The Impact of Policy Drivers on the Logistics Supply Chain.

This report is designed to highlight the impact of policy drivers on the freight logistics supply chain. This section will define the term policy drivers and outline the different types of impacts the can have upon the logistics supply chain. In Section Two a list of policy drivers is presented, along with associated policy levers. An attempt to assess what impact each policy lever has on the logistics supply chain is made in Section Three and in Section Four a number of policies levers are selected to take forward as possible scenarios to be evaluated in the University of Leeds cost modelling work. Policy drivers are defined as broad aims, targets or statements that are considered to be desirable by the various bodies of government or non-government organisations in satisfying their overall goals such as “maximising social welfare”, “staying in power” etc... The types of policy drivers vary by organisation and may be complimentary or contradictory. They may also change over time as new doctrine is implemented or new research findings put into practise. In the Government’s, ‘Transport 2010 - The 10 Year Plan’ (DFT, 2000) the policy drivers are outlined under the heading ‘Vision’ and are presented below, · Fully integrated public transport information, booking and ticketing systems; · Safer and more secure transport accessible to all; and, · A transport system that makes less impact on the environment. Policy levers are the policy instruments used to attain policy drivers and can be used to achieve more than one Both policy drivers and policy levers can be categorised under two headings as outlined below, a) Fiscal Drivers; and, b) Physical & Regulatory Drivers The implementation of these policies leads to both direct and indirect outcomes that will make some contribution to achieving the policy drivers set out by the government. The policy levers will impact upon the freight industry in a positive, negative or neutral manner and for the purposes of the next section three definitions have been formulated which have been related to the impact of policy levers on costs and externalities. In Section Four a broader range of impacts are discussed for the policy levers that have been selected as possible scenarios. A Positive Impact - Any outcome that, 1) Lowers operating cost without increasing externalities, and/or; 2) Lowers externalities without increasing costs. A Neutral lmpact – Any outcome that, 1) Maintains defacto operating costs without changing externalities, and/or; 2) Maintains defacto externalities with out changing operating costs. A Negative Impact – Any outcome that, 5 1) Increases operating costs, and/or; 2) Increases externalities. Making a judgement as to whether any one policy is beneficial or not is difficult in the absence of any data and will differ depending upon who you are. The judgements that will be made in this paper will apply to the freight logistics industry only and the externalities they produce. It is stressed that they are not exact. The next section will outline in more detail some of the possible policy drivers that either currently apply to or could be applied to the freight logistics industry. The likely policy levers that could arise from the policy drivers are then discussed along with the possible transport outcomes and their impact

The Development of a Common Investment Appraisal for Urban Transport Projects.

In December 1990 we were invited by Birmingham City Council and Centro to submit a proposal for an introductory study of the development of a common investment appraisal for urban transport projects. Many of the issues had arisen during the Birmingham Integrated Transport Study (BITS) in which we were involved, and in the subsequent assessment of light rail schemes of which we have considerable experience. In subsequent discussion, the objectives were identified as being:- (i) to identify, briefly, the weaknesses with existing appraisal techniques; (ii) to develop proposals for common methods for the social cost-benefit appraisal of both urban road and rail schemes which overcome these weaknesses; (iii) to develop complementary and consistent proposals for common methods of financial appraisal of such projects; (iv) to develop proposals for variants of the methods in (ii) and (iii) which are appropriate to schemes of differing complexity and cost; (v) to consider briefly methods of treating externalities, and performance against other public sector goals, which are consistent with those developed under (ii) to (iv) above; (vi) to recommend work to be done in the second phase of the study (beyond March 1991) on the provision of input to such evaluation methods from strategic and mode-specific models, and on the testing of the proposed evaluation methods. Such issues are particularly topical at present, and we have been able to draw, in our study, on experience of:- (i) evaluation methods developed for BITS and subsequent integrated transport studies (MVA) (ii) evaluation of individual light rail and heavy rail investment projects (ITS,MVA); (iii) the recommendations of AMA in "Changing Gear" (iv) advice to IPPR on appraisal methodology (ITS); (v) submissions to the House of Commons enquiry into "Roads for the Future" (ITS); (vi) advice to the National Audit Office (ITS) (vii) involvement in the SACTRA study of urban road appraisal (MVA, ITS

Accident Analysis and Prevention: Course Notes 1987/88

This report consists of the notes from a series of lectures given by the authors for a course entitled Accident Analysis and Prevention. The course took place during the second term of a one year Masters degree course in Transport Planning and Engineering run by the Institute for Transport Studies and the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Leeds. The course consisted of 18 lectures of which 16 are reported on in this document (the remaining two, on Human Factors, are not reported on in this document as no notes were provided). Each lecture represents one chapter of this document, except in two instances where two lectures are covered in one chapter (Chapters 10 and 14). The course first took place in 1988, and at the date of publication has been run for a second time. This report contains the notes for the initial version of the course. A number of changes were made in the content and emphasis of the course during its second run, mainly due to a change of personnel, with different ideas and experiences in the field of accident analysis and prevention. It is likely that each time the course is run, there will be significant changes, but that the notes provided in this document can be considered to contain a number of the core elements of any future version of the course

Travel survey data required to inform transport safety policy and practice

The risk of accidental death per hour spent using the roads in Hong Kong is about I I times the average risk per hour in the rest of everyday life. Other kinds of travel also have risks. Changes in travel patterns affect the numbers of people killed and injured in transport accidents. This means that all policies that affect travel patterns also affect the numbers killed and injured in transport accidents, and conversely, changing travel patterns may itself be a way of reducing these numbers. Investigation of these interactions between travel patterns and amount of death and injury in transport accidents can benefit greatly from various kinds of data that are already commonly collected in travel surveys. But the range of such investigations could be extended in useful ways if some additional items of data could be collected in travel surveys. There is also scope for the methods used in travel surveys to be extended in new ways to improve understanding of the occurrence of transport accidents and people's involvement in them by supplementing with surveys akin to travel surveys the data that are recorded when accidents occur

The economic costs of road traffic congestion

The main cause of road traffic congestion is that the volume of traffic is tooclose to the maximum capacity of a road or network. Congestion in the UK isworse than many, perhaps most, other European countries. More important, itis getting worse, year by year. Current official forecasts imply that congestionwill be substantially worse by the end of this decade, even on the veryfavourable assumption that all current Government projects and policies areimplemented in full, successfully, and to time. This is because road traffic isgrowing faster than road capacity. This is not a temporary problem: it willcontinue to be the case, in the absence of measures to reduce traffic, because itis infeasible to match a road programme to unrestricted trends in traffic growth.The effect, using the current Government method of measuring congestion,and a long established method of valuing it, would be that the widely quotedfigure of an annual cost of £20 billion, would increase to £30 billion by 2010.Under current social and economic frameworks, there are no feasible policiesthat could reduce congestion to zero in practice, or that would be worthwhiledoing in theory. But savings worth £4b-£6b a year could in principle be madeby congestion charging alone, over the whole network, of which (veryapproximately) half might be reflected in the prices of goods, and half insavings in individuals? own time spent travelling. A good proportion of thiscould alternatively be secured by an appropriate package of alternativemeasures: priority lanes and signalling; switching to other modes includingfreight to rail and passenger movements to public transport, walking andcycling; ?soft? policies to encourage reduced travel by car; land-use patternswhich reduce unnecessary travel; and associated measures to prevent benefitsfrom being eroded by induced travel. The combined effects of road chargingand a supportive set of complementary measures represent the best that couldbe reasonably achieved in the short to medium run. This could reducecongestion costs (as distinct from slowing down their increase) by 40%-50%.These broad-brush figures, though based on long-established methods, must betreated with great caution. The ?cost of congestion?, as used for thesecalculations, is based on relationships which in reality are not exact, stable oreven meaningful. The wrong indicator has been used, comparing average realspeeds with average ideal speeds. But in the real world, speeds are differentevery day, and so is the level of congestion. For just-in-time operation, and formuch personal and business travel, variability and reliability are much moreimportant. The really costly effect of congestion is not the slightly increasedaverage time, but the greater than average effect in particular locations andmarkets, and the greatly increased unreliability.During the near future, until road pricing is implemented, increases in roadcongestion can lead to some shift in the balance of attractiveness of rail freight,sufficient for a proportion of the freight market to transfer from road. Thiswould in turn make a small but significant contribution to reducing congestion,especially in some specific important corridors. Even though rail freight isusually a small proportion of all freight, the annual economic saving incongestion cost, to road users generally, from transferring a 5-times a week,200 mile round trip, mostly on congested motorways, from road to rail wouldbe in the order of £40,000 to £80,000, to which should be added thecommercial cost savings made by the freight operator who chooses to do so. Itshould be emphasised that sustaining this would require measures to preventinduced car traffic filling up the relieved road space.An example of the impact of factoring in unreliability is given by approximatecalculations made for journeys such as Glasgow to Newcastle, Cardiff toDover, or London to Manchester. In free-flow theory these could be 3-hourjourneys, but moderate congestion requires adding an hour to the average timeand another hour safety margin to ensure that a tight delivery slot is not missedtoo often. In congestion so severe as to double the average time, the extrasafety margin for unreliability could be as much as 4 hours, which is simply notfeasible in many cases.The ?total cost of congestion? is a large number, but it is practicallymeaningless and by ?devaluing the currency? it distracts attention from moreimportant, achievable, objectives. It would be better not to use it as a target forpolicy. The two key important things to do are:· Strategic action to reduce traffic volume to a level where conditions do notvary too much from day to day. In some circumstances this will slightlyincrease average speed, though not always: in some road conditions areduction of average speed can greatly improve the smoothness of trafficflow. But in both cases, it will greatly increase reliability, this being moreimportant than the change in average speed;· Practical measures to provide good alternatives for freight and passengermovements which reduce the intensity of use of scarce road space incongested conditions. Even where this only applies to a minority ofmovements, significant effects are possible.The Government plans to ?re-launch? the Ten Year Plan for Transport thisSummer or Autumn. It is not reasonable to expect that the re-launch willinclude congestion charging for cars within the decade, so it will need to planfor it as soon as possible after, and a short-term coping strategy of prioritymeasures to protect the most important classes of movement (both passengerand freight) from congestion in the period before charging is implemented

Instruments of Transport Policy.

The material in this Working Paper was generated as input to DETR's Guidance on the Methodology for Multi Modal Studies (GOMMMS). DETR subsequently decided only to provide summary information on transport policy measures, and to leave the consultants involved in individual multi modal studies to make their own assessment of individual policy measures in the context of specific study areas. It has been decided to make this fuller document available as a reference source. The purpose of the review of policy measures was to provide summary information on the range of policy measures available, experience of their use and, based on past studies, their potential contribution to the range of policy objectives specified for GOMMMS. The review was based on an earlier one included in the Institution of Highways and Transportation's Guidelines on Developing Urban Transport Strategies (1996). This material was updated using references published since 1996 and expanded to cover policy measures relevant in inter-urban areas. It had been intended to circulate it for comment before publishing a revised version. However, DETR decided to use an abridged version before this consultation was complete. It should be borne in mind that this document has not, therefore, undergone the peer assessment which had been intended. To avoid unnecessary further work, the material is presented as it had been drafted for the GOMMMS Guidance document. The only modifications have been to change the chapter and paragraph numbers, and to remove the cross references to other parts of the Guidance document

Investing for Reliability and Security in Transportation Networks

Alternative transportation investment policies can lead to very different network forms in the future. The desirability of a transportation network should be assessed not only by its economic efficiency but also by its reliability and security, because the cost of an incidental capacity loss in a road network can be massive. This research concerns how investment rules shape the hierarchical structure of roads and affect network fragility to natural disasters, congestion, and accidents and vulnerability to targeted attacks. A microscopic network growth model predicts the equilibrium road networks under two alternative policy scenarios: investment based on beneÞtÐcost analysis and investment based on bottleneck removal. A set of Monte Carlo simulation runs, in which a certain percentage of links was removed according to the type of network degradation analyzed, was carried out to evaluate the equilibrium road networks. It was found that a hierarchy existed in road networks for reasons such as economic efficiency but that an overly hierarchical structure had serious reliability problems. Throughout the equilibrating or evolution process, the grid network studied under beneÞtÐcost analysis had better efficiency performance, as well as error and attack tolerance. The paper demonstrates that reliability and security considerations can be integrated into the planning of transportation systems.