HCI in e-Government and e-Democracy

This chapter introduces the application of HCI design processes and design principles in e-government and e-democracy. We elaborate on HCI design processes and six HCI design principles in the context of e-government and e-democracy, including citizen-centered design, usability, accessibility, access to information, transaction efficiency, and security and privacy. Then, we present two cases to demonstrate the value of applying the HCI processes and design principles in developing and deploying e-government and e-democracy. Finally, we highlight the challenges faced by e-government and e-democracy as well as the future trends. In conclusion, HCI can help the success of e-government and e-democracy and their future growth

Better Ballots

Literacy tests to gain access to the polls were banned in the United States in 1965 with the passage of the Voting Rights Act.99 But in November 2008, eight years after an election debacle of historic proportions, millions of voters across the United States will face a literacy test of a different sort after they've stepped into the voting booth. Their intended choices may be recorded only if they can understand instructions written at a high reading level, often using legal and election terminology. And they will only be counted if they successfully navigate ballot designs that are needlessly complicated, where candidates for the same offi ce may be listed on multiple columns or pages, or different contests are inconsistently formatted. As we have tried to demonstrate in this report, ballot design and instructions can have a huge impact on election results. We sampled some of the more "high profi le" ballot design disasters over the last several years; this is not a comprehensive analysis of the cost of poor ballot design on elections and votes counted. But, the examples illustrate how dramatically poor ballot design can affect vote totals -- particularly when a number of design fl aws appear on the same ballot. Not surprisingly, when these mistakes affected many ballots (by appearing on a signifi cant percentage of the ballots in large counties like Los Angeles or Palm Beach, or on most of the ballots in a particular state), tens of thousands -- and sometimes hundreds of thousands -- of votes in a single federal or statewide race have been lost. This does not even include the voters who may have been so confused by a ballot design that they cast their ballot for a candidate for whom they did not intend to vote (for obvious reasons, it is far more diffi cult to determine this than to know when a voter failed to successfully cast a vote at all). Better ballot design will make it far more likely that the preferred candidates of all voters will be declared winners of their contests. Palm Beach County 2000 should have been a wake-up call to legislators, election offi cials, and watchdog groups that ensuring good ballot design is a critical election administration issue that needs to be systematically addressed. Unfortunately, for the last eight years, it has continued to be largely ignored. The predictable result has disproportionately affected low-income and elderly voters, and thrown several important elections into turmoil. The good news is that there is still time before November 2008 to ensure that ballot design fl aws do not throw the results of another closely contested race into doubt, as has happened in several federal and state races in the last decade. And unlike changes to equipment (which, there is no question, could make systems more secure, accessible and usable), improving ballot design and instructions is possible for little or no cost, and a relatively small-scale investment of time

Impact of universal design ballot interfaces on voting performance and satisfaction of people with and without vision loss

Since the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 that addressed improvements to voting systems and voter access through the use of electronic technologies, electronic voting systems have improved in U.S. elections. However, voters with disabilities have been disappointed and frustrated, because they have not been able to vote privately and independently (Runyan, 2007). Voting accessibility for individuals with disabilities has generally been accomplished through specialized designs, providing the addition of alternative inputs (e.g., headphones with tactile keypad for audio output, sip-and-puff) and outputs (e.g., audio output) to existing hardware and/or software architecture. However, while the add-on features may technically be accessible, they are often complex and difficult for poll workers to set up and require more time for targeted voters with disabilities to use compared to the direct touch that enable voters without disabilities to select any candidate in a particular contest at any time. To address the complexities and inequities with the accessible alternatives, a universal design (UD) approach was used to design two experimental ballot interfaces, namely EZ Ballot and QUICK Ballot, that seamlessly integrate accessible features (e.g., audio output) based on the goal of designing one voting system for all. EZ Ballot presents information linearly (i.e., one candidate’s name at a time) and voters can choose Yes or No inputs that does not require search (i.e., finding a particular name). QUICK Ballot presents multiple names that allow users to choose a name using direct-touch or gesture-touch interactions (e.g., the drag and lift gesture). Despite the same goal of providing one type of voting system for all voters, each ballot has a unique selection and navigation process designed to facilitate access and participation in voting. Thus, my proposed research plan was to examine the effectiveness of the two UD ballots primarily with respect to their different ballot structures in facilitating voting performance and satisfaction for people with a range of visual abilities including those with blindness or vision loss. The findings from this work show that voters with a range of visual abilities were able to use both ballots independently. However, as expected, the voter performance and preferences of each ballot interface differed by voters through the range of visual abilities. While non-sighted voters made fewer errors on the linear ballot (EZ Ballot), partially-sighted and sighted voters completed the random access ballot (QUICK Ballot) in less time. In addition, a higher percentage of non-sighted participants preferred the linear ballot, and a higher percentage of sighted participants preferred the random ballot. The main contributions of this work are in: 1) utilizing UD principles to design ballot interfaces that can be differentially usable by voters with a range of abilities; 2) demonstrating the feasibility of two UD ballot interfaces by voters with a range of visual abilities; 3) providing an impact for people with a range of visual abilities on other applications. The study suggests that the two ballots, both designed according to UD principles but with different weighting of principles, can be differentially usable by individuals with a range of visual abilities. This approach clearly distinguishes this work from previous efforts, which have focused on developing one UD solution for everyone because UD does not dictate a single solution for everyone (e.g., a one-size-fits-all approach), but rather supports flexibility in use that provide a new perspective into human-computer interaction (Stephanidis, 2001).Ph.D

