a mental defective, committed to a mental institution, and legal authority; compares these terms with those current in Alaska Statues and used by social service and mental health agencies in the state; and describes, in general, data held by federal, state, local, and private agencies in Alaska. At present, there is no clear or cost-effective way to create and maintain a database for either of the two categories with any accuracy: besides technical difficulties in getting different databases to "talk" to each other, records are not kept on mentally ill individuals, and even if they were, access would be prohibited in the face of federal and state laws regarding privacy.Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice Grant No. 96-RU-RX-K026Introduction / Adjudicated Mental Defectives / Involuntary Mental Commitments / References / Appendix A: Mental Health Commitments (Civil Commitments) / Appendix B: Forms USed in the Alaska Court System During the Involuntary Mental Commitment Proces

Brady Statute Data: Establishing Noncriminal Classifications for the Alaska Department of Public Safety

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 prohibits the purchase of firearms by persons in certain noncriminal categories. These reports describe potential data sources for the identification of mental committments, addicted substance abusers, illegal aliens, and persons who have been the subject of a domestic violence restraining order and discusses possible procedures, problems, and solutions associated with data collection for the purpose of Brady background checks. Lack of infrastructure for collecting certain types of data, incompleteness of information, and state constitutional protections, including the guarantee of privacy, are the chief obstacles to completely meeting the provisions of the Brady Act in Alaska.Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice Grant No. 96-RU-RX-K026Background / Needs and Benefits / Goals and Objectives / Project Design / Findings by Classification / Conclusio

Restoration of Second Amendment Rights from a Lifetime Ban Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(4): The Sixth Circuit Provides a Path Forward

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) imposes a disability prohibiting the ownership and possession of firearms on individuals who have been previously involuntarily committed. Because of an inconsistent patchwork of state and federal laws, relief from this disability, or restoration of an individual’s fundamental right to own or possess firearms, is not available to all people. In effect, some individuals who have been previously involuntarily committed face a lifetime ban, while other similarly situated people can own or possess firearms once again. This issue has created a circuit split between the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Despite applying the same constitutional analysis to the issue and similar facts, all three circuits reached different results. The Sixth Circuit found an individual who had been previously involuntarily committed many years prior had a Second Amendment claim to challenge the firearm disability prohibiting firearm ownership. This Note asserts the Sixth Circuit’s analysis is most persuasive because it properly applies intermediate scrutiny, it is consistent with the current understanding of Second Amendment rights and related legislative history, it fairly considers the rights of those with a history of mental illness rather than continues the stigmatization of mental illness, and it effectively balances the rights of those previously involuntarily committed with the compelling government interests of general public safety

Justice Denied: The Case Against Gun Industry Immunity

This report exposes the unprecedented legal protections provided to the gun industry by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, a law enacted in 2005 at the behest of the NRA

Interpreting Begay After Sykes: Why Reckless Offenses Should Be Eligible To Qualify as Violent Felonies Under the ACCA’s Residual Clause

Passed as part of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) subjects felons in possession of firearms to a strict mandatory minimum sentence if the offenders have three prior state or federal convictions that qualify as serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A crime qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), if it is one of the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Current federal circuit court interpretations of the Supreme Court\u27s decisions in Begay v. United States and Sykes v. United States exclude both crimes with lesser mens rea—recklessness or negligence—and strict-liability crimes from qualifying under the residual clause. This Note proposes that some reckless crimes, like drive-by shooting, would qualify if compared to their closest analogs among the enumerated offenses for purposes of determining similarity in kind, a requirement under Sykes and Begay. This proposed solution would bring some reckless offenses within the scope of the residual clause, allowing for increased, though narrow, targeting of the most dangerous felons: the armed career criminals

Once Mentally Ill, Always So? Maybe Yes. Maybe No: Addressing the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) Circuit Split and Lifetime Gun Bans for the (Formerly) Mentally Ill

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), an individual who is adjudicated as mentally ill or who has received a prior involuntary commitment to a mental health institution may not possess a firearm.This federal code section was first established in the late 1960s, yet it remains unclear whether this regulation on firearms dispossession is a permanent or temporary disability.In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department (Tyler III), Clifford Tyler brought an as-applied constitutional challenge against § 922(g)(4), alleging that the statute was unconstitutional because it prevented him from possessing a firearm even though he was no longer mentally ill and posed no danger to himself or others.In Beers v. Attorney General (Beers II), Bradley Beers claimed that § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional because as applied, it continued to restrict his ability to purchase or own a gun even though he was rehabilitated from the condition that led to his involuntary commitment.In Mai v. United States (Mai III), Duy Mai also challenged § 922(g)(4) as unconstitutional as applied to his circumstances because he had successfully proven to a Washington court that he was no longer mentally ill, yet federal restrictions continued to prevent him from purchasing a firearm.For Clifford Tyler, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the government had not offered data sufficient to justify a lifetime ban where Tyler had been rehabilitated.Bradley Beers’s claim before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was unsuccessful after the court held that Beers was not protected by the Second Amendment at all; however, Beers was able to later obtain a firearm after Pennsylvania’s relief-from-disabilities program was certified by the federal government.Duy Mai’s claim was denied entirely after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the government had offered data sufficient to justify a lifetime ban, irrespective of Mai’s rehabilitation.In each as-applied challenge, the government relied on the same meta-analysis of data to support § 922(g)(4). The Tyler III court found this meta-analysis insufficient to justify a lifetime ban against rehabilitated individuals and thus held that § 922(g)(4) did not survive intermediate scrutiny.The Mai III court, on the other hand, found that the meta-analysis was sufficient to justify a lifetime ban regardless of rehabilitation and that the statute survived intermediate scrutiny.But because the Ninth Circuit’s application of the intermediate scrutiny standard was too broad and because it overlooked critical flaws in the data, future courts considering as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(4) should follow the precedent set by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tyler III, rather than that set by the Ninth Circuit in Mai III. To impose such a severe restriction on Second Amendment rights as a lifetime ban, the government must provide stronger justification using more accurate data and tailor enforcement with a temporal limitation

Under Fire: Evaluating As-Applied Challenges to Disarming the Involuntarily Committed

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) prohibits previously committed persons from purchasing or possessing firearms. On March 11, 2020, in Mai v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that § 922(g)(4) burdens the Second Amendment rights of individuals no longer living with mental illness. It then agreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals—the lone other circuit to reach the question—in holding that intermediate scrutiny applies. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the provision survives intermediate scrutiny. The Third Circuit also considered an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4), but it did not address the scrutiny issue because it held that the law does not burden constitutionally protected conduct. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is correct because it does not give undue weight to ambiguous historical evidence in determining the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections and it demonstrates appropriate deference to Congress

Mass Shootings, Mental Illness, and Tarasoff

The continuing public attention focused on acts of mass violence, including mass shootings, has understandably created significant concerns over the ability to protect individuals from death and injury attributable to these acts. At least two generalized explanations for this kind of violence have been put forward, based on the nature of the acts and apparent motivation of the perpetrators, who are often killed in the process by themselves or law enforcement officers. Many acts of mass violence are committed by individuals confirmed to be terrorists, acting with political or religious-political motivations. Others are assumed to be committed by individuals acting out of mental instability. For at least the latter, evidence of prior mental health problems or treatment affords support for the notion that mental health professionals may offer the potential for prevention in some cases or instances. While looking to the mental health professions for solutions to some cases of mass violence may seem logical and has resulted in legislative responses that recognize or create a duty for mental health professionals to warn or take other protective action to prevent injury to third persons, it is far from clear that this approach can be counted on to yield favorable results, and certainly not with respect to all, or even a majority of episodes of mass violence