Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on the Second-Best Decision

In the research addressing the prisoner's dilemma game, the effectiveness and accountableness of the method allowing for the emergence of cooperation is generally discussed. The most well-known solutions for this question are memory based iteration, the tag used to distinguish between defector and cooperator, the spatial structure of the game and the either direct or indirect reciprocity. We have also challenged to approach the topic from a different point of view namely that temperate acquisitiveness in decision making could be possible to achieve cooperation. It was already shown in our previous research that the exclusion of the best decision had a remarkable effect on the emergence of an almost cooperative state. In this paper, we advance the decision of our former research to become more explainable by introducing the second-best decision. If that decision is adopted, players also reach an extremely high level cooperative state in the prisoner's dilemma game and also in that of extended strategy expression. The cooperation of this extended game is facilitated only if the product of two parameters is under the criticality. In addition, the applicability of our model to the problem in the real world is discussed.Cooperation, Altruism, Agent-Based Simulation, Evolutionary Game Theory

ACE Models of Endogenous Interactions

Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).Endogenous interaction, Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE)

Iterated Prisoner\u27s Dilemma for Species

The Iterated Prisoner\u27s Dilemma (IPD) is widely used to study the evolution of cooperation between self-interested agents. Existing work asks how genes that code for cooperation arise and spread through a single-species population of IPD playing agents. In this paper, we focus on competition between different species of agents. Making this distinction allows us to separate and examine macroevolutionary phenomena. We illustrate with some species-level simulation experiments with agents that use well-known strategies, and with species of agents that use team strategies

Cooperation in Networked Populations of Selfish Adaptive Agents: Sensitivity to Learning Speed

This paper investigates the evolution of cooperation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) games with individually learning agents, subject to the structure of the interaction network. In particular, we study how Tit-for-Tat or All-Defection comes to dominate the population on Watts-Strogatz networks, under varying learning speeds and average network path lengths. We find that the presence of a cooperative regime (where almost the entire population plays Tit-for-Tat) is dependent on the quickness of information spreading across the network. More precisely, cooperation hinges on the relation between individual adaptation speed and average path length in the interaction topology. Our results are in good agreement with previous works both on discrete choice dynamics on networks and in the evolution of cooperation literature

Agent Based Modeling of Electronic Markets To Analyze the Sustainability of Mutual Cooperation

According to game theory, dominant strategy of Prisoner’s Dilemma game is defecting. Since online trading between two strangers falls in the realm of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, failure should be the only logical conclusion of such electronic commerce situation. Traders are less likely to cooperate since they are not required to deal with the same buyer again given the enormous population of online traders. Thus one could argue that markets like eBay should never exist. Then what is the reason behind resounding success of such electronic markets? The answer lies in the reputation system that they established. Google page rankings and reader reviews on various sites like Amazon.com and Epinions.com are some other examples of the reputation system pointing towards the enormous influence that they wield in our everyday life. This research thus attempts to analyze importance of reputation system in an online trading using Agent Based Simulation. The effect of reputation system on the sustainability of mutual cooperation between online traders is analyzed by taking into account key factors like level of gullibility of online traders and the weight of influence given to their past behavior. Results indicate that reputation system is certainly capable of sustaining cooperation among online traders. However, weightage given to the past behavior of agents should be decided only after taking into account the level of gullibility of agents. Use of agent based modeling for studying dynamics of online trading is a relatively new concept. Sustaining cooperation among online traders is often perceived to be difficult task. The reputation system proposed in this research is expected to make contribution towards this goal

Intragenerational Cultural Evolution and Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism denotes a positive orientation towards those sharing the same ethnicity and a negative one towards others. Previous models demonstrated how ethnocentrism might evolve inter-generationally (vertically) when ethnicity and behavior is inherited. We model short-term intra-generational (horizontal) cultural adaptation where agents have a fixed ethnicity but have the ability to form and join fluid cultural groups and to change how they define their in-group based on both ethnic and cultural markers. We find that fluid cultural markers become the dominant way that agents identify their ingroup supporting positive interaction between ethnicities. However, in some circumstances, discrimination evolves in terms of a combination of cultural and ethnic markers producing bouts of ethnocentrism. This suggests the hypothesis that in human societies, even in the absence of direct selection on ethnic marker based discrimination, selection on the use of fluid cultural markers can lead to marked changes in ethnocentrism within a generation

Intraorganizational evolution

Intraorganizational evolution (iOE) is a relatively new, emergent area of research. Although evolutionary metaphors have often surfaced in organization theory, attempts to analyze the evolutionary dynamics unfolding within organizations have been quite sparse and systematic only in recent years. The basic concepts and tools of iOE are thus still in the process of being shaped. As a subject of analysis, iOE is the set of processes through which intraorganizational entities of different types (e.g. routines, jobs, formal rules) reproduce and modify themselves, and change their relative frequency in populations of individuals carrying them. As a theoretical perspective, it is the attempt to apply the lens of evolutionary thinking to the observation and understanding of these processes

The Emergence of Symbiotic Groups Resulting From Skill Differentiation and Tags

This paper presents a evolutionary simulation where the presence of 'tags' and an inbuilt specialisation in terms of skills result in the development of 'symbiotic' sharing within groups of individuals with similar tags. It is shown that the greater the number of possible sharing occasions there are the higher the population that is able to be sustained using the same level of resources. The 'life-cycle' of a particular cluster of tag-groups is illustrated showing: the establishment of sharing; a focusing-in of the cluster; the exploitation of the group by a particular skill-group and the waning of the group. This simulation differs from other tag-based models in that is does not rely on either the forced donation of resources to individuals with the same tag and where the tolerance mechanism plays a significant part. These 'symbiotic' groups could provide the structure necessary for the true emergence of artificial societies, supporting a division of labour similar to that found in human societies

Maternal investment tactics in cooperative breeding systems

Whenever multiple individuals contribute to the care of offspring, the optimum level of investment for each carer depends on the behaviour of the others. Previous theoretical and empirical work has largely focused on carer contributions within a single stage of a breeding attempt, neglecting the potential for investment during earlier stages to influence later care decisions. Typically, mothers have much greater control than other carers over the number and quality of offspring, and hence by altering her investment during offspring production a mother can adaptively adjust offspring phenotype to match or exploit the predicted care paradigm. In this dissertation, I use theoretical, empirical and comparative methods to investigate the influence of maternal tactics on investment rules in cooperative breeding systems, where ‘helpers’ care in addition to parents. In three chapters I model maternal control of offspring quality and offspring number across a cooperative breeding attempt, and investigate how the costliness of different reproductive stages, the kin-structure of the care group, and the consequences of offspring early-life condition influence the investment rules of carers. During offspring rearing, fair division of labour within a cooperative group can theoretically be resolved using simple turn-taking rules, leading to efficient outcomes for all carers. To test whether such a rule is employed in nature, a later chapter analyses empirical provisioning data from the chestnut-crowned babbler (Pomatostomus ruficeps), a cooperatively breeding bird endemic to the Australian outback. I use a Markov chain Monte Carlo approach to determine whether individuals alter their provisioning rate when other carers visit the nest, and identify both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ turn-taking behaviour. Finally, I present a comparative analysis of studies on provisioning rules in cooperatively breeding birds, and investigate whether the level of investment mothers must contribute to offspring influences the later care paradigm observed. My results indicate that maternal costs contribute to variation in both breeding group size and female provisioning behaviour. I conclude that maternal investment tactics are an underappreciated influence on carer investment rules in both the theoretical and empirical literature, and that incorporating them is crucial to understanding variation in cooperative care behaviour in nature.This PhD was funded by a studentship from the Natural Environment Research Council, and supplementary support from Peterhouse, Cambridge