Current Election Administration Litigation

This briefing paper summarizes election administration litigation that is active or has been settled from January 1, 2006 to the present, excluding campaign finance reform and redistricting litigation.Case subjects include: Voter ID; Felon Voting Rights; Voting Equipment; Database and List Maintenance (Purging); National Voter Registration Act, Section 7 Compliance; Help America Vote Act compliance; Voter Registration; and General Election Administration

Digital inclusion - the vision, the challenges and the way forward

This paper considers the vision and aspiration of digital inclusion, and then examines the current reality. It looks beyond the rhetoric to provide an analysis of the status quo, a consideration of some facilitators and challenges to progress and some suggestions for moving forward with renewed energy and commitment. The far-reaching benefits of digital inclusion and the crucial role it plays in enabling full participation in our digital society are considered. At the heart of the vision of universal digital inclusion is the deceptively simple goal to ensure that everyone is able to access and experience the wide-ranging benefits and transformational opportunities and impacts it offers. The reality is a long way from the vision: inequality of access still exists despite many national campaigns and initiatives to reduce it. The benefits and beneficiaries of a digital society are not just the individual but all stakeholders in the wider society. Research evidence has shown that the critical success factors for successful digital participation are (i) appropriate design and (ii) readily available and on-going ICT (Information and Communication Technology) support in the community. Challenges and proven solutions are presented. The proposition of community hubs in local venues to provide user-centred ICT support and learning for older and disabled people is presented. While the challenges to achieve digital inclusion are very considerable, the knowledge of how to achieve it and the technologies which enable it already exist. Harnessing of political will is necessary to make digital inclusion a reality rather than a vision. With the cooperation and commitment of all stakeholders actualisation of the vision of a digitally inclusive society, while challenging, can be achieved and will yield opportunities and rewards that eclipse the cost of implementation

Towards internet voting in the state of Qatar

Qatar is a small country in the Middle East which has used its oil wealth to invest in the country's infrastructure and education. The technology for Internet voting now exists or can be developed, but are the people of Qatar willing to take part in Internet voting for national elections?. This research identifies the willingness of government and citizens to introduce and participate in Internet voting (I-voting) in Qatar and the barriers that may be encountered when doing so. A secure I voting model for the Qatar government is then proposed that address issues of I-voting which might arise due to the introduction of such new technology. Recommendations are made for the Qatar government to assist in the introduction of I-voting. The research identifies the feasibility of I-voting and the government s readiness and willingness to introduce it. Multiple factors are examined: the voting experience, educational development, telecommunication development, the large number of Internet users, Qatar law which does not bar the use of I-voting and Qatar culture which supports I-voting introduction. It is shown that there is a willingness amongst both the people and the government to introduce I-voting, and there is appropriate accessibility, availability of IT infrastructure, availability of Internet law to protect online consumers and the existence of the e government project. However, many Qataris have concerns of security, privacy, usability, transparency and other issues that would need to be addressed before any voting system could be considered to be a quality system in the eyes of the voters. Also, the need to consider the security threat associated on client-side machines is identified where a lack of user awareness on information security is an important factor. The proposed model attempts to satisfy voting principles, introducing a secure platform for I-voting using best practices and solutions such as the smart card, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates. The model was reviewed by a number of experts on Information Technology, and the Qatari culture and law who found that the system would, generally, satisfy voting principles, but pointed out the need to consider the scalability of the model, the possible cyber-attacks and the risks associated with voters computers. which could be reduced by enhancing user awareness on security and using secure operating systems or Internet browsers. From these findings, a set of recommendations were proposed to encourage the government to introduce I-voting which consider different aspects of I-voting, including the digital divide, e-literacy, I voting infrastructure, legal aspects, transparency, security and privacy. These recommendations were also reviewed by experts who found them to be both valuable and effective. Since literature on Internet voting in Qatar is sparse, empirical and non-empirical studies were carried out in a variety of surveys, interviews and experiments. The research successfully achieved its aim and objectives and is now being considered by the Qatari Government

The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost

This report is the final product of the first comprehensive, empirical analysis of electronic voting systems in the United States. It comes after nearly two years of study with many of the nations leading academics, election officials, economists, and security, usability and accessibility experts.Up until this point, there has been surprisingly little empirical study of voting systems in the areas of security, accessibility, usability, and cost. The result is that jurisdictions make purchasing decisions and adopt laws and procedures that have little to do with their overall goals.The Brennan Center analysis finds that there is not yet any perfect voting system or set of procedures. One system might be more affordable, but less accessible to members of the disabled community; certain election procedures might make the systems easier to use, but they compromise security. Election officials and community members should be aware of the trade-offs when choosing one voting system or set of procedures over another, and they should know how to improve the system they choose.Included in this full report is an executive summary of the Brennan Centers analysis of voting system security, voting system usability, as well as voting system accessibility and cost.The Brennan Center analysis of cost is in part based upon a review of voting system contracts provided by jurisdictions around the country and a cost calculator [no longer available]. The cost calculator and contracts should assist jurisdictions in determining the initial on ongoing costs of various voting systems