Evolution of cognitive function via redeployment of brain areas

The creative re-use of existing cognitive capacities may have played a significant role in the evolutionary development of the brain. There are obvious evolutionary advantages to such redeployment, and the data presented here confirm three important empirical predictions of this account of the development of cognition: (1) a typical brain area will be utilized by many cognitive functions in diverse task categories, (2) evolutionarily older brain areas will be deployed in more cognitive functions and (3) more recent cognitive functions will utilize more, and more widely scattered brain areas. These findings have implications not just for our understanding of the evolutionary origins of cognitive function, but also for the practice of both clinical and experimental neuroscience

Using experimental research designs to explore the scope of cumulative culture in humans and other animals

In humans, cultural evolutionary processes are capable of shaping our cognition, because the conceptual tools we learn from others enable mental feats which otherwise would be beyond our capabilities. This is possible because human culture supports the inter-generational accumulation of skills and knowledge, such that later generations can benefit from the experience and exploration efforts of their predecessors. However, it remains unclear how exactly human social transmission supports the accumulation of advantageous traits, and why we see little evidence of this in the natural behaviour of other species. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the cognitive abilities of other animals might be similarly scaffolded by processes of cultural evolution. In this article I discuss how experimental studies of cultural evolution have contributed to our understanding of human cumulative culture, as well as some of the limitations of these approaches. I also discuss how similar research designs can be used to evaluate the potential for cumulative culture in other species. Such research may be able to clarify what distinguishes human cumulative culture from related phenomena in nonhumans, shedding light on the issue of whether other species also have the potential to develop cognitive capacities that are outcomes of cultural evolution

Language: what it's for and why we have it

In this thesis, I agree with the notion that human natural languages are underpinned by an innate faculty of language which predisposes us to acquire the structural aspects of language. Theories pertaining to its primary function, however, are lacking as they are either out of touch with the bigger picture of human social life (Berwick and Chomsky 2017) or, if they do embrace this, they are met with challenges from evolutionary and communication theory (Pinker and Bloom 1990; Jackendoff 2002). In order to give a more satisfactory evolutionary account of the faculty of language, I propose that we take inspiration from the alternative view that natural languages are social entities which are wholly learnt and exist to improve human cooperation and social living (Tomasello 2014; Sterelny 2012). An important aspect of this view is seeing that humans have an advanced form of social cognition—that is the ability to understand that other creatures also have minds—which underpins their cooperative and communicative capabilities. I suggest, instead, that we ask what the faculty of language brings to this viewpoint. My response is that an innate linguistic structure is able to bring to mind new thoughts, ideas, or explanations in human communicative discourse and in situations where it would not be possible with just standalone words or pointing and pantomime. In more technical terms ‘the primary function of the faculty of language is to make relevant what is not salient in communicative discourses’. The faculty of language, thus, introduces a new paradigm to human communication and social living. In conclusion, we will appreciate that an approach which integrates valuable lessons from viewpoints that are usually diametrically opposed provides a picture of language evolution that is more holistic and streamlined. My theory, therefore, appreciates and combines our understanding of linguistic structure, social cognition, human communication, and evolution in a way that is not seen in either of the theories that precede it

Light will be Thrown: The Emerging Science of Cultural Evolution

Culture evolves, not just in the trivial sense that cultures change over time, but also in the strong sense that such change is governed by Darwinian principles. Both biological and cultural evolution are essentially cumulative selection processes in which information – whether genetic or cultural – is sieved, retained and then transmitted to the next generation. In both domains such a process will result in recognizable lineages and tree-like phylogenies so characteristic of Darwinian evolution. Because a principle of inheritance (i.e., faithful replication of information) holds in both domains, we may trace back particular transmission histories and identify the forces that influenced them. The idea that culture evolves is quite old, but only in recent years there has been a serious effort to turn this idea into science. This article offers a concise analysis of how a rudimentary idea gradually evolved into a thriving research program

The Evolutionary Origin and Biological Utility of Supernatural Expertise

Recent psychological and cognitive research has explored the evolutionary origins of human religiosity. In this thesis, I explore the historical origin and social function of supernatural expertise. I define supernatural expertise as the act of acquiring and expressing supernatural knowledge. I critique several recent theories from evolutionary psychology and cognitive science by assessing the extent to which they can explain supernatural expertise. Costly signalling theory is the view that religious costs are adaptations that signal the cooperative intent of individuals. This theory cannot account for supernatural expertise as expressions of supernatural knowledge are typically linguistic, and one can verbally misrepresent one’s supernatural beliefs. Sexual selection theory explains how physiological or psychological traits can become exaggerated over time if they are preferred by mating partners. Sexual selection can explain an increase in the cognitive capacities necessary for the acquisition of supernatural knowledge. However, it cannot account for the complex nature of supernatural information. Cognitively optimal theory predicts that the religious information which persists within human populations should be easily transferred and recalled. The theory cannot account for any supernatural information which requires considerable effort to acquire. The modes theory explains religion in terms of memory systems and the social arrangements that humans have developed to mediate the exchange of religious ideas. These result in two modes of religiosity. The doctrinal mode of religiosity explains why supernatural experts exist, but not how supernatural expertise originated. I conclude by arguing for an innovative theory for supernatural expertise. I employ cognitively optimal theory to explain why some supernatural concepts are difficult to recall. I explain the signalling function of supernatural expertise in terms of the costly effort invested in the acquisition of supernatural information. I propose that sexual selection for the cognitive capacities to acquire supernatural knowledge has enhanced the ability to acquire such information; this necessitates an increase in the complexity of supernatural information which ensures cooperative commitment remains a predominant motivation for the acquisition of supernatural knowledge, in spite of enhanced cognitive ability. I discuss several social conditions that result from the doctrinal mode of religiosity and how they solve cooperation problems in dense populations

What is cumulative cultural evolution?

