The Emergence of Up and Down States in Cortical Networks

The cerebral cortex is continuously active in the absence of external stimuli. An example of this spontaneous activity is the voltage transition between an Up and a Down state, observed simultaneously at individual neurons. Since this phenomenon could be of critical importance for working memory and attention, its explanation could reveal some fundamental properties of cortical organization. To identify a possible scenario for the dynamics of Up–Down states, we analyze a reduced stochastic dynamical system that models an interconnected network of excitatory neurons with activity-dependent synaptic depression. The model reveals that when the total synaptic connection strength exceeds a certain threshold, the phase space of the dynamical system contains two attractors, interpreted as Up and Down states. In that case, synaptic noise causes transitions between the states. Moreover, an external stimulation producing a depolarization increases the time spent in the Up state, as observed experimentally. We therefore propose that the existence of Up–Down states is a fundamental and inherent property of a noisy neural ensemble with sufficiently strong synaptic connections

Neutral theory and scale-free neural dynamics

Avalanches of electrochemical activity in brain networks have been empirically reported to obey scale-invariant behavior --characterized by power-law distributions up to some upper cut-off-- both in vitro and in vivo. Elucidating whether such scaling laws stem from the underlying neural dynamics operating at the edge of a phase transition is a fascinating possibility, as systems poised at criticality have been argued to exhibit a number of important functional advantages. Here we employ a well-known model for neural dynamics with synaptic plasticity, to elucidate an alternative scenario in which neuronal avalanches can coexist, overlapping in time, but still remaining scale-free. Remarkably their scale-invariance does not stem from underlying criticality nor self-organization at the edge of a continuous phase transition. Instead, it emerges from the fact that perturbations to the system exhibit a neutral drift --guided by demographic fluctuations-- with respect to endogenous spontaneous activity. Such a neutral dynamics --similar to the one in neutral theories of population genetics-- implies marginal propagation of activity, characterized by power-law distributed causal avalanches. Importantly, our results underline the importance of considering causal information --on which neuron triggers the firing of which-- to properly estimate the statistics of avalanches of neural activity. We discuss the implications of these findings both in modeling and to elucidate experimental observations, as well as its possible consequences for actual neural dynamics and information processing in actual neural networks.Comment: Main text: 8 pages, 3 figures. Supplementary information: 5 pages, 4 figure

Interacting Turing-Hopf Instabilities Drive Symmetry-Breaking Transitions in a Mean-Field Model of the Cortex: A Mechanism for the Slow Oscillation

Electrical recordings of brain activity during the transition from wake to anesthetic coma show temporal and spectral alterations that are correlated with gross changes in the underlying brain state. Entry into anesthetic unconsciousness is signposted by the emergence of large, slow oscillations of electrical activity (≲1  Hz) similar to the slow waves observed in natural sleep. Here we present a two-dimensional mean-field model of the cortex in which slow spatiotemporal oscillations arise spontaneously through a Turing (spatial) symmetry-breaking bifurcation that is modulated by a Hopf (temporal) instability. In our model, populations of neurons are densely interlinked by chemical synapses, and by interneuronal gap junctions represented as an inhibitory diffusive coupling. To demonstrate cortical behavior over a wide range of distinct brain states, we explore model dynamics in the vicinity of a general-anesthetic-induced transition from “wake” to “coma.” In this region, the system is poised at a codimension-2 point where competing Turing and Hopf instabilities coexist. We model anesthesia as a moderate reduction in inhibitory diffusion, paired with an increase in inhibitory postsynaptic response, producing a coma state that is characterized by emergent low-frequency oscillations whose dynamics is chaotic in time and space. The effect of long-range axonal white-matter connectivity is probed with the inclusion of a single idealized point-to-point connection. We find that the additional excitation from the long-range connection can provoke seizurelike bursts of cortical activity when inhibitory diffusion is weak, but has little impact on an active cortex. Our proposed dynamic mechanism for the origin of anesthetic slow waves complements—and contrasts with—conventional explanations that require cyclic modulation of ion-channel conductances. We postulate that a similar bifurcation mechanism might underpin the slow waves of natural sleep and comment on the possible consequences of chaotic dynamics for memory processing and learning

Homeostatic plasticity and external input shape neural network dynamics

In vitro and in vivo spiking activity clearly differ. Whereas networks in vitro develop strong bursts separated by periods of very little spiking activity, in vivo cortical networks show continuous activity. This is puzzling considering that both networks presumably share similar single-neuron dynamics and plasticity rules. We propose that the defining difference between in vitro and in vivo dynamics is the strength of external input. In vitro, networks are virtually isolated, whereas in vivo every brain area receives continuous input. We analyze a model of spiking neurons in which the input strength, mediated by spike rate homeostasis, determines the characteristics of the dynamical state. In more detail, our analytical and numerical results on various network topologies show consistently that under increasing input, homeostatic plasticity generates distinct dynamic states, from bursting, to close-to-critical, reverberating and irregular states. This implies that the dynamic state of a neural network is not fixed but can readily adapt to the input strengths. Indeed, our results match experimental spike recordings in vitro and in vivo: the in vitro bursting behavior is consistent with a state generated by very low network input (< 0.1%), whereas in vivo activity suggests that on the order of 1% recorded spikes are input-driven, resulting in reverberating dynamics. Importantly, this predicts that one can abolish the ubiquitous bursts of in vitro preparations, and instead impose dynamics comparable to in vivo activity by exposing the system to weak long-term stimulation, thereby opening new paths to establish an in vivo-like assay in vitro for basic as well as neurological studies.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures, accepted at Phys. Rev.

Precis of neuroconstructivism: how the brain constructs cognition

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment