Scientific Rationality as Normative System

ABSTRACT: Decision-theoretic approach and a nonlinguistic theory of norms are applied in the paper in an attempt to explain the nature of scientific rationality. It is considered as a normative system accepted by scientific community. When we say that a certain action is rational, we express a speaker’s acceptance of some norms concerning a definite action. Scientists can choose according to epistemic utility or other rules and values, which themselves have a variable nature. Rationality can be identified with a decision to accept a norm. This type of decision cannot be reduced only to its linguistic formulation; it is an act of evolvement of the normative regulation of human behavior. Norms are treated as decisions of a normative authority: a specific scientific community is the normative authority in science. These norms form a system and they are absolutely objective in the context of individual scientists. There exists an invariant core in all the norms of rationality, accounting for their not being liable to change, as compared with the flexibility of legal norms. The acceptance of and abidance by these norms is of social importance – it affects the aims of the community. A norm only defines the common framework and principles of scientific problem-solving; its application is a matter of professional skills and creative approach to a particular problem. It is of no importance at all, if an agent’s cognitive abilities do not live up to the requirements of a norm. Such discrepancy can be compensated for by the fact that a scientist carries out work in a conceptual and normative framework established by a respective scientific community

The better toolbox: experimental methodology in economics and psychology

In experimental economics one can confront a “don’t!”, as in “do not deceive your participants!”, as well as a “do!”, as in “incentivize choice making!”. Neither exists in experimental psychology. Further controversies exist in data collection methods, e.g., play strategy (vector) method in game experiments, and how to guarantee external and internal validity by describing experimental scenarios by feld-related vignettes or by abstract, often formal, rules as it is used in decision and game theory. We emphasize that diferences between the experimental methodology of the two disciplines are minor rather than substantial and suggest that such diferences should be resolved, as much as possible, through empirical research. Rather than focusing on familiar debates, we suggest to substitute the revealed-motive approach in experimental economics by designs whose data not only inform about choice, but also about the reasoning dynamics

An internal version of epistemic logic

International audienceRepresenting an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is one of the agents involved in the situation. For this approach we propose and axiomatize a logical formalism based on epistemic logic. This leads us to formalize some intuitions about the internal approach and about its connections with the external ones. Finally, we show that our internal logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete

Deliberation Welcomes Prediction

According to the so-called ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis, while deliberating about what you'll do, you cannot rationally have credences for what you'll do – you cannot rationally have option-credences. Versions of the thesis have been defended by authors such as Spohn, Levi, Gilboa, Price, Louise, and others. After registering a number of concerns about the thesis, I rehearse and rebut many of the main arguments for it, grouped according to their main themes: agency, vacuity, betting, and decision-theoretical considerations. I go on to suggest many possible theoretical roles for option-credences. I locate the debate about the thesis in a broader discussion: Are there rational credence gaps – propositions to which one cannot rationally assign credences? If there are, they spell trouble for various foundations of Bayesian epistemology, including the usual ratio formula for conditional probability, conditionalization, decision theory, and independence. According to the thesis, credence gaps are completely mundane; they arise every time someone rationally deliberates. But these foundations are safe from any threat here, I contend, since the thesis is false. Deliberation welcomes prediction

The Political Economy of Constitution

The distinction between constitution, as the set of fundamental normative premises ensuring the cohesion of any given polity, and contract, as the formal covenant agreed upon by the relevant stakeholders in that polity, is central to political economy. This paper outlines a conceptual framework for the political economy of constitution based on the above distinction. Our argument is that constitution in the material sense, that is, as a relatively stable configuration of interests prior to formal arrangements, determines the way in which formal rules and procedures operate within a specific historical context. The paper develops the constitutionalist tradition towards a ‘constitutional heuristic’ that helps to detect feasible organisations of political-economic interests in society. Stratified social systems are rooted in multi-layered connectivity and provide a structure for organising partially overlapping interests beyond purely contractual covenants. This conception of constitution has far-reaching implications for economic policy because it charts a course beyond the dichotomy between consensus and conflict. The political economy of constitution focuses on the multiple interdependencies within the social domain, which give rise to substantive arrangements among stakeholders. This approach enables the identification of policy domains, thresholds and measures congruent with the material constitution of any given society

Agency and Evidence

How does evidence figure into the reasoning of an agent? This is an intricate philosophical problem but also one we all encounter in our daily lives. In this chapter, we identify the problem and outline a possible solution to it. The problem arises, because the fact that it is up to us whether we do something makes a difference to how we should think of the evidence concerning whether we will actually do it. Otherwise we regard something that is up to us as if it were not: We regard something that is up to us as if it were the outcome of a lottery. Nonetheless, we would be wrong to ignore the evidence. Otherwise we could not make a rational decision. In this chapter, we first show that a decision-theoretic approach to this problem cannot succeed. This approach does not explain how we can take evidence into account in practical reasoning without making predictions concerning matters that are up to us. It also gives rise to incoherence between our practical and our theoretical conclusions. We then argue that what is required to solve the problem is recognizing that beliefs about matters that are up to us can be grounded in practical reasoning. We argue that such beliefs are not subject to an evidential norm, because they are not meant to reflect a reality that is independent of them but instead are meant to bring about the reality they represent. Finally, we argue that, even if we are fully rational agents, we will sometimes lack practical knowledge of what we will do. That is because when it is practically rational to do something that will require resolve, we may be in a position to rationally conclude that we will do it, even though we have evidence that there is a non-negligible chance that we won’t. In such cases, our evidence serves as a defeater for our practical knowledge

Why Take Both Boxes?

The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization

Deliberation and Prediction

Can an agent hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? Following Spohn and Levi, some writers claim that such ‘act credences’ are incoherent – Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), as Levi put it. Others claim that the case for DCOP is weak, or even that it is clearly false. We argue these disagreements are to a large extent terminological, or model-relative. After explaining why DCOP does hold in the kind of operationalist model of credence we owe to Ramsey, we note that it is a trivial matter to extend this model so that DCOP no longer holds, in the extended model. We then discuss in detail the model proposed by James Joyce, who presents it explicitly in opposition to Levi and to DCOP. We show that Joyce’s disagreement with writers such as Ramsey and Levi rests largely on different choices concerning the use of terms such as ‘evidence’, prediction’ and ‘belief’. Once these differences are in view, they reveal a great deal of underlying agreement. In particular, a principle that Joyce calls the Evidential Autonomy Thesis (EAT) is effectively DCOP, in new terminological clothing. We close by proposing that the origin of what is correct in both principles lies in the so-called ‘transparency’ of the first-person present-tensed view of certain of one’s own mental states