12 research outputs found

    Nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and generalised Nash equilibrium problems

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    Non-linear non-zero-sum Dynkin games with Bermudan strategies

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    In this paper, we study a non-zero-sum game with two players, where each of the players plays what we call Bermudan strategies and optimizes a general non-linear assessment functional of the pay-off. By using a recursive construction, we show that the game has a Nash equilibrium point

    Optimal stopping and a non-zero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time with risk measures induced by BSDEs

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    We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) g-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum game on discrete stopping times with two agents who aim at minimizing their respective risks. The payoffs of the agents are assessed by g-expectations (with possibly different drivers for the different players). By using the results of the first part, combined with some ideas of S. Hamadène and J. Zhang, we construct a Nash equilibrium point of this game by a recursive procedure. Our results are obtained in the case of a standard Lipschitz driver g without any additional assumption on the driver besides that ensuring the monotonicity of the corresponding g-expectation

    Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations

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    Nash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping

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    This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of ItČŹ and McKean (1974), p. 108). We provide suffcient conditions under which Nash equilibria are realised by each player stopping the diffusion at one of the two boundary points of an interval. The boundaries of this interval solve a system of algebraic equations. We also provide conditions sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in this class

    Exit game with private information

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    The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about their competitor's exit value. We construct an equilibrium for a large class of payoff flows driven by a general one-dimensional diffusion. In the equilibrium, the players employ sophisticated exit strategies involving both the state variable and the posterior belief process. These strategies are specified explicitly in terms of the problem data and a solution to an auxiliary optimal stopping problem. The equilibrium we obtain is further shown to be unique within a wide subclass of symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria.Comment: 32 page

    Strategically-Timed Actions in Stochastic Differential Games

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    Financial systems are rich in interactions amenable to description by stochastic control theory. Optimal stochastic control theory is an elegant mathematical framework in which a controller, profitably alters the dynamics of a stochastic system by exercising costly control inputs. If the system includes more than one agent, the appropriate modelling framework is stochastic differential game theory — a multiplayer generalisation of stochastic control theory. There are numerous environments in which financial agents incur fixed minimal costs when adjusting their investment positions; trading environments with transaction costs and real options pricing are important examples. The presence of fixed minimal adjustment costs produces adjustment stickiness as agents now enact their investment adjustments over a sequence of discrete points. Despite the fundamental relevance of adjustment stickiness within economic theory, in stochastic differential game theory, the set of players’ modifications to the system dynamics is mainly restricted to a continuous class of controls. Under this assumption, players modify their positions through infinitesimally fine adjustments over the problem horizon. This renders such models unsuitable for modelling systems with fixed minimal adjustment costs. To this end, we present a detailed study of strategic interactions with fixed minimal adjustment costs. We perform a comprehensive study of a new stochastic differential game of impulse control and stopping on a jump-diffusion process and, conduct a detailed investigation of two-player impulse control stochastic differential games. We establish the existence of a value of the games and show that the value is a unique (viscosity) solution to a double obstacle problem which is characterised in terms of a solution to a non-linear partial differential equation (PDE). The study is contextualised within two new models of investment that tackle a dynamic duopoly investment problem and an optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem. It is then shown that each optimal investment strategy can be recovered from the equilibrium strategies of the corresponding stochastic differential game. Lastly, we introduce a dynamic principal-agent model with a self-interested agent that faces minimally bounded adjustment costs. For this setting, we show for the first time that the principal can sufficiently distort that agent’s preferences so that the agent finds it optimal to execute policies that maximise the principal’s payoff in the presence of fixed minimal costs
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