This is the final version. Available from The Royal Society via the DOI in this record.In recent years, the phenomenon of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has become the focus of major research interest in biology, psychology and anthropology. Some researchers argue that CCE is unique to humans and underlies our extraordinary evolutionary success as a species. Others claim to have found CCE in non-human species. Yet others remain sceptical that CCE is even important for explaining human behavioural diversity and complexity. These debates are hampered by multiple and often ambiguous definitions of CCE. Here, we review how researchers define, use and test CCE. We identify a core set of criteria for CCE which are both necessary and sufficient, and may be found in non-human species. We also identify a set of extended criteria that are observed in human CCE but not, to date, in other species. Different socio-cognitive mechanisms may underlie these different criteria. We reinterpret previous theoretical models and observational and experimental studies of both human and non-human species in light of these more fine-grained criteria. Finally, we discuss key issues surrounding information, fitness and cognition. We recommend that researchers are more explicit about what components of CCE they are testing and claiming to demonstrate.Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC

A naturalistic explanation of communication across cultures

In order to understand how communication works across cultures, it is no longer possible to “naturalize” meaning presupposing that the human mind behaves like a “black box”, where intelligence is completely determinate by external linguistic-conceptual schemes every language, or more broadly, every culture owns. The very idea of the existence of radically divergent conceptual schemes entails the absence of a relation of equivalence among sentences in different languages. If there is a difference between conceptual schemes, it could concern the cultural access we have to the world, but, at any rate, we need to share this world and some cognitive capacities. The human mind owns its own structures that cannot be ignored in order to explain the fact that language depends on the creativity of a rich and articulated mind. Consequently, communication can be considered an inferential practice that involves the specific human capacity of mind-reading, a natural ability of intuitively attributing mental states to others and to oneself. In intercultural communication, translation is nothing but a kind of metarepresentation based on an interpretive and context-dependent use of language

Cumulative culture and explicit metacognition: a review of theories, evidence and key predictions

A variety of different proposals have attempted to explain the apparent uniqueness of human cumulative culture as a consequence of underlying mechanisms that are also assumed to be uniquely well-developed in humans. Recently, Heyes and colleagues have proposed explicit (or Type 2) metacognition as a key feature of human cognition that might enable cumulative culture. In the current review we examine these arguments, and consider their plausibility. Firstly we consider whether distinctions between cognitive processes described as explicit/implicit, and Type 1/2 (or Systems 1/2), do indeed capture features that distinguish processes specific to human cognition, versus those that are shared with other species. In particular we consider whether this applies to distinctions relating to metacognitive processes. We also consider the ways in which explicit metacognitive processing might plausibly facilitate cumulative culture. We categorise the potential benefits as either optimising receiver behaviour, or optimising sender behaviour. Within both of these categories benefits could arise as a consequence of more effective representation of either one’s own knowledge state, or that of others. We evaluate the current state of evidence supporting each of these potential benefits. We conclude by proposing methodological approaches that could be used to directly test the theory, and also identify which (if any) of the possible causal mechanisms may be implicated

The Roots of the Ratchet: An Evaluation of the Capacity for Cumulative Culture in Non-human Primates

Cumulative culture has been argued to be unique to humans, however, recent evidence from nonhuman animals suggests that relatively simple cases may be possible in other species. In this thesis, I explored whether non-human primates could strategically use information in a manner that may theoretically support cumulative cultural evolution. As the emergence of cumulative culture may depend on task demands, we hypothesised that favourable learning conditions may facilitate this effect. We presented monkeys with simple stimulus selection tasks, shown to produce evidence of cumulative cultural learning in human children. Success on these tasks depended on repeating rewarded and avoiding unrewarded stimuli, whose value had been revealed in a demonstration. Subjects were initially given task training to ensure that they had grasped the task contingencies and were required to meet a performance criterion before progressing. Subsequent test data was then used to simulate outcomes under linear transmission, using individual level task responses. This was done by aggregating the performance of individuals following multiple exposures to demonstrations of varying value. We tested whether, on average, exposure to higher quality information was associated with greater task success, a hallmark of cumulative culture, and whether subjects could improve upon the demonstrations they were presented with, representing increases in functionality. We also used the data to classify each subject’s potential for cumulative culture according to a continuum. Several individuals displayed the capacity for cumulative culture using this method, demonstrating that it is not precluded in non-human animals. However, this may depend on significant experience of relevant cues indicating the presence or absence of rewards (as provided for our subjects in the task training). Furthermore, increases in performance were limited, apparently due to relatively low precision use of the demonstrated information. Overall, this thesis suggests that, in non-human primates, cumulative culture might be limited to minor improvements accumulated over just a few episodes of transmission, and that it is likely to be rare due to its probable dependence on favourable learning conditions. This may help to explain the apparent rarity of this phenomenon in the natural behaviour of non-human species

Good Faith Discrimination

The Supreme Court\u27s current doctrinal rules governing racial discrimination and affirmative action are unsatisfying. They often seem artificial, internally inconsistent, and even conceptually incoherent. Despite a long and continuing history of racial discrimination in the United States, many of the problems with the Supreme Court\u27s racial jurisprudence stem from the Court\u27s willingness to view the current distribution of societal resources as establishing a colorblind, race-neutral baseline that can be used to make equality determinations. As a result, the current rules are as likely to facilitate racial discrimination as to prevent it, or to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination