The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty

This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of the design allows me to study the extent to which voting methods defeat the Condorcet loser and elect the Condorcet winner in a repeated-game, divided majority setting. I assess and compare the performance of three voting mechanisms, Approval Voting, Borda Count, and Plurality Voting under two information structures. Voters either know the preference structure in the electorate or hold no information regarding other voters’ preferences. With enough experience, the number of elections won by the Condorcet loser is fairly low across voting methods and information structures. Approval Voting and Borda Count dissolve information imperfect

Using simulation gaming to validate a mathematical modeling platform for resource allocation in disasters

The extraordinary conditions of a disaster require the mobilisation of all available resources, inducing the rush of humanitarian partners into the affected area This phenomenon called the proliferation of actors, causes serious problems during the disaster response phase including the oversupply, duplicated efforts, lack of planning In an attempt to reduce the partner proliferation problem a framework called PREDIS (PREdictive model for DISaster response partner selection) is put forward to configure the humanitarian network within early hours after disaster strike when the information is scarce To verify this model a simulation game is designed using two sets of real decision makers (experts and non-experts) in the disaster Haiyan scenario The result shows that using the PREDIS framework 100% of the experts could make the same decisions less than six hours comparing to 72 hours Also between 71% and 86% of the times experts and non-experts decide similarly using the PREDIS framewor

Analysis of Voting procedures in One-Seat Elections: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Efficiency

In this paper 16 different voting procedures for one-seat elections are analysed: the rules of Borda, Condorcet, Black, Copeland, Simpson, Hare, Coombs, Baldwin, Nanson and the plurality, anti-plurality, majority, approval and runoff rules. The 2 criteria we use as a measure for the validity of the voting procedures are Condorcet efficiency (the number of times a voting procedure selects the Condorcet winner) and Borda efficiency (the number of times a voting procedure selects the Borda winner). Computer simulations calculate efficiencies for the 16 voting procedures. We find that the Borda rule is about 85% Condorcet efficient while some voting procedures are always 100 % Condorcet efficient (Black, Copeland, Simpson, Baldwin, Nanson). Another rule is only 100 % Condorcet efficient with single peaked profiles (Coombs). This can be proven theoretically. Another feature from single peaked profiles seems to be that some voting procedures select the same winner (Simpson, Baldwin, and Nanson). This result may be interesting for future research. Considering Borda efficiencies we see that the Black rule scores well, followed by the rules of Copeland, Nanson and Baldwin. Taking both Condorcet and Borda efficiencies into account, we can state that the Black rule is superior. Then come the rules of Copeland, Simpson, Nanson and Baldwin.

On the Possibility of Democracy and Rational Collective Choice

The paper challenges the 'orthodox doctrine' of collective choice theory according to which Arrow’s 'general possibility theorem' precludes rational decision procedures generally and implies that in particular all voting procedures must be flawed. I point out that all voting procedures are cardinal and that Arrow’s result, based on preference orderings cannot apply to them. All voting procedures that have been proposed, with the exception of approval voting, involve restrictions on voters expressions of their preferences. These restrictions, not any general impossibility, are the cause of various well known pathologies. In the class of unrestricted voting procedures I favor 'evaluative voting' under which a voter can vote for or against any alternative, or abstain. I give a historical/conceptual analysis of the origins of theorists’ aversion to cardinal analysis in collective choice and voting theories

Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?

Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a third and chanceless candidate in a 2-candidate race, and the possibility to win a 3-candidate election through different kinds of strategic voting. Here the focus is on the "burying" strategy in single-winner elections, where the win is obtained by ranking a main competitor artificially low. Condorcet methods are compared with the major alternatives (Borda Count, Approval Voting, Instant Runoff Voting). Various Condorcet methods are studied, and one method is proposed that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles where burying is possible.Preferential election methods; agenda manipulation; strategic voting

New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking

The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean

New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking

The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean

Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review

The procedure that is currently employed to allocate time on telescopes is horribly onerous on those unfortunate astronomers who serve on the committees that administer the process, and is in danger of complete collapse as the number of applications steadily increases. Here, an alternative is presented, whereby the task is distributed around the astronomical community, with a suitable mechanism design established to steer the outcome toward awarding this precious resource to those projects where there is a consensus across the community that the science is most exciting and innovative.Comment: 9 pages, accepted for publication in Astronomy & Geophysic