Probabilistic alternatives for competitive analysis

In the last 20 years competitive analysis has become the main tool for analyzing the quality of online algorithms. Despite of this, competitive analysis has also been criticized: it sometimes cannot discriminate between algorithms that exhibit significantly different empirical behavior or it even favors an algorithm that is worse from an empirical point of view. Therefore, there have been several approaches to circumvent these drawbacks. In this survey, we discuss probabilistic alternatives for competitive analysis.operations research and management science;

Online graph coloring against a randomized adversary

Electronic version of an article published as Online graph coloring against a randomized adversary. "International journal of foundations of computer science", 1 Juny 2018, vol. 29, núm. 4, p. 551-569. DOI:10.1142/S0129054118410058 © 2018 copyright World Scientific Publishing Company. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129054118410058We consider an online model where an adversary constructs a set of 2s instances S instead of one single instance. The algorithm knows S and the adversary will choose one instance from S at random to present to the algorithm. We further focus on adversaries that construct sets of k-chromatic instances. In this setting, we provide upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio for the online graph coloring problem as a function of the parameters in this model. Both bounds are linear in s and matching upper and lower bound are given for a specific set of algorithms that we call “minimalistic online algorithms”.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

DR.SGX: Hardening SGX Enclaves against Cache Attacks with Data Location Randomization

Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to various software-based side-channel attacks. In particular, attacks that monitor CPU caches shared between the victim enclave and untrusted software enable accurate leakage of secret enclave data. Known defenses assume developer assistance, require hardware changes, impose high overhead, or prevent only some of the known attacks. In this paper we propose data location randomization as a novel defensive approach to address the threat of side-channel attacks. Our main goal is to break the link between the cache observations by the privileged adversary and the actual data accesses by the victim. We design and implement a compiler-based tool called DR.SGX that instruments enclave code such that data locations are permuted at the granularity of cache lines. We realize the permutation with the CPU's cryptographic hardware-acceleration units providing secure randomization. To prevent correlation of repeated memory accesses we continuously re-randomize all enclave data during execution. Our solution effectively protects many (but not all) enclaves from cache attacks and provides a complementary enclave hardening technique that is especially useful against unpredictable information leakage

HardIDX: Practical and Secure Index with SGX

Software-based approaches for search over encrypted data are still either challenged by lack of proper, low-leakage encryption or slow performance. Existing hardware-based approaches do not scale well due to hardware limitations and software designs that are not specifically tailored to the hardware architecture, and are rarely well analyzed for their security (e.g., the impact of side channels). Additionally, existing hardware-based solutions often have a large code footprint in the trusted environment susceptible to software compromises. In this paper we present HardIDX: a hardware-based approach, leveraging Intel's SGX, for search over encrypted data. It implements only the security critical core, i.e., the search functionality, in the trusted environment and resorts to untrusted software for the remainder. HardIDX is deployable as a highly performant encrypted database index: it is logarithmic in the size of the index and searches are performed within a few milliseconds rather than seconds. We formally model and prove the security of our scheme showing that its leakage is equivalent to the best known searchable encryption schemes. Our implementation has a very small code and memory footprint yet still scales to virtually unlimited search index sizes, i.e., size is limited only by the general - non-secure - hardware